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A B S T R A C T
This thesis examined the relationship o f behavioural self-blame and psychological 
adjustment to chronic illness and addressed some of the conceptual and methodological 
inconsistencies found in the existing literature on self-blame by studying different groups 
o f  chronically ill patients.
Study One comprised a questionnaire study and was designed to mainly examine 1) 
differences in the levels o f self-blame in three different patient groups (i.e. diabetes, heart 
disease and breast cancer patients), 2) the relationship between perceptions of behavioural 
risk factors contributing to the patients’ illness and level o f self-blame and 3) the 
relationship between self-blame, self-efficacy and psychological adjustment. Findings 
showed that there are significant differences ill the levels o f self-blame across the three 
groups with breast cancer patients showing the least self-blame. These differences were 
explained in terms of the different levels o f perceived lifestyle factors contributing to the 
cause o f illness and its subsequent management in the three groups. Also, self-blame was 
higher when patients were asked to consider a specific negative event relevant to their 
illness than when they considered their illness in general. For all three groups, self-blame 
was correlated to the number o f behavioural risk factors patients reported as having 
contributed to their illness. No relationship was found between self-blame and self-efficacy 
or psychological adjustment.
Study Two looked at the predictors o f  behavioural self-blame in heart disease patients by 
testing a theoretical model derived from evidence in the literature. The model included 
certain person (i.e. gender, age, characterological self-blame, and prior risk) and illness- 
related characteristics (i.e. type o f  diagnosis, time since diagnosis, perceived illness 
consequences, controllability of health behaviours) that had either direct paths to 
behavioural self-blame or indirect paths through their effect on behavioural causal 
attributions. The final model -show ing gender and characterological self-blame as having 
both direct and indirect paths to self-blame, and prior risk, diagnosis and consequences as 
having only indirect paths- fit the data well. Also, behavioural attributions predicted
improved health behaviour after the illness. No relationship between behavioural self­
blame or causal attributions and psychological adjustment was found.
Studies Three and Four addressed criticisms regarding the inconsistent conceptualisation 
and operation definitions o f  self-blame, which caution against unfounded generalisations 
such as the interchangeable use o f the tenns causality, responsibility and blame or the 
generalisation o f results across different populations. This was done by 1) examining the 
degree to which self-blame is contingent upon the actual experience o f illness, and 2) by 
comparing 14 negative events rated on dimensions relevant to blame and controllability. 
Specifically, in Study Three, non-patients were compared to patient counterparts from the 
previous study to look at differences in levels o f self-blame for heart disease. Non-patients 
were found to have higher levels of self-blame than non-patients and showed no 
relationship between self-blame and behavioural risk suggesting a different understanding 
and utility o f the concept. In Study Four, non-patients rated 14 negative events on the 
dimensions o f blame, responsibility, control and avoidability. Two dimensional plots 
showed that while there were many similarities in the way the examined dimensions were 
applied to the 14 events, illnesses were represented separately from other negative events.
Overall, these studies suggest a strong cognitive component in self-blaming patients as 
opposed to the motivational elements suggested in the literature. Possible explanations 
and ways to theoretically link the contradictory findings are discussed in the last chapter 
o f the thesis and include the consideration of self-regulation processes and o f changes that 
the self is subject to throughout the course o f an illness.
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C H A P T E R  O N E  
O V E R V IE W  O F  T H E  T H E S IS
When people face unexpected negative events, they usually attempt to find an explanation 
for this event by examining possible causes such as themselves, others, the environment, 
and chance. Psychological research has examined the type of attributions people make for 
a negative event, as well as their potential impact on psychological adjustment. One 
particular relationship, that between self-blame for a misfortune and psychological 
adjustment, has been extensively studied in a variety of populations, but results have been 
far from conclusive. Conclusions become even more complicated when the two types of 
self-blame, behavioural self-blame (i.e. attributing a negative event to one’s own 
behaviour) and characterological self-blame (i.e. attributing a negative event to one’s own 
character) are considered. In particular, where a relationship to adjustment has been 
found, characterological self-blame has generally yielded a negative relationship. In 
contrast, behavioural self-blame has been found to have positive, negative or no 
relationship to measures of anxiety, depression or general distress. Studies on chronically 
ill patients mirror these inconsistencies and raise questions regarding the reasons for such 
a lack of consensus.
By focusing mainly on behavioural self-blame, the central aim of the present thesis is to 
identify the possible explanations for the inconsistent results and address some of them. 
Specifically, this thesis looks at the following:
1. Sample and event diversity.
2. Person and situation-related predictors of behavioural self-blame.
1
3. Time elapsed since diagnosis.
4. Operationalisation and measurement of self-blame.
5. Effects of behavioural self-blame on adjustment and health behaviour change.
Throughout the four studies presented in this thesis, an attempt is made to unpack the 
concept of behavioural self-blame and describe the context within which it is used as well 
as its functions.
Specifically, Chapters Two and Three review the literature on causal attributions and self­
blame aiid portray the theoretical background of the thesis. Studies of causal attributions 
for illness are reviewed in Chapter Two and the evidence for their antecedents and 
consequences are considered. Chapter Three specifically identifies the inconsistencies in 
the findings regarding behavioural self-blame and the reasons behind them. Regarding its 
lack of conceptual clarity, evidence on the distinction between behavioural causal 
attributions and behavioural self-blame is presented and the implications of this evidence 
on the conceptual issues surrounding self-blame are discussed. Finally, Chapter Three 
concludes by identifying the main issues addressed by the studies in the thesis.
The study presented in Chapter Four deals with the issues of self-blame measurement and 
sample diversity. A self-blame scale is constructed and piloted, before it is administered 
in three different patient groups (i.e. heart disease, diabetes and breast cancer patients). 
Self-blame levels are compared across the three groups and the significant differences 
found are theoretically and empirically linked to differences in illness characteristics, 
mainly the number of behavioural risk factors associated with each illness. This chapter
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also explores the relationship between self-blame and time since diagnosis, psychological 
adjustment, and adherence to healthy diet and exercise plans. All relationships are 
examined both for the whole sample and for each patient group separately. Findings 
demonstrate the plausibility of the idea that self-blame may be situation specific.
The possibility of situation-specificity in self-blame (and more specifically behavioural 
self-blame) raises the need to examine a number of predictors of behavioural self-blame 
in order to assess when self-blame is likely to be more evident. Chapter Five proposes a 
theoretical model of predictors and outcomes of behavioural self-blame and tests it on a 
sample of heart disease patients. The final model includes several person and situation- 
related variables (e.g. gender, characterological self-blame, prior risk, type of diagnosis) 
many of which affect behavioural self-blame indirectly through their effect on 
behavioural attributions. Behavioural attributions are also shown to predict changes in 
certain health behaviours such as diet and smoking. No relationship was found between 
self-blame and psychological adjustment.
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight deal with the issues of operationalisation of self-blame and 
the effects of event diversity on understanding blame and responsibility for illness. After 
introducing the rationale and methodology for the two studies in Chapter Six, Chapter 
Seven presents a comparison of self-blame between patients and non-patients. Patients 
were found to display lower levels of self-blame than non-patients suggesting that having 
actually experienced the threats of illness affects the cognitive and motivational 
components of illness explanations. Chapter Eight uses a quite different approach than the 
other studies in the thesis and attempts to offer a visual depiction of people’s
3
representations of negative events when issues of blame and control are considered. Using 
Cluster and Multidimensional Scaling analyses participants’ ratings of 14 negative events 
-including a variety of illnesses- on the dimensions of blame, responsibility, control and 
avoidability are examined. The resulting clusters and two-dimensional plots allow the 
examination of a) people’s overall representations of negative events along the four 
dimensions, thus informing on how these dimensions are understood and used, b) 
similarities and differences among the representations of these dimensions, c) perceived 
similarities and differences among the 14 negative events- all of which have been used in 
the literature and have yielded inconsistent results. Results show that while participants 
represented the 14 events very similarly along the four dimensions (and indeed no 
significant differences are found when these are tested statistically for each event) they 
represent illnesses separately from other negative events, suggesting that an illness may 
carry a different meaning than other misfortunes. The implications of these findings on 
the way self-blame is operationalised and relevant evidence generalised across situations 
are considered.
Finally, Chapter Nine brings together all the evidence presented in the thesis and reviews 
it in relation to the original research questions identified in Chapter Three. The theoretical 
implications of these findings are also discussed, and past and present evidence regarding 
behavioural self-blame are placed within the theoretical framework of self-regulation and 
the dynamics that develop through the course of adaptation to illness. It is also proposed 
that self-blame be studied through the prism of such a theoretical framework that allows 
the inclusion of many aspects of the illness experience. The chapter concludes with a
4
review of the limitations of the studies presented and a brief stipulation of the findings 
into a general conclusion.
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C H A P T E R  T W O  
S E T T IN G  T H E  T H E O R E T I C A L  B A C K G R O U N D  F O R  T H E  
S T U D Y  O F  S E L F -B L A M E
SUMMARY
This chapter provides a comprehensive overview of the general theories and concepts that 
formed the background for the present thesis. The experience of chronic illness is briefly 
discussed. LeventhaFs self-regulation model is considered as a framework for 
understanding the illness experience and the focus is directed specifically on causal 
attributions, a particular aspect within the Illness Perceptions component of the model. 
The theory and empirical evidence regarding causal attributions in illness is discussed. 
Finally, the theoretical and empirical issues discussed in the chapter are brought together 
in a discussion on how they can shape one’s understanding of and inform research on self­
blame.
2.1 INTRODUCTION
In order to understand the concept of self-blame, one needs to review a number of 
theoretical frameworks that have served as the background for self-blame research. This 
thesis is about self-blame in chronic illness. Put more simply, it is about people’s 
explanation of the cause of their illness and the extent to which they see themselves as 
being responsible for causing their illness. This implies that when studying self-blame, 
one studies an illness cognition, a part of an illness representation, an attribution. It is 
therefore necessary to set the theoretical scene against which self-blame must be explored
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and understood. For this reason, the following sections consider the evidence on illness 
attributions placed within the scope of well-established models of illness cognitions.
2.2 ILLNESS AS A CHRONIC CONDITION
Both the medical and the psychosocial perspective on illness agree on certain 
categorizations of illness. One of the most frequently used is that of acute versus chronic 
illness. An acute illness makes an individual move from a healthy state to a temporarily 
wnhealthy state and then back to healthy one. A ‘sick role’ is adopted while in the 
unhealthy state and is abandoned once the person recovers. In contrast, a chronic illness 
makes the individual move into an - often permanent - state where the boundaries between 
health and illness are not so clear and the effects of the illness must be incorporated in the 
everyday functioning of an otherwise healthy life (Bradley, 1994). Thus, the long-term 
management of the illness becomes a central part of a patient’s life and may involve a re- 
assessement of fundamental cognitions and behaviour's in ways analogous to those seen in 
victimization (e.g. Collins, Taylor & Slcokan, 1990).
It is these issues of management that make chronic illness particularly interesting from a 
social-psychological perspective. How do people cope with chronic illness? How do they 
understand and explain its occurrence and what role do these explanations play in 
modifying behaviour and maintaining a certain lifestyle? The answers to these questions 
have been sought repeatedly in psychological research but certain parameters have made 
the quest a complicated one. For example, there is a fair amount of uncertainty in 
medicine as to what the exact causes are for certain diseases. This has an impact on
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people’s understanding of illness and the actions they take to avoid illness. For example, 
studies by Davison et al (1990) found that participants’ uncertainty regarding the 
relationship between lifestyle and heart disease contributed to their remarkable lack of 
concern about the effects that their diet could have on maintaining a healthy heart. 
Moreover, the public is the recipient of conflicting messages regarding thexauses of 
disease. While health campaigns target certain risk behaviours and present certain 
behavioural profiles as risk factors for chronic conditions, progress in genetics stresses the 
role that hereditaiy predispositions can play in one’s health and implies a deterministic 
view of illness. And although to a health professional the two approaches are not mutually 
exclusive, it is left up to laypeople to make sense of this information and decide on the 
appropriate course of action (Mumma & McCorkle, 1982).
Apart from the issue of causal explanation, there are other features of chronic illness that 
make it a compelling topic for study. First, the time duration implied by the term chronic 
is an important factor (Bradley, 1994). Although patients may not actually experience 
symptoms every day of their chronic illness, the knowledge of a potential recurrence is 
permanent and the way the present is interpreted is defined by both past experiences and 
future possibilities (Bury, 1991). Finally, the variability in symptoms, prognosis, and 
significance across chronic illnesses (or sometimes within the same type of illness) is 
another characteristic of chronic illness. This feature implies that there is a large number 
of variables (e.g. stage of illness, type of symptoms, treatability, severity) that may be 
salient in people’s minds that must be considered when the experience of a chronic illness 
is explored. These salient characteristics of the experience are likely to influence how the
illness representations of the patient are shaped and may also affect how the patient copes 
with the illness.
2.2.1 Illness representations and LeventhaVs model o f illness behaviour
The complicated process of understanding and adjusting to illness has been expressed in a 
model proposed by Leventhal and his colleagues (Leventhal and Nerenz, 1985). It is a 
self-regulation model that assumes that, given a problem, a person will be motivated to 
solve the problem and re-establish their state of health. Although not directly tested in the 
studies reported in this thesis, this model is used as a helpful framework for understanding 
the concepts involved. According to this model (Figure 2.1) there are three stages of self­
regulation: interpretation (stage 1), coping (stage 2), and appraisal (stage 3).
Stage 1 involves the attempt to understand the problem and assign meaning to it using 
available information. This information comes from a variety of sources such as the 
characteristics of a problem (e.g. alarming symptoms), social messages (e.g. doctor’s 
advice), emotional responses to the threat (e.g. fear), and the individual’s representation of 
the threat (e.g. its cause, consequences).
Stage 2 involves the development of coping strategies broadly categorised into approach 
and avoidance strategies. Coping can refer to the individual’s attempt to a) come to terms 
with the diagnosis itself, b) deal with the crisis of an illness, or c) adjust to the illness 
through a process of cognitive adaptation.
Finally, Stage 3 involves appraisal, the evaluation of the strategies utilised so far and the 
decision of whether to proceed in the same way or use an alternative course of action. It is 
worth noting that there are bi-directional arrows going from each stage (or stage 
component) to the other stages. This implies a dynamic relationship between the various 
stages of the self-regulation process and expresses the possibility that at any point in the 
process information arising from a given stage can feed back to a previous stage and alter 
it.
Looking at the issues involved in being chronically ill discussed earlier, one can see how 
they could be explored with Leventhal’s model in mind. For example, at stage 1, the 
uncertainty of an illness cause can lead to unclear or contradictory illness representations 
which in turn can give rise to more negative emotions and affect the type and efficiency of 
the coping strategy used.
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Leventhal’s model has been a very useful framework in describing illness cognitions. It 
has also proven to be a practical model because it is general enough to allow researchers 
considerable flexibility to ‘zoom in' to its components and study them in more depth. For 
example, considerable research exists on the component of illness representations (Petrie 
& Weinman, 1996). Indeed, this component can be broken down into its own constituents 
which can easily be studied separately. The present thesis deals with a specific part of 
illness representations, causal attributions. Within attributions, it investigates the concept 
of self-blame as an attribution for one’s illness and attempts to explore its meaning and 
significance in the illness experience. Therefore, in the next sections, discussion will 
focus on theoretical and methodological issues regarding causal attributions in illness. 
Leventhal’s overall model will be considered again in the last chapter in an attempt to 
present all the findings in this thesis against a clear theoretical background.
2.3 THEORIES OF CAUSAL ATTRIBUTION
Causal thinking is a complicated set of processes which affects everyday thoughts, actions 
and emotions (Anderson, 1991). In turn, this set of processes is itself affected by beliefs 
and attitudes, creating a complex cognitive network of dynamically interacting parts 
which has been the focus of a considerable amount of research.
[...] attributions! analyses may be propaedeutic to the application of other 
theories, for the simple reason that attributions arouse a diversity of other 
motives and mediate numerous other processes such as aggression, guilt, or 
motivational changes (Jones et al., 1972, pp xii).
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To this day, the cornerstones of the psychological theories of causal attribution are the 
works of Heider (1958), Jones and Davis (1965), and Kelley (1973). Heider’s interest in 
‘naive psychology’ led to an attempt to understand and formulate people’s common-sense 
rules for causal attributions (Hewstone, 1989).
According to Heider’s theory (1958), actor and act are seen as parts of a causal imit. 
Interpretations regarding this unit are affected by factors such as similarity and proximity: 
when two events are similar or proximate to each other, then the one is likely to be seen as 
the cause of the other. Also, there is a mutual influence between actor and act, and acts 
can become infused with characteristics of the person to whom they were attributed. 
Consequently, a ‘person’ attribution is more likely than a ‘situational’ one (fundamental 
attribution error) because the person is seen as the centre of a situation (‘prototype of 
origin’). Heider has also suggested that intentional actions are more readily attributed to 
personal dispositions than unintentional ones. Perceived intentionality is in turn based on 
the criteria of ‘equiflnality (whether action is goal-directed rather than means-centred), 
local causality (whether people are seen as agents of an action, rather than passive 
recipients of environmental forces), and exertion (people are presumed to try harder to 
achieve intended effects or goals)’ (Hewstone, 1989, pp. 14).
An important idea added to Heider’s theory is the concept of Correspondent Inference put 
forward by Jones and Davis (1965). This refers to one’s judgement that the actor’s 
behaviour (and intention behind it) is caused by, or corresponds to a particular trait that he 
or she possesses. For example, someone’s hostile behaviour would lead to the assumption
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that the person is hostile by trait. In the process of inferring personal dispositions the 
perceiver is faced with two problems: the attribution of intention, and the attribution of 
dispositions. The attribution of intention involves deciding which effects of an observed 
action were intended by the actor. This suggests that the perceiver must believe that the 
actor is both capable of performing the action as well as aware of its consequences. Then, 
by considering the consequences of chosen actions, the observer makes a correspondent 
inference of dispositions when the chosen action has a few relatively unique 
consequences. Such inferences are stronger when the consequences of a chosen behaviour 
are socially undesirable.
Finally, Kelly (1967; cited in Hewstone, 1989) focused on the information used to arrive 
at a causal attribution. He outlined two different cases that depend on the amount of 
information available to the perceiver. In the first case, the perceiver has information from 
multiple sources and can perceive the covariation of an observed effect and its possible 
causes. In the second case, the perceiver is faced with a single observation and must take 
account of the configuration of factors that are plausible causes of the observed effect.
2.3.1 Categorisation and basic assumption in theories o f attribution
The three theories outlined above are generally considered the major contributions in the 
field of causal attribution. They have been the centre of continuous criticism and have 
given rise to a considerable amount of research which in turn has lead to extensions or 
specifications of the main theories. Hence, what has come to be commonly known as 
Attribution Theory in psychology is really a collection of theories that explain how
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common sense operates and how people provide themselves with explanations about 
events they observe.
Theories of attribution are often divided into two sub-fields: attribution theories and 
attributional theories (Kelley & Michela, 1980). As illustrated in Figure 2.2, attribution 
theories deal with the antecedents of attributions while attributional theories deal with the 
psychological consequences.
Figure 2.2: Basic structure of attribution conceptions as proposed by Kelley and Michela, 
(1980)
Forsteling (2001) reviews three basic assumptions behind theories of attribution. First, as 
with any cognitive approach to psychology, there is the assumption that cognitions 
mediate the relationship between stimulus and behaviour. Hence, theories of attribution 
focus on the nature of the cognitive processes that will result in an attribution being made 
as well as the variables that can affect those processes. A second assumption is that people 
typically attempt to understand the world around them by making attributions and do so in 
a methodical way similar to that of the scientific method. Individuals are believed to 
generate hypotheses about the occurrences of events and test them using available or
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inferred information which will eventually either confirm the hypothesis or disconfirm it 
and lead to its refonnulation. Finally, a third assumption is that it is functional to make 
attributions. It is believed that trying to understand the causes of observed events is 
inherently beneficial in that it enhances one’s sense of control and allows for future 
predictions to be made.
2.3.2 Motivations behind causal attributions
Possibly because of the last assumption discussed above, theories of causal attributions 
have mainly focused 011 how people reach conclusions about the causes of events and less 
on the reasons that such cognitive processes occur in the first place. The best attempt 
towards addressing the latter can be found in two reviews that emphasise the following 
points (Forsyth, 1980; Tetloclc and Levi, 1982):
1. The control function. Causal explanations of events create a sense of control about 
one’s acquired experiences and anticipated future outcomes (Wortman, 1976). This 
function often provides an explanation about attributions that appear ‘unreasonable’. 
For example, blaming the victim for his/her misfortune or claiming responsibility for 
an outcome that is clearly beyond one’s control are both instances of counter-intuitive 
attributions that can be explained as ‘control - oriented’ responses to negative events
(J annoff-Bulman, 1983)'.
2. The self-esteem function . Quite commonly in attribution processes the actor/attributer 
makes an internal attribution for a positive outcome and an external attribution for a
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negative outcome. Such self-serving biases are seen as enhancing self-esteem since 
they protect from embarrassment or humiliation.
3. The self-presentation function. Following from the logic behind the self- esteem
function is the effort individuals make to control the way they are seen by those around 
them. By making external attributions for negative events and internal attributions for 
positive ones, people not only enhance their self-esteem but at the same time ensure a 
more positive public image.
2.3.3 Dimensions in causal attribution
Causal attributions can be subject to a number of classification criteria. These can refer to 
the type of relationship between the cause and the effect (relational properties) or to the 
type of cause (qualitative properties). The latter are of particular importance in this thesis. 
In contrast to the relational properties, which carry more significance for studies focusing 
on the perceptual and infonnation processing aspects of causal thinking, the qualitative 
properties have attracted interest through studies focusing on attributional motivation and 
outcomes. The most popular theory on this is Weiner’s (1986) attributional theory on 
motivation and emotion, which classifies causal attributions in three domains: locus, 
stability and controllability.
A. Relational Properties
Proximal vs. distal relations: Kelley (1983) stressed the role that the distance between the 
cause and the effect can have on attributions. He proposed that in a chain of causes which 
eventually led to the effect under scrutiny, it is the proximal causes (temporally closer to
16
the effect) rather than the distal ones (temporally distant) that will offer the best 
explanation.
Simple vs. complex relations: A simple causal cognition exists when only one cause is 
related to only one effect. Alternatively, a complex attribution exists when jnany causes or 
their interaction lead to one or more effects (Kelley, 1983)
B. Qualitative properties
Locus: It is very common for attributions to be conceptualised as either internal (with the 
causal factors lying within the person) or external (with causal factors lying outside the 
individual). Heider (1958) argued that such a distinction is of fundamental importance and 
many studies since then have used it as a framework. However, it has been criticised on 
several points (Miller et al, 1981). First, attributing more causality to internal factors does 
not entail attributing less causality on external ones. That is, internal and external factors 
are not necessarily on the same continuum nor are they mutually exclusive. Second, 
intemality and externality may have a theoretical basis of interest but are so broad and 
ambiguous that they become practically meaningless. For example, attributing one’s 
illness to an unhealthy diet may appear as an internal attribution but if that diet resulted 
from poor parental guidance or financial reasons then it may be closer to the externality 
dimension. In such cases, a theoretical debate might continue endlessly, but it is the actual 
meaning of the attribution (the behaviours and emotions it elicits to the patient) that carry 
the most interest. Third, and in line with the previous point, the various measures of 
external or internal attributions have shown lack of convergent validity indicating that 
actors and theorists do not conceptualise causality in the same way. Finally, the internal-
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external distinction cannot account for instances where the individual acts intentionally on 
the external factors. Could a car accident be attributed to the icy road (external attribution) 
when the driver intentionally ignored the weather forecast warnings and did not take the 
necessary precautions?
In an attempt to clarify the internal-external dimension, White (1991) conducted two 
studies where participants were asked to judge whether different explanations of events 
were internal or external and whether they were reasons for or causes of the events. It was 
found that asking people to distinguish between internal or external causes is not enough 
since no reference is made to whether the behaviour was conscious, intentional and 
explained or not.
Stability: Weiner identified another dimension along which causes are perceived (Weiner 
et al., 1971). Depending on how changing or unchanging causes are believed to be over 
time, they are categorised as stable or unstable. For example, ability and intelligence are 
generally seen as stable factors, while luck or effort as unstable ones.
A popular approach in the literature is the combination of the locus and stability 
dimensions to create a taxonomy of causes. Based on this, a cause can be internal and 
stable (e.g. ability), internal and unstable (e.g. effort), external and stable (e.g. task 
difficulty) or external and unstable (e.g. chance) (Weiner et al. 1971).
Controllability: An important element missing from the above taxonomy is the extent to 
which a cause or factor leading to an outcome is controllable by the individual or not.
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This was pointed out by Rosenbaum (1972; cited in Forsterling, 1988), who integrated 
this dimension in Weiner et al.’s (1971) scheme. However, Rosenbaum’s original 
dimension was that of ‘intentionality’ and not controllability implying that the two tenns 
do not differ. This was later criticised by Weiner (1986), who differentiated intentional 
actions (e.g. intention to go on a diet) from controllable ones (e.g. uncontrollable eating 
behaviour).
Another dimension of cause categorisation later added to the above (Forsterling, 1988) is 
that of generality. Generality differentiates global causes (those having broad effects) 
from specific causes (those relating to a narrow field). Thus, for example, low intelligence 
would be categorised as global since its effects would probably appear* in a wide spectrum 
of behaviours. In contrast, a special inability such as dyslexia would affect only a certain 
range of behaviours (i.e. language skills) and would be seen as specific.
2.3.4 Common confusions about the organisation o f causes
Although research on causal attribution has been carried out for the last 30 years, there is 
still confusion about the organisation of causal factors (Anderson, 1991). First, there is 
difficulty in distinguishing phenomenal from scientific descriptions of causes. That is, it 
is not necessarily true that people’s way of thinking about the world matches the scientific 
approach. It may well be, for example, that people think about causes without realising 
that their reasoning follows the dimensions of locus, stability or generality. Finally, it may 
be that there is a perfect match between people’s categorisation of causes and the 
scientific relations between these variables. However, none of these instances indicate that
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there is a necessary relation between people’s beliefs about the dimensions mentioned 
earlier and their actual effects.
Second, literature on causal attributions seems to assume that the way people can think is 
the same as the way people do think. Thus, study designs usually force people to think 
along the various attributional dimensions and eventually measure people’s ability to 
think that way. It is therefore important that this limitation be acknowledged when 
findings in the area are discussed.
As a result of the two previous points, a third confusion in attribution literature arises. It 
seems to be a common assumption that people think in tenns of dimensions. This is 
probably an influence stemming from scientific reasoning where theories, laws, constructs 
and so on are generally framed in dimensional tenns. However, it is possible that people 
t h i n k  in categorical terms, or even, both categorical and dimensional terms. Anderson 
(1991) presented participants with 63 different causes and asked them to either rate them 
on given dimensions (i.e. internal vs. external), sort them in as many meaningful groups 
as they could think of (favouring both categorical and dimensional sorting), or sort them 
in exactly two groups (favouring dimensional sorting). He found that people typically 
engage in both categorical and dimensional thinking. It was suggested that categories are 
used very quickly in the beginning of the attribution process and indicate the implications 
for action, followed by dimensional thinking (mainly along the locus and controllability 
dimensions).
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2.4 CAUSAL ATTRIBUTIONS IN PHYSICAL ILLNESS
The general principles on attribution theory presented above are based mostly on research 
within the area of social psychology. However, attributional approaches have been 
applied to many types of behaviour relevant to motivation, emotion and cognition. 
Regarding health, principles of attribution are increasingly used to investigate the role of 
such health cognitions in relation to the illness experience.
Illness is a negative, usually unexpected event that has profound physiological and 
psychological effects on the individual. It usually evokes a series of bodily responses that 
place an adjustment demand on the human organism making the need for psychological 
adaptation equally important. Since attributional search is seen as an attempt to 
understand, predict, and control events (including threats), it can be functional in the early 
stages of the adjustment process (Taylor, Lichtman & Wood, 1984). As with all other 
negative events, ill individuals may seek answers to questions such as ‘Why am I ill?’,
*'What caused my illness?5, ‘Could my illness have been prevented?’ ‘Did I cause the 
illness or is it due to an external cause? (Bishop, 1991)’.
2.4.1 Fact or artifact?
Benyamini, Leventhal & Leventhal (1997) approach attributions of health and illness 
from the perspective of Leventhal’s ‘self-regulation model’ (Leventhal, Meyer & Nerenz, 
1980). As presented earlier in this chapter, the model proposes five cognitive dimensions 
(i.e. the illness representation component) to make sense of their health or illness: a) 
identity, i.e. the label given for a condition or symptom (e.g. cold, runny nose), b) cause, 
i.e. biological (e.g. virus), psychological (e.g. stress), c) time line, i.e. how long the
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illness/symptom will last, d) consequences, i.e. physical or emotional effects of the 
condition on the person’s life, and e) curability and controllability, i.e. the person’s 
perception of whether the condition can be treated, and the extent to which it can be 
controlled. Based on these dimensions, it appears that illness cognitions mainly involve an 
illness/symptom representation, illness management procedures and outcome evaluation 
criteria. In the self-regulation model causal attributions are seen as part of the illness 
representation.
As part of this model however, attributions are seen as more likely to occur early in the 
disease progression and with serious or life-threatening conditions. However, not enough 
evidence exists on that yet. Benyamini, Baum, Newman et al (1997) claim that the 
methodology of attribution assessment has so far been flawed because probes were used 
extensively in order to assess the types of attributions. It should not be assumed that 
patients will spontaneously seek causal explanations for their condition. To illustrate this 
point they cite Lowery et al (1987) who found that chronically ill patients with arthritis, 
diabetes, hypertension, or past myocardial infarction reported they had never thought why 
this had happened to them. It may well be that these particular groups of patients see no 
use in causal explanations since re-occurrence is not as much an issue as is symptom 
management and quality of life. In any case, the way in which attributions are assessed 
may well affect yielded results and should therefore be considered during the 
interpretation of findings.
Aside from how salient or spontaneous causal attributions are, such attempts to explain 
disease appear in patients independently of their medical knowledge. Mabeck & Olesen
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(1997) performed interviews to examine the attributions of patients in general practice. It 
was found that, regardless of their ability to understand scientific explanations about 
disease symptoms, patients used a number of metaphors to make sense of the problem 
indicating a mechanical understanding of the body (ethnomecanics). They thus provided 
some evidence towards a spontaneous attempt to offer a causal explanation!
2.4.2 Attributions and Adjustment
The main interest regarding attributions in illness (or any other negative event) is its 
potential effects on the individual’s psychological well-being. It is believed that making 
an attribution helps one explain the event, find meaning in its occurrence and maintain a 
sense of an orderly world (Thomson, 1985; 1991; Thomson & Janigan, 1988, Witenberg, 
Blanchard, Suls et al, 1983). The following section includes a review of evidence for 
these effects. However as it will be discussed there, the majority of studies in the field are 
cross-sectional and can only talk about correlations and not causal relationships.
However, theoretical models regarding the causal relationship between adjustment and 
attributions have been proposed by Downey, Cohen Silver & Wortman (1990). According 
to them, there are three possible paths linking attributions and adjustment (Figure 2.3). 
One is the attribution driven model (model a), which holds that attributions are triggered 
by an event and, once formed, will determine the levels of distress experienced by the 
individual. Another model, the distress driven model (model b), claims that an event will 
elicit distress that in turn will lead to the fonnation of attributions. Finally, the 
correlational model (model c) holds that it is an undetermined factor that will be elicited 
by an event that will trigger both distress and attributions. In this model attributions and 
adjustment are not causally linked but are allowed to interact with each other. The studies
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presented in the next section could support (or not) any of the three models through their 
cross-sectional design. As it will be demonstrated, longitudinal or experimental studies 
are needed to test and possibly enhance these models.
Figure 2.3: Theoretical path models of the relationship between attributions and 
adjustment (distress).
a)
Event Attributions Distress
b) Event Distress Attribution
c) Event Variable X
Attribution
A
V
Distress
2.4.3 Empirical evidence on illness attributions
The studies on causal attribution for illness have focused on a variety of illnesses, 
however large proportion of those focus on cancer patients. Explaining the occurrence of 
cancer is a challenge for the patient: so far the aetiology of most types of cancer has not 
been established, the symptom onset is typically sudden and unexpected, and the course 
of the disease cannot be controlled or predicted by the patient (Gotay, 1985). From this 
point of view, explanations about cancer have been of special interest to attribution 
research. In a study of terminally ill male cancer patients (including pulmonary, colon, 
stomach, pancreas, bladder and primary unknown cancer patients), Linn, Linn & Stein 
(1982) found that compared to their healthy counterparts, cancer patients held weaker
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convictions about the cause of the disease. These patients listed ‘heredity’ and ‘God’s 
will’ among the top four causes of cancer. Heredity was more strongly endorsed as a 
reason among patients who have known about their disease for a longer time. It was 
suggested that the lack of strong beliefs was ‘a result of direct experience and a 
consequent greater awareness of the complexities of causes that are almost always 
involved in the development of cancer’ (pp. 83 8). Similar results were yielded by Gotay 
(1985) when she studied cancer patients’ responses to the question ‘Why me?’. Again, a 
significant number of patients did not hold a strong explanation for their condition, and 
God was the cause cited most frequently.
It has been indicated that people’s.causal attributions are much more specific when they 
suffer from a disease with a better understood aetiology. For example, a study on lung 
cancer patients’ attributions about their medical condition revealed smoking to be the 
most frequently mentioned factor (Faller, Schilling & Lang, 1995). Such a behavioural 
attribution also suggested self-blame, thus triggering a cognitive dissonance process that 
attempted to negate the involvement of smoking in the aetiology of cancer (e.g.
‘Obviously smoking is usually the cause, but it is not really so in my particular case!’ 
pp.624). When the results of this study were compared to those of studies that have found 
a profound lack of causal explanations among cancer patients, it was concluded that the ‘I 
don’t know’ response commonly expressed by patients denoted ‘ a subjective certainty 
regarding the causal explanations rather than an absolute state of not knowing’ (pp 624). 
Therefore, while the frequency o f ‘I don’t know’ answers have led researchers to conclude 
that not everyone has an explanation for a negative event, it is likely that this lack of
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explanation was due to subjective, biased reactions to the event rather than lack of 
knowledge.
Recently more attribution studies on specific symptoms or conditions have been reported. 
Fernandez & Sheffield (1996) studied people’s attributions about headache!and found the 
most frequent explanations to be mental stress and alcohol. In another study, Clemet and 
Schoemiesson (1998) examined the attributions of 57 self-defined gay men with HIV. 
Most participants had at least one explanation about their condition and the majority 
provided a combination of attributions (e.g. self- and other-blame) rather than a single 
explanation for contacting HIV. Finally, Deale, Chalder & Wessely (1998) studied the 
stability of attributions in patients with Chronic Fatigue Syndrome who participated in 
cognitive-behaviour therapy or relaxation training. It was found that patients’ causal 
attributions remained unchanged throughout treatment.
Other medical conditions have also attracted the interest of attribution researchers. For 
example, a study by Affleck, Tennen, Croog & Levine (1987) focused on interviews of 
heart attack victims seven weeks and eight years after their initial heart attack. They found 
that the majority of patients attributed their condition to stress and personal behaviours. 
Just over half of the sample reported gains and benefits from their experience and these 
patients were less likely to have a subsequent heart attack and exhibited less morbidity in 
the following years.
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A. Antecedents of causal attributions in illness 
The factors that lead to causal attributions for illness have not been studied as much as a) 
the nature of those attributions (e.g. internal vs. external, spontaneous vs. prompted etc.) 
and b) the consequences of attributional processes on the illness experience. Michela and 
Wood (1986) identified reality (i.e. factual information), prior knowledge, and socio­
demographic factors as the three major categories of factors that, until then, had been 
found to affect the formation of illness attr ibutions. However, since their chapter, the 
literature in the area has grown considerably and various other factors can be identified. 
For example, Furnham (1994) examined the structure and determinants of people’s 
explanations regarding a) their current state, b) ability to achieve better health, c) 
perceived probability of becoming ill, and d) perceived speed/likelihood of recovery. He 
found that for all four aspects studied, a common underlying structure emerged. 
Specifically, people explained their (expected) health outcomes in terms of behaviour, 
environment, medical treatment, life-style and fate/religion. In agreement with Michela 
and Wood (1986), Furnham also found that certain demographic variables (i.e. sex, 
education and marital status) consistently predicted health beliefs.
i) Factual information
Illness attributions can be affected by factual information (i.e. specific circumstances 
under which the illness occurred, information provided by respected ‘authorities’ such as 
physicians etc). For example, spinal cord injured victims in Bulnian and Wortnian’s 
(1977) study were more likely to attribute the accident to someone else when another 
person was indeed present (e.g. passenger, other driver) at the time of their injury. 
Similarly, Faller et al (1995) found that the most frequent illness attribution made by lung
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cancer patients is smoking, an attribution that reflects medical research findings and 
widely held societal beliefs.
ii) Prior knowledge
One’s level of sophistication or prior knowledge about the illness may be aii important 
factor. For example, Taylor (1983) found the more naive the patients are, the more likely 
they are to employ basic attribution principles (e.g. attributing cancer to a fairly recent 
event and not taking into account that cancers may take even 15 years to grow). 
According to Michela and Wood (1986) lay theories about causality may also be 
susceptible to folklore or conventional wisdom. The shift to a more patient-centred 
attitude to health that has marked the last decade may have changed the nature of the 
above relationships by giving people more knowledge about the factors that cause an 
illness and reducing the need to use conventional wisdom and folklore.
iii) Characteristics of the individual
Gender: The effects of sociodemographic factors on the formation of illness attributions 
have the focus of some studies. Consistent with experimental studies on achievement- 
failure attributions, significant differences have been found between men and women in 
the type and amount of attributions they make for an illness or health-related problem. 
Despite methodological weaknesses in differentiating between causal attributions, blame 
and attribution of responsibility (see Chapter 3), studies generally show that women tend 
to attribute their health problem more to themselves than their male counterparts. For 
example, Juvonen & Leskinen (1994) found that mothers accepted more responsibility 
and reported feelings of guilt for their child’s mental retardation more often than fathers
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did. Similarly, Vieyra, Temien, Affleck, Allen & McCann (1990) and Abbey & Halman 
(1995) found that women were more likely to attribute their infertility to their behaviour 
than men were. Other studies supporting similar' results have also focused on miscarriage 
and still birth (McGreal, Evans & Burrows, 1997), and children disabilities (Shapp, 
Thurman & DuCette, 1992). It must be noted, however, that gender differences are often 
omitted in studies of illness attributions mainly because the samples under study tend to 
be gender specific (e.g. breast cancer, heart disease etc.). Therefore, evidence on gender 
differences is by no means compelling.
Age: Age has also been found to play a role in attributional search for illness. Again, 
overlooking temporarily the lack of conceptual clarity among the different terms used to 
signify causal attributions, Heineman, Bulka & Smetak (1988) found that younger people 
tend to engage in more self-blame than older ones. Similar results were found by Manne 
& Sandler (1984) in their study of patients with genital herpes. They found that younger 
participants were more likely to blame their character for their illness than were older 
participants. In contrast to these studies, lack of a relationship between attributions and 
age have been reported in studies on parental attributions for a child’s death (Downey, 
Cohen, Silver & Wortman, 1990) and maternal attributions for severe perinatal 
complications (Affleck, McGrade, Allen & McQueeny, 1985).
Socio-economic status (SES): SES has also been found to affect illness attributions. 
Specifically, Affleck, Temien, Croog & Levine (1987) found that MI patients with higher 
SES (and age) tended to make significantly more attributions to heredity than those of 
Lower SES. Lack of a relationship between income and causal attributions has been
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reported by Downey et al (1990) in bereaved parents and Webb, Wrigley, Yoels & Fine 
(1995) in patients with traumatic brain injury.
Culture: The evidence linking culture differences to causal attributions is limited so no 
conclusive comments can be made. To illustrate the effect of culture on patients’ 
attributions, Sissons-Joshi (1995) carried out a cross-cultural study to compare beliefs 
about diabetes in England and India. Structured interviews revealed that more Indians 
than English reported diet as a cause for their condition and blamed themselves more than 
their English counterparts. In addition, it was found that more Indians than English did 
not see causality as central to their illness cognitions and displayed an inability or 
unwillingness to carry out causal reasoning. Similarly, Kohli and Dalai (1998) studied the 
attributions of Indian Hindu women diagnosed with cancer. It was found that the majority 
of attributions focused more on metaphysical beliefs such as fate, God’s will and Karma 
than to any other factors. In contrast, Hunt et al (1998) studied the illness concepts of 
Mexican American non-insulin dependent diabetes patients and found that most 
participants were aware of the biomedically accepted causes of their disease while at the 
same time tried to link their condition to their personal experience. Also, Downey et al 
(1990) found that white parents were more likely to make chance attributions about their 
child’s death than non-white parents. In contrast, Webb et al (1995) reported similar 
levels of self-blame between white and non-white American participants with traumatic 
brain injuries.
Individual Differences: It has also been suggested that personality affects people’s 
attributions, and that there is a ‘blaming personality style’ which is associated to poorer
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adjustment regardless of who blame is directed towards (Wollert, Heinrich, Wood, 
Werner, 1983). It has also been proposed that coping (and related attributional processes) 
is personality in action under stress (Bolger, 1990). While these suggestions have received 
some support, work on this topic has been fairly limited (Mittelstaedt & Wollert, 1991; 
Wollert & Rowley, 1987; Anderson, Miller, Riger et al, 1994).
iv) Characteristics of the event
Severity: According to literature reviews on this issue (e.g. Michaela & Wood, 1986), the 
higher the severity of the event, the higher the tendency to make attributions. A study by 
Affleck et al (1987a) found that the higher the medically defined severity of participants’ 
heart attack, the higher the levels of blaming others endorsed by the patients. Also, Gotay 
(1985) found that patients with more advanced stages of cancer engaged in more self­
blame than those in the earlier stages of the disease. Interestingly, Affleck et al (1987b) 
found that the severity of patients’ heart attack increased all types of attributions (self­
blame, other-blame, chance, stress, heredity) supporting the assumption of Weiner’s 
attributional theory (Wong & Weiner, 1981). Similar findings have been reported when 
levels of perceived severity have been considered. Specifically, in mothers of children 
with insulin dependent diabetes, perceived severity of their child’s illness was positively 
associated with the number of attributions they made (Affleck et al, 1985). A somewhat 
contradictory finding has been reported by Tennen, Affleck & Gershman (1986). They 
found that medically defined but not perceived severity was associated with more 
attributions in mothers of children with severe perinatal complications. Thus, although a 
relationship between severity and attributions seems to be present, it is not clear enough 
for general conclusions to be drawn.
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Controllability: The degree to which an event is seen as controllable has also been linked 
to people’s attributions. Like severity, it is the individual’s own perception of 
controllability that is important rather than some ‘objective’ measure of controllability. 
Event controllability has been considered as a motive for making attributions. 
Specifically, it has been proposed that certain attributions (e.g. behavioural attributions, 
self-blame) enhance feelings of future control and people will engage in those even if no 
culpability is evident to an outside observer (Janoff-Bulman, 1992). Research has looked 
at relationships among past controllability, attributions, future controllability and 
adjustment. Brickman, Rabinowitz, Karuza et al (1982) have also proposed a distinction 
between past and future control or, in other words, a distinction between taking 
responsibility for a problem versus taking responsibility for the future. The most well 
supported relationship is that between past controllability and self-blame. Studies have 
consistently shown that the higher the perceived past controllability of an illness, the 
higher the levels of behavioural self-blame (e.g. Timko and Janoff-Bulman, 1985; Dalai 
& Singh, 1992). In contrast, associations between attributions and future controllability 
have not been as consistent.
While some studies have reported a positive relationship between self-blame and future 
control of breast cancer (Timko and Bulman, 1985) and perinatal complications (Tennen, 
Affleck & Gershman, 1986), others did not find any support for such associations 
(Malcame et al, 1995; Frazier, 1990; Frazier & Schauben, 1994). Similarly, expected 
associations between past and future controllability have not been supported by research. 
Apart from one study with cancer patients (Timko & Janoff-Bulman, 1985), studies with
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accident victims (Dalai & Pande, 1988), rape victims (Frazier, 1990) and bereaved 
women (Frazier & Schauben, 1994) have not found a correlation between past and future 
controllability. Finally, associations between future control and adjustment are 
inconsistent as well. The association between perceived future control and adjustment has 
been found to be positive (Frazier, 1990; Gotay, 1985; Taylor, Lichtman & Wood, 1984), 
negative (Frazier & Schauben, 1994), and non-existent (Malcame et al., 1995; Timko & 
Janoff-Bulman, 1985).
v) Other factors
Sensky (1997) identified a series o f biases that may affect the final outcome of the 
attribution process. Specifically, more probability will be given to disease explanations 
that come more readily to one’s mind. Emphasis should be placed in the role of the media 
in rendering certain types of information as easily available to lay people. Furthermore, 
the context within which attributions are made can be a potential influence. Clinical 
settings for example would probably elicit more pathological attributions than a 
laboratory setting. Finally, an already existing psychological state can influence patients’ 
attributions. Depressed mood has been repeatedly linked with more internal, stable and 
global attributions that in turn can affect susceptibility to further illness or delay recovery.
B. Consequences of causal attributions in illness 
i) Attributions and adjustment
Adjustment to a negative event has been the most widely studied consequence of 
attributions (Harvey & Weary, 1984). The assmnptions behind attribution theory hold that
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people engage in attributions in order to make sense of the world around them. It is thus 
likely that once an attribution has been made, the individual is in a better position or state 
than before the attribution was made. Studies in search for evidence for this relationship 
have focused on conditions of attributions versus no attributions, on the number of 
attributions made, and on the type of attributions made (self, others, chance-etc). In their 
review of studies on attributions and adjustment in serious illnesses, Tirnquist, Harvey, & 
Andersen, (1988) found that in general patients who report explicit attributions fare better 
than patients who make no attributions at all. While there is a number of studies 
supporting this conclusion (e.g. Witenberg et al, 1983; Thomson, 1981), several studies 
have also failed to find supporting evidence. For example, Taylor, Lichtman & Wood 
(1985) found no association between reporting an attribution and adjustment in breast 
cancer patients. Similar findings have been reported by Gotey (1985) and Sholomskas, 
Steil & Plummer (1990).
Regarding the number of attributions made, Taylor (1983) claimed that the greater the 
number of attributions made the better the individual’s adjustment because, even in the 
face of evidence that disconfirms one attribution, another attribution is available. 
However, two studies have reported evidence regarding this relationship and both failed 
to confirm its existence (Affleck et al, 1985; Tennen, Affleck & Gershman, 1986).
The majority of studies on attributions and adjustment focus on specific attributions. Self­
blame as an internal attribution (or self-attribution of responsibility) is discussed in detail 
in the next chapter as it is the main focus of this thesis. Other attributions have included 
blaming others, chance or heredity, and environment. Blaming others was the focus of a
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thorough literature review by Teirnen & Affleck (1990). They found that blaming others 
was associated with poorer adjustment in 17 out of the 22 studies they reviewed. They 
also found that an individual's appraisal of the situation (i.e. whether it is seen as a costly 
or beneficial event) and his or her own personality characteristics (e.g. attributional style, 
optimism) may determine the expression of other blame. However, there are some studies 
that do not support these findings (e.g. Van den Bout et al, 1988; Eiser, Havermans & 
Eiser, 1995; Hazzard, Weston & Gutteres, 1992; Reidy & Caplan, 1995). Attributions to 
chance are seen as external, unstable and uncontrollable attributions that have 
demonstrated no consistent relationship to adjustment for negative events (Michaela & 
Wood, 1986). Similarly, attributions to the environment have shown a positive (Affleck et 
al 1985), negative (Gotay, 1985) and non-existent (Bulman & Wortman, 1977; 
Sholomskas, Steil, Plummer, 1990) relationship to adjustment.
C. Limitations in the literature 
A number of methodological and theoretical limitations can be identified in the literature 
that may account for inconsistent findings among studies on attributions for negative 
events. These limitations range from small sample sizes and lack of power to lack of 
agreement on an operational definition for each attribution. A detailed discussion of these 
is presented in the next chapter, where the concept of self-blame is considered and studies 
on it are shown to be particularly inconsistent.
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Based on the above presentation o f the relevant theoretical and empirical work, a useful 
framework for understanding self-blame has emerged. Self-blame in chronic illness can 
be seen as a type of attribution or, to be more precise, a response that includes 
attributional elements. Using Leventhal’s model (Leventhal and Nerenz, 19S5), self­
blame can be placed within the Illness Representation component of a broader network of 
self-regulatory behaviours, emotions or cognitions that aim towards adjustment in a 
stressful situation such as chronic illness. As a type of attribution, it can be expected to 
range along several dimensions (internal-external, stable-unstable, global-specific), result 
from spontaneous or probed attributional processes, and be affected by the wide range of 
personal or situational characteristics. The next chapter will look specifically at studies 
on self-blame in chronic illness and present a comprehensive review of the findings. More 
importantly, it will show that, although the theoretical approaches described above could 
have lent themselves as theoretical guides towards clearer conceptualisations in the area 
of self-blame research, there are a considerable number of theoretical and methodological 
limitations in the literature, some of which the present thesis will address empirically.
2.5 A SYNTHESIS
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C H A P T E R  T H R E E  
SE L F -B L A M E : T H E O R E T IC A L , M E T H O D O L O G IC A L  A N D  
E M P IR IC A L  C O N SID E R A T IO N S
SUMMARY
This chapter aims to review the literature on self-blame and provide the background that led 
to the studies presented in this thesis. It begins by presenting the theoiy of self-blame 
(Janoff-Bulman, 1979). It then reviews the relevant literature and identifies those studies 
directly relevant to the subject matter of the thesis. Furthermore, it demonstrates a number 
of inconsistencies in research findings and explores the reasons behind these 
inconsistencies. It identifies methodological and theoretical limitations in the literature, 
many of which have not been previously considered. Finally, the resolution of these 
limitations is discussed and the emerging research questions addressed in the thesis are 
identified.
3.1 THE THEORY OF SELF-BLAME
In 1977, a study by Bulman and Wortman on attributions of blame in accident victims was 
the beginning of a series of studies on victimization and self-blame. In that study, the 
researchers interviewed 29 individuals paralyzed in serious accidents and found that 
blaming others and feelings of avoidability were positively correlated with poor coping 
ratings by the participants’ rehabilitation staff. In contrast, self-blame was a predictor of 
good coping ratings.
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Janoff-Bulman’s (1979) theory had significant bearing on the well-founded theories of 
depression and learned helplessness. Specifically, according to Beck’s cognitive model of 
depression (1967), depressed individuals are characterized by a readiness to interpret events 
in their life as personal failures and assume responsibility and blame for negative outcomes. 
In contrast, Selingman’s (1975) learned helplessness theory claimed that depression is the 
result of the erroneous learning that outcomes such as rewards and punishments are 
uncontrollable. Thus, it appeared that the two theories contradict each other on the issues of 
responsibility (Abramson & Sackeim, 1977; Peterson, 1979). Do depressed individuals 
assume responsibility for events they feel they cannot control or not?
Jannoff-Bulman’s (1979) theory provided a resolution to this paradox by defining two types 
of self-blame: behavioural self-blame -referring to the actions that can lead to an event- and 
characterological self-blame -referring to the personality characteristics that can lead to an 
event. Behavioural self-blame (BSB) is control-related and focuses on those aspects of 
behaviour (or omissions of it) that are perceived to have contributed to the outcome. On the 
other hand, characterological self-blame (CSB) is esteem-related and focuses on the 
person’s personality characteristics or permanent traits.
BSB suggests that, since an event is attributed to one’s actions, the future is controllable: a 
similar* future event can be avoided by choosing the right course of action. So, the victim 
does not feel helpless or hopeless, and adjustment and recovery become easier. For 
example, it may be very comforting for cancer patients to attribute their misfortune to past 
eating behaviour or for rape victims to attribute their misfortune to provocative appearance. 
The chances of the events happening again can be reduced considerably by changing
38
behaviour and the person feels less vulnerable. This type of self-blame has been linked to 
better adjustment and increased sense of control in patients and victims of violence. On the 
other hand, CSB suggests that the factors that led to the unfortunate outcome are permanent 
and usually unchangeable. In contrast to behavioural self-blamers who use past tense in 
their statements (e.g. ‘should (not) have done), characterological self-blamers use present 
tense (e.g. ‘I am...’, ‘I do...’). This type of blame is strongly linked to depression and is 
regarded as a maladaptive response to a negative event.
Recognising the distinction between the two types of self-blame leads to a resolution of the 
depression paradox. Characterological self-blamers will attribute failures or unfortunate 
events to their perceived inadequacies. It is these inadequacies that they view as generally 
stable and un-modifiable and consequently feel helpless. Thus, the conjunction of self­
blame and helplessness need no longer be seen as paradoxical.
3.1.1 The theoretical rationale for the functionality o f self-blame
Theorists endorsing the functionality of self-blame follow the motivational explanations of 
causal attributions (see Chapter 2) and view it as serving three basic needs (Miller & Porter, 
1983). The first is the need for control over one’s life. Self-blame serves this need by 
implying that any harm done was caused by the individual and can be avoided in the future 
by a change in behaviour. In that way, victims feel in control of their life and their future. 
The second need served by self-blame is the belief in a fair, just world. According to Lemer 
(1980) people prefer to accept responsibility for their actions, even when there are no 
grounds for doing so, than to admit that the world is unfair and thus, unpredictable. ‘A Just 
World is one in which people ‘get what they deserve.’ The judgement o f ‘deserving’ is
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based on the outcome that someone is entitled to receive’ (Lemer, 1980, pp.l 1). 
Specifically, the preconditions for deserving (or not) a certain outcome are determined by 
society. This is based on people’s behaviour and attributes: good behaviour (preparation, 
precautions, quantity and quality of production in their life) and good attributes (kindness, 
friendliness, generosity, conscientiousness, intelligence) deserve positive, desirable fates. In 
contrast, bad behaviour (carelessness, laziness, lack of productivity) and bad attributes 
(cruelty, ugliness, stupidity, unfriendliness) deserve some degree of punishment or bad fate. 
Finally, self-blame selves the need to find meaning in significant events. Being raped or 
dying of cancer would be harder to tolerate if they where incomprehensible. It seems that 
being able to answer questions such as ‘why?’ or ‘why me?’ is crucial to coping and 
recovering from negative events. Self-blame provides an answer to these questions.
In her work on the psychology of trauma, Janoff-Bulman (1992) refined the above 
theoretical framework and used it as a way to explain most psychological reactions 
following a traumatic event. She proposed that at the core of one’s assumptive world are 
abstract beliefs about oneself, the external world, and the relationship between the two. 
Specifically, the three fundamental assumptions are that a) the world is benevolent (i.e. 
the world is a good and safe place), b) the world is meaningful (i.e. there is a relationship 
between people and the events that happen to them, and the ‘Why?’ questions can be 
answered), and c) the self is worthy (i.e. people perceive themselves as good, capable and 
moral individuals). Although not held by eveiyone, these assumptions are accepted even 
indirectly by most people and form the bases of more complex philosophical and 
psychological positions. Like most schemas, the three assumptions are resistant to change, 
and in the face of discontinuing evidence, can guide behaviour to discount the
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contradictory infonnation. According to Janoff-Bulman, a traumatic experience can 
shatter a victim’s fundamental assumptions, forcing them to question the belief in a good 
and meaningful world, and leave him or her disillusioned trying to preserve or restore as 
much of their assumptive world as possible. Following this line of thinking self-blame is 
the victim’s attempt to minimise the threatening, meaningless nature of the event.
3.2 EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON SELF-BLAME
The impact that the theory had on explaining depression as well as its novel view on the 
adaptiveness of victims’ self-blame intrigued many researches who tested the theory on a 
variety of populations. However, to date, the studies have yielded inconclusive results 
even in attempts to replicate the original findings. The following paragraphs provide a 
comprehensive review of the empirical studies on self-blame.
3.2.1 Literature search and organization o f results
The main criteria for paper selection during the literature search were fairly relaxed and 
simple. For electronic searches, the keyword *self-blame' had to appeal* in the title or 
abstract of a reference and would only be considered if the work was a paper, chapter, or 
book, written in English, and focused on adult populations. To identify those references 
relevant to the issue of self-blame but not bearing the tenn explicitly (e.g. research on issues 
of responsibility), follow-up searches for synonymous keywords under the same criteria 
were performed both electronically and manually.
From the identified references, a relatively small proportion focuses specifically on self­
blame, discusses Janoff-Bulman’s findings and directly informs on the theoretical and
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empirical aspects of relevant research. More frequent is a rather general approach to self­
blame, where the main focus is on coping styles of specific populations. Such studies tend 
to use standardized measures of coping which include self-blame (01* acceptance of 
responsibility) in their structure. The most widely used coping measure that includes a scale 
for self-blame is the Ways of Coping by Folkman and Lazarus (1980). Used in many of the 
studies mentioned in this section, this measure includes confrontive coping (i.e. aggressive, 
hostile or risk-taking efforts to alter the situation), distancing coping (cognitive efforts to 
detach oneself from and minimize a situation), self-controlling coping (efforts to regulate 
one's feelings and actions), seeldng social support (seeking informational, tangible and 
emotional support), escape-avoidance coping (wishful thinking and behavioral efforts to 
escape or avoid the problem), planful problem solving (problem-focused, analytic efforts to 
alter the situation), and positive reappraisal (creating positive meaning by focusing 011 
personal growth). Self-blame is included in the coping style of accepting responsibility 
which involves acknowledgement of one's own role in the problem with a concomitant 
theme of trying to put things right.
Although coping studies provide some information about correlates of self-blame coping, 
they include little 011 no discussion of the operational definition or theoretical rational 
behind the tenn. Also, they occasionally imply a trait view of coping (i.e. a rather stable 
pattern of dealing with a problem) which, when applied to self-blame could contradict 
Janoff-Bulman’s classification of behavioural and characterological self-blame.
For the purposes of the present review, studies have been grouped according to the way they 
define self-blame. Studies not adopting a distinction between behavioural and
42
characterological self-blame are seen as studying general self-blame (GSB). These include 
studies on coping. Studies specifically addressing Janoff-Bulman5s theory and definitions 
are presented according to their findings on behavioural and characterological self-blame 
(BSB and CSB respectively). Table 3.1, presented in section 3.3 for illustration purposes 
relevant to that section, may be referred to here as a guide for the discussion that follows.
3.2.2 General self-blame
General self-blame has been studied in a variety of populations. In physical illness, it has 
been associated with younger age (Felton & Revenson, 1987; Blanchard-Fields &
Robinson, 1987), problematic psychological adjustment to rheumatoid arthritis (Parker et al, 
1988), psychological distress in infertile couples (Morrow, Thoreson & Penney, 1995), 
reactions to acute coronary syndromes (Pignalberi et al, 1998; Karanci, 1988)), adjustment 
to irritable bowel syndrome (Ali, Toner, Stuckles et al, 1998) and abortion (Stirtzinger et al, 
1999). Also, associations have been reported between self-blame and lower quality of life in 
patients with inflammatory bowel disease (Moskovitz et al, 2000), greater number of 
physical symptoms in the elderly (Smith, Patterson and Grant, 1990), and higher anxiety 
and depression in patients with orthopedic or brain injuries (Curran et al, 2000).
Mentally ill populations have attracted research on the subject as well. The use of self­
blame in emotion-focused coping styles has often been associated with depressed or 
emotionally distressed individuals (e.g. Kleinke, 1984; Weinberg, 1995; Kinderman, 1997; 
Grossi, 1999; Banazak, 2000) and has even been a central aspect of depression measures 
such as the Depression Coping Questionnaire (Kleinke, 1988). Also, along with self­
isolation and wishful thinking, self-blame has been found to be a common coping strategy
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in repatriated prisoners of war with post-traumatic stress disorder (Fairbank, Hansen and 
Fitterling, 1991) and other clinical samples (Wolfradt & Engelmann, 1999). Finally, a study 
by McCullough et al (1994) raises an interesting issue regarding potentially different 
approaches (practical or theoretical) to self-blame one could adopt. The study measured 
both coping styles and attributions and found that, compared to non depressed controls, 
dysthymia patients tended to make more external causal attributions but mainly employ 
wishful thinking and self-blame coping styles. These contradictory findings suggest a need 
to look more carefully into the theoretical aspects of self-blame and uncover the 
psychological processes it involves.
3.2.3 Characterological self-blame
The study by Bulman and Wortman (1977) gave rise to a series of studies looking mainly at 
the relationships between BSB, CSB and adjustment to negative events. However, for a 
number of methodological and conceptual reasons, discussed later, results verify Janoff- 
Bulman’s theory in some cases and fail to do so in others.
Of the two types of self-blame, CSB has yielded more consistent findings and has been 
negatively linked to adjustment. In physical illness, for example, Timko and Bulman (1985) 
found that characterological attributions were negatively associated with adjustment and 
perceptions of invulnerability to future recurrence. Similarly, Frazier (1990) and Frazier & 
Schauben (1994) found that CSB was significantly associated with increased post-rape 
depression. Also, Malcame et al (1995) found a negative relationship between CSB and 
adjustment in cancer patients at four months post diagnosis, suggesting an effect of timing 
on the aforementioned relationship.
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A small number of studies have failed to find any relationship between CSB and 
adjustment. For example, Gotay (1985) and Houldin et al (1996) found that both CSB and 
BSB were unrelated to adjustment in cancer patients. Also, Sholomskas, Steil & Plummer 
(1990) arrived at similar conclusions in their study of spinal-cord injured people. However, 
Gotay’s (1985) and Sholomskas, Steil & Plummer (1990) studies had small sample sizes 
(n= 73 and n=31 respectively). Given the inconsistent findings regarding the association 
between CSB and negative outcomes, it may be more appropriate to conclude that there is 
no positive relationship between CSB and adjustment.
3.2.4 Behavioural self-blame
Behavioural self-blame has been a particularly problematic concept, and studies have 
yielded contradictory results. In agreement with Bulman and Wortman’s (1977) findings, 
Tirnlco and Janoff-Bulman, (1985) showed that behavioural attributions of blame were 
positively associated with adjustment in breast cancer patients. This study was also the first 
to look at the mediating effects of control and vulnerability on the relationship between self­
blame and adjustment. Similarly, Tennen, Affleck and Gersbman (1986), in a study of 
mothers of infants with severe perinatal complications, presented further support for a 
positive relationship between behavioural self-blame and adjustment. Only partial support 
for the functionality of self-blame was provided by Taylor, Lichtman & Wood, (1984) who 
found that self-blame correlated with adjustment between 17 and 36 months after surgeiy in 
post-mastectomy patients but not earlier or later than that period.
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Ill non-patient populations, Peterson, Schwartz & Selingman (1981) found that, while 
general self-blame was systematically related to depressive symptoms in undergraduate 
women, there are two attributional styles incompatible with depression: a style of attributing 
bad events externally or a style of attributing them to one’s behavior. This indirectly 
provided support to Jannof-Bulman’s theory. Also, Meyer and Taylor (1986) studied victim 
attributions and post-rape trauma, basing their hypotheses on Janoff-Bulman’s theory. They 
found that although rape victims engaged in self-blame, they did not distinguish between 
behavioral and characterological self-blame.
However, many studies have found evidence contradicting that presented above. As already 
mentioned, Gotay (1985) studied 42 early-stage and 31 advanced-stage cancer patients and 
found that neither characterological nor behavioural self-blame were related to adjustment. 
In a later study on bum-injured patients, Kiecolt-Glaser and Williams (1987) concluded that 
behavioural self-blame (displayed by virtually all self-blaming participants in this study to 
some degree) is maladaptive and is associated with poorer compliance, more pain behaviour 
and greater depression. In 1988, the theory of adaptiveness of self-blame was challenged 
once again by Nielson and MacDonald’s study of spinal-cord-injured patients. Results 
showed a strong association between self-blame and poor post-traumatic adjustment.
Finally, Houldin, Jacobsen and Lowery (1996) studied the relationship between self-blame 
in a sample of 234 women diagnosed with stage I or stage II breast cancer. Although results 
failed to provide evidence for the different effects of characterological self-blame and 
adjustment, it was shown that more self-blame (of both kinds) was associated with poorer 
adjustment.
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In a non-patient population, Sholomskas, Steil and Plummer (1990) managed to select a 
sample comparable to that of Bulman and Wortman’s (1977) in all relevant dimensions (i.e 
size, diagnosis, time since diagnosis, mean age). Yet, the study failed to replicate the 
original findings, although it did provide evidence that blaming another for a negative event 
was associated with poor coping. Similar results were obtained by Frazier {1990), who 
foimd that, as with CSB, behavioral self-blame was positively associated with post-rape 
depression. This study also indicated that participants’ distinction between characterological 
and behavioral self-blame was not as clear cut as previously assumed.
Of all the studies reviewed above, two studies were identified for attempting to address the 
limitations of previous research by employing a prospective design. Malcame et al (1995) 
studied self-blame and perceived control over disease progression and recurrence as 
predictors of distress in cancer patients. Patients were assessed near the time of diagnosis 
and 4 months later. This allowed for stronger conclusions regarding whether self-blame 
affects or is affected by psychological distress. Results supported the notion that 
characterological self-blame has negative effects on adjustment but found no evidence of 
beneficial effects of behavioral self-blame. Building on the work of Malcame et al, Glinder 
& Compas (1999) examined the associations between self-blame and distress both cross- 
sectionally and prospectively, and were the first to study the effects of self-blame on cancer 
patients from diagnosis to a full year’s follow-up. Results showed that characterological 
self-blame was a predictor of distress over time (i.e. predicted distress at three months), 
while behavioural self-blame was a better predictor of distress cross-sectionally (i.e. 
correlated only to concurrent affective symptoms).
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Finally, an interesting development in the self-blame literature was marked by Christensen 
et al (1999). Rather than focusing once more on the relationship between self-blame and 
adjustment, their study investigated the effects of behavioural self-blame on behaviour 
change in head and neck cancer patients. They found that behavioural self-blame was a 
good predictor of behaviour change (i.e reduced smoking and alcohol consumption) only 
among those patients with high perceived control over future health.
3.3 LIMITATIONS IN THE LITERATURE
The previous section showed that results in the studies of self-blame have not been 
consistent. It has also shown that BSB is the concept that has yielded the most contradictory 
findings. To illustrate these inconsistencies, Table 3.1 shows a breakdown of the main 
studies on patient populations according to a) the type and size of sample they used, b) the 
design used, c) the types of blame investigated, d) the time elapsed since the negative event, 
e) the measures used to assess adjustment, and f) the results regarding the relationship 
between self-blame and adjustment (with signifying a negative relationship and *+’ 
signifying a positive relationship).
As can be seen in Table 3.1, only three studies (i.e. Schultz & Decker, 1985, Moulton et al, 
1987, and Houldin et al, 1996) have sample sizes larger than 100 participants. All other 
studies on the table have considerably smaller sample sizes suggesting problems with 
power. Also, there is great variability in the time that had elapsed since the negative event in 
these studies. Time variables range from the day of diagnosis/event (Malcame et al, 1995; 
Glinder & Compas, 1999) to 21 years later (Schultz & Decker, 1985). Similar variability
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can be seen in the selection of adjustment variables and their measures presented in these 
studies. Specifically, studies define adjustment as combinations of the following: levels of 
anxiety and depression, mood state, levels o f general adjustment to illness, general well­
being, marital adjustment, hopelessness levels. The potential effects of such diversities on 
the validity of the results are discussed in detail in the next section.
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Inconsistencies regarding the adaptiveness of patient self-blame can be attributed to the 
following methodological problems.
a) Operational definitions and measurement.
The construct of self-blame has been operationalised differently by different studies. For 
example, while Temien, Affleck and Gershman (1986) aim to study self-blame among 
parents of infants with perinatal complications (and indeed give this title to their paper), 
they ask their participants: ‘Today, do you think that something you (or someone else) did 
or did not do might have been, at least in part, responsible for your infant’s medical 
problems or immaturity?’ (pp. 692). They then asked the mothers to rate on 10-point scales, 
ranging from 1 = not at all responsible to 10= totally responsible, the extent to which they 
believed the problems were due to themselves, others or chance. In contrast, Frazier (1990) 
assessed the rape victims’ characterological and behavioural self-blame by asking directly, 
‘How much do you blame things you did before the rape?’ or ‘How much do you blame 
things about your personality that you feel you can’t change?’ (pp. 300). As in these 
examples, in many studies on self-blame it is not clear from the beginning whether self­
blame refers to ‘self-attribution of causality’ or ‘self-attribution of responsibility’ or a 
different term altogether
Differentiating between causality, responsibility and blame in research and application has 
been viewed as an important issue since it may affect the construct validity of ‘self-blame’ 
(Shaver & Drown, 1986). Using the terms interchangeably reduces clarity and, thus, 
contributes to a vague theory that lacks consistency and predictive value. These distinctions
3.3.1 Methodological explanations fo r  the inconsistent results.
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are discussed in Shaver’s (1985) model of blame attribution. Based on the philosophy of 
science and moral philosophy that discuss causation and responsibility respectively, she 
concludes that judgements of responsibility and blame tend to follow the occurrence of 
negative rather than positive events. In this line of reason, the cause of an event is that 
behaviour or situation that is sufficient for the occurrence of the event. Causality is 
dichotomous since a cause either exists or not. In contrast, responsibility characterises or 
even labels a process, can have degrees (high/low, minimum/maximum), and is thus 
variable. Responsibility usually connotes the perceiver’s judgement about a person in 
question and may be direct or indirect (i.e. vicarious responsibility). Finally, blame is the 
attribution made by the perceiver when the offender’s justification for an action is 
unacceptable.
While Shaver’s model refers mainly to situations where the perceiver is different from the 
actor, it can also be applied when the same person is both the actor and the perceiver. For 
example, when a medical problem is considered from the point o f view of the patient the 
distinction among the three terms may apply: the past actions or omissions of a patient can 
cause the medical problem, and the degree of the patient’s negligence can be the ground of 
accepting responsibility. According to Shaver & Drown (1986), ‘a victim cannot be 
objectively blameworthy for the occurrence of a crime or an illness, unless the victim 
intentionally behaved in a manner to produce the suffering' (p.704). hi other words, the 
authors object to the use of the term ‘(self-) blame’, unless intention to suffer is involved.
Although a literary analysis of the term may support the author’s views, it is also important 
to examine the participant’s understanding of the term. Being able to differentiate between
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responsibility, blame and cause does not imply that when presented with each term alone 
participants have its literal meaning in mind. For example, asking patients with a history of 
an unhealthy lifestyle whether they blame themselves for their current illness may not be 
inappropriate if, in retrospect, ‘not doing the right thing5 seems to them just as culpable as 
an intentionally harmful act.
Moreover, Shaver & Drown (1986) do not offer a comprehensive literature review. Indeed, 
there is contradictory evidence that participants in fact cannot differentiate among the three 
tenns of responsibility, causality and blame (e.g. Wortman, 1983; Sholomskas, Steil & 
Plummer, 1990; Drown, 1985). Perhaps a more promising view was incorporated in Shaver 
& Drown’s comment that ‘the manner in which blame is inaccurately applied by victims 
may prove valuable in understanding their emotional adjustment. [Self-blame] is the 
outcome of an intensely personal dispute’ and ‘may cany the affective connotations that can 
lead to depression’ (p.701).
To follow the above point, Brewin, Robson & Shapiro (1983) demonstrated that it is 
possible to make causal attributions to self or others without blame. In a study of male 
victims of industrial accidents, participants’ causal attributions (including self-attributions) 
were measured separately from blame assessments. Measures of blame and culpability 
focused on the moral evaluations of participants and included items relating to negligence 
and just cause. In contrast, causal attributions focused only on the cause-effect relationship 
between actors and events. Results showed that men who felt more culpable for their 
accidents had faster recoveries while men who only made self-attributions did not have
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consistent recovery rates. The moral component of self-blame has also been supported by 
studies on non-patient populations (e.g. Kelly, 1998).
In any case, a clear and realistic operational definition of self-blame and, consequently, a 
systematic investigation of participants understanding of it is necessary for a study to be 
well-founded, complete and comparable to others.
A similar lack of coherence in the supposed effects of self-blame is evident in the 
measurement of outcome variables in self-blame studies. Measures of adjustment have 
included measures of coping (e.g, Tennen et al, 1984), mood state (e.g. Tennen et al, 
1986), distress (e.g. Malcame et al, 1995), depression (Timko & Janoff-Bulman, 1985), 
general measures of adjustment to illness (e.g. Houldin, Jacobsen & Lowery, 1996), or a 
combination of the above (e.g. Moulton, Sweet, Temosholc & Mandel, 1987). Finally, 
behaviour change was investigated as an outcome measure in patients with head and neck 
cancer (Christensen et al, 1999). This ‘polyphony’ of constructs has been coupled by a 
similar* polyphony in measures within each construct, covering a wide range of 
methodologies from standardized and unstandardised questionnaires, surveys and 
obseiver ratings (e.g. most of studies mentioned above) to qualitative data (e.g. Anderson, 
1999). In addition, some studies base their findings on qualitative data. As a result, 
comparison and integration of the findings, let alone a meta-analysis of them, becomes a 
difficult task.
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b) Statistical power
As mentioned in the previous section, a large proportion of studies on self-blame (as well as 
on other specific attributions) employ small samples for their analyses. This has an impact 
on the statistical power of a study (Robins, 1988). Power is the probability of rejecting a 
false null hypothesis. It is a function of the significance criterion (typically p<.005), effect 
size and sample size (Cohen, 1988). Power calculations should ideally be carried out prior 
to data collection. As suggested by Hall (2000), to have 80% power with p<.005 
significance criterion when a medium effect size is expected, a sample size of 64 is needed 
for a correlation analysis and 102 for a t-test. Effect sizes in psychology tend to be medium 
to small (Cooper & Findley, 1982) and effects of self-blame on adjustment or behaviour 
change should not be an exception. Power and effect sizes are not discussed in self-blame 
studies and there is a possibility that even significant results are a result of Type 1 error.
c) Timing
Another aspect relevant to the inconsistencies in the self-blame literature is the timing o f the 
measurement. As with the study of other attributions (e.g. Agrawal & Dalai, 1993; Major, 
Mueller & Hildebrandt, 1985; Dirksen, 1995), the time interval between participants’ 
experience and self-blame measurements has varied considerably among the different 
studies. For example, ranging from a few days after the diagnosis (e.g Moulton et al, 1987) 
to several years (e.g. Timko & Janoff-Bulman, 1985), the effect of elapsed time on 
perceptions of responsibility or blame has not been accounted for. When a negative 
experience is recent and ‘vivid’ in one’s memory, it is likely to be charged with powerful 
emotions that affect cognition. Reacting to statements about the event will only reflect the 
individual’s present state which in many cases may not be permanent. On the other hand, if
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too much time has passed since the negative event, the individual may have completely 
overcome the experience, large parts of which may have even been forgotten. Comparing 
data obtained at such potentially different circumstances can be a misleading task and 
should be avoided.
Timing issues are also involved in the design various studies have used. The majority of 
them are cross-sectional (see Table 3.1), making data susceptible to time of measurement 
effects. For example, being in the hospital (whether as an in-patient or an out-patient), 
waiting to see the doctor or having just come out of a possibly stressfiil follow-up session 
may affect the sample’s responses. Conducting time series studies to control for time of 
measurement effects is one way around the problem. However, even more preferable are 
prospective studies, which have iately been utilised with very promising results (e.g.
Glinder & Compas, 1999; Richards, Elliot, Shewchuck & Fine, 1997). The latter research 
design, not only allows for the control of timing effects, it also resolves problems of 
potential reciprocal relations. Indeed, by employing a prospective design in their study, 
Malcame et al (1995) found that ‘initial distress predicts increases in later self-blame, just as 
initial self-blame predicts increases in later distress’ (pp.414). Unfortunately, only a small 
number of studies on self-blame have used a prospective design possibly due to time and 
cost considerations.
d) Sample diversity
By focusing on Janoff-Bulman’s initial observations of better adjusted self-blaming victims 
(namely severe accident and rape victims), a chain-effect was initiated whereby subsequent 
studies set out to explore that same observation hoping to provide critical evidence for or
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against it. However, the theory was unquestionably expanded to other populations without 
ensuring the applicability of the construct and the logic behind it. Participants such as 
cancer patients (e.g. Malcane et al, 1995), AIDS patients (e.g. Moulton et al, 1987) or heart 
disease patients (Affleck, Tennen, Croog & Levine, 1987), possibly have different 
experiences when compared to each other as well as to rape or severe accident victims. As 
Forsythe and Compas (1987) have shown, the effectiveness of different coping strategies or 
attributions varies from one event to another and often depends on the controllability of the 
events. Frazier and Schauben (1994) have provided some evidence towards the 
generalisability of the relationship between self-blame and recovery from negative events. 
They performed their study on college students who had suffered one of three negative 
events (i.e. rape, bereavement, and relationship loss). Results showed that bereavement was 
seen as less controllable than relationship loss and involved less behavioural and 
characterological self-blame. Also, in all three groups, both types o f self-blame were related 
to poor adjustment. Although this study acknowledges the need to systematically test for 
generalisability across different populations, it leaves room for some criticism. First, 
comparisons for differences in responses were only performed between two of the three 
groups (i.e. bereavement and relationship loss). There was no comparison of these groups 
with that o f rape victims. Consequently, one cannot safely say whether rape -the event 
originally involved in the formulation of the theory- is in any way similar to bereavement or 
relationship loss. Finally, it is important that the similarities and or differences of negative 
events be studied systematically on dimensions that are relevant not only theoretically but 
also empirically based on lay people’s own representations of negative events.
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Apart form the methodological weaknesses of the research on self-blame a number of 
theoretical limitations also exist. These limitations can be divided into two categories: a) 
those regarding the purpose or reasons for self-blame and b) those regarding its relation to 
adjustment. This section reviews these limitations beginning in both instances with those 
recently reported in the literature.
a) Lack o f theoretical scrutiny
A large number of the studies mentioned earlier focus mainly on coping strategies as a 
collection of spontaneous behaviours employed in order to achieve psychological 
adjustment. Consequently a general theoretical perspective is adopted (e.g. Lazarus’ model 
of problem vs. emotion focus coping), through which self-blame is seen as one of many 
different reactions to a stressful situation, and discussion typically revolves around more 
general ideas of coping motivation and effectiveness. However, Janoff-Bulman (1992) had a 
slightly different approach when describing self-blame. The tenn was placed in the context 
of trauma reinterpretation and seen as a cognitive strategy that ultimately contributes to the 
process of emotional recovery. Using the coping concepts of primary and secondary 
appraisal (and not coping strategies) proposed by Lazarus (1966), Janoff-Bulman (1992) 
claims that “a third type of appraisal process becomes very evident in the case of traumatic 
events. These are not appraisals that occur during the initial confrontation with the traumatic 
situation, but rather interpretations and redefinitions of the event that occur over the course 
of coping and adjustment” (pp. 116). Thus, it is obvious that the conceptualization of self­
blame depends largely on the level of theoretical scrutiny that researchers apply when 
formulating their research questions. It is possible that if Janoff-Bulman’s findings had not
3.3.2 Theoretical limitations in self-blame research
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been surprising enough to spur a series of studies and eventually create the theoretical and 
methodological challenges that they have, self-blame would have remained a concept tied to 
the ideas of coping strategies and seen as more of an emotional reaction (similar to guilt) 
and less of a cognitive process related to attributions.
b) Alternative reasons for self-blame
One factor not previously considered in the formulation and application of the self-blame 
theory is the level of consistency between the actual risk factors involved in the patient’s 
condition and his or her causal attributions for the event. Self-blame may be the result o f  
identifying those behavioural or personality factors in the patient’s life that are believed to 
be related to a given chronic condition and attributing the condition to them. For example, 
heart disease patients who believe their heart attack is directly related to their smoking or 
dietary behaviour or their stress-prone personality may blame themselves for their illness. 
Similarly, a breast cancer patient may blame herself for the seriousness of her condition 
because of her neglect to have regular breast cancer screening. In other words, it is possible 
that in some studies self-blame reflects the participants’ causal attributions and not a need to 
regain control.
To take the above point further, self-blame (or lack of it) may be affected by the social 
environment within which physical illness is experienced. With the links between disease 
and lifestyle being emphasised by the media and health campaigns targeting unhealthy 
behaviours, there is an increasing awareness of the role of the individual in maintaining 
health. Psychological literature has repeatedly addressed the impact of this awareness on
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people’s health cognitions (e.g. B lax ter, 1993; Lupton, 1994). As Bradley (1994) has 
written:
The perceived failure of medicine to remove [the chronic] diseases, and the 
consequent demand placed upon health services to care for the chronically sick, 
provide the backdrop to the call for the individual to be responsible for improving 
the health of the nation [...] Control of conditions like cancer and heart disease 
depends upon modification of the individual’s behaviour and- habit of 
living...(pp.198).
It is, thus, possible that patient self-blame is a reflection of a more widely held notion o f  
individual responsibility for health. To the best of our knowledge, this parameter has not 
been empirically investigated.
c) Self-blame and adjustment.
MacLeod (1999) revisited the assumptions behind Janoff-Buhnan’s model and presented 
an alternative interpretation ‘o f why attributions appeal* to mediate psychological 
adjustment’ (ppl9). The first assumption underlying Janoff-Bulman’s model is that victims 
of misfortune are likely to engage in an attributional search in order to make sense of the 
event. However, this is not always the case. As Gotey (1985) found in her study of cancer 
patients, a large proportion of the sample (24%) had not looked for a reason for their 
situation. Moreover, Taylor, Lichtman & Wood (1984) found little difference in recovery 
between breast cancer patients who engage in causal thinking and those who don’t. While 
such contradictions may be due to differences in timing considerations (i.e. patients may be 
preoccupied with different aspects of a disease at different points in time), it is also possible 
that attributional flunking (and behavioural self-blame in particular) is unrelated to 
psychological adjustment (MacLeod, 1999).
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A second aspect o f the self-blame theory criticised by MacLeod is the role o f perceived 
control as a mediator between self-blame and adjustment. He argues that past evidence for 
this relationship is considerably weak and, despite some useful suggestions for a distinction 
between control over outcomes and control over recurrence (Tennen, Affleck, & Gersliman, 
1986; Malcarne, Compas, Epping-Jordan and Howell, 1995), any attempts for a re-appraisal 
remain inadequate.
Finally, McLeod suggested that the possible inconsistencies in the literature may be due to 
unidentified yet better moderators or predictors of the relationship between perceived 
control and adjustment. Specifically, it is stressed that results may be affected by how 
controllable the incident really is (i.e. the objective controllability o f the incident rather than 
its comparative controllability). For example, while a relationship breakdown seems more 
controllable than bereavement, it can nevertheless be an event of very low control. 
Moreover, in low control events, it may be more important to consider the perceived 
likelihood o f recurrence rather than perceived control per se.
Inconsistent results regarding the adjustive function of behavioural self-blame may also be 
due to a possible interaction between behavioural and characterological self-blame. The 
importance of this relationship has been stressed by Janoff-Bulman (1992) herself. 
Specifically, she cautioned that ‘the effects of characterological self-blame should be 
partialled out of correlations between behavioral self-blame and coping outcomes. This has 
not been done in research studies, and thus the adaptive value of behavioral self-blame is 
apt to be missed or seriously underestimated’ (pp. 200). Unfortunately, this clarification
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came somewhat late in the debate and few studies have tested and/or controlled for this 
interaction (e.g. Malcame et al, 1995).
Finally, inconsistent findings may also be due to a reciprocal relation between self-blame 
and outcome variables. Specifically, it is important to examine whether self-blame and 
adjustment are part of a perpetuating emotional cycle rather than two separate states in a 
cause and effect relationship. If, for example, self-blame (whether behavioural or 
characterological) is a result of a causal search that took place during a period of 
significant experienced anxiety or depression (e.g. soon after a negative event), it is likely 
that it may contribute to more anxiety or depression which may, in turn, strengthen self­
blame and so on, explaining the studies showing a negative correlation between 
adjustment and self-blame. Similarly, a positive relationship might be explained by 
successful coping already in use at the time of the attributional search. In this case, the 
mere availability of an explanation (even as self-implicating as self-blame) may promote 
emotional well-being. As already noted, timing considerations might be of importance 
here as well. The amount of time elapsed since the event might determine the presence or 
absence of successful coping and thus, the positive or negative nature of the reciprocal 
relationship.
3.4 IDENTIFICATION OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Research 011 self-blame needs to address the weaknesses of past studies and work towards 
revising the theory to account for specific populations. The present thesis attempts to
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address some of the issues mentioned above and provide evidence for an alternative 
conceptualization of self-blame.
a) Sample diversity
The issue of sample diversity is addressed in two ways in this thesis. First,-* a comparative 
approach is used and the degree to which levels of self-blame differ across populations is 
investigated. Levels of self-blame and its relationship to adjustment are compared among 
heart disease, breast cancer and diabetes patients. The reasons for detected differences are 
explored. This issue is also addressed by looking at the illness representations of non­
patients and exploring the place that various illnesses- compared to other negative events- 
hold in the lay representations of negative events. Furthermore, a comparison of levels of 
self-blame between patient and non-patient samples matched on all relevant variables is 
performed to explore the role that the actual experience can have on the levels of self-blame.
b) Reasons fo r self-blame
The role of self-blame and the reasons for its occurrence are addressed in two ways in the 
thesis. Specifically, the relationship between self-blame and causal attributions is 
investigated and the possibility that self-blame is a result of ‘reality based’ attributions is 
examined. This issue is addressed rather indirectly at first by relating the number of 
behavioural attributions patients made to their levels of self-blame. Later in the thesis, a 
model looking at predictors of self-blame is proposed and tested.
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c) Timing
Ideally, the effect of the time elapsed since diagnosis should be investigated longitudinally. 
However, the studies presented in this thesis adopted cross-sectional designs for both 
methodological reasons relating to other variables and practical considerations. A good 
cross-section of data on time elapsed since diagnosis was available in all studies involving 
patient samples. Timing information was repeatedly examined in relation to self-blame and 
adjustment in all relevant studies.
d) Self-blame and adjustment
The relationship between self-blame and adjustment was investigated in both an 
exploratory and a model testing approach in separate samples. Adjustment was assessed 
through measures of depression and anxiety. To incorporate the recent findings by 
Christensen et al (1999) a measure of health behaviour change was also incorporated in the 
third study reported in the thesis.
e) Operationalization and measurement o f  self-blame
Shaver and Drown’s (1986) proposal for a distinction between responsibility, causality and 
blame is addressed in the last study where participants’ responses to a series of items 
differing in the use of these three tenns are compared. Also, the need for a multi-item 
measure is briefly addressed in the first study. The first steps towards the design of a scale 
sensitive to the different types of self-blame that takes into account the potential differences 
between causality, responsibility and blame is presented.
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a) Does self-blame differ across different patient populations? If yes, in what way?
b) What are the personal and situational characteristics, if any, that predict behavioural 
self-blame?
c) Does the time elapsed since diagnosis affect patient self-blame?
d) Is there a relationship between self-blame and adjustment or behaviour change?
e) How do people understand the concept of blame in illness? Do they differentiate 
between similar tenns such as blame and responsibility or control and avoidability?
To summarise, the following general research questions are investigated in this thesis:
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C H A P T E R  FO U R  
M E A S U R IN G  SE L F -B L A M E  IN  C H R O N IC A L L Y  IL L  P A T IE N T S: 
A  P IL O T  ST U D Y
SUMMARY
This study aimed to explore self-blame in chronic illness by comparing responses in three 
groups of chronically ill patients (i.e. heart disease, breast cancer and diabetes patients). In 
the first part of the study, the preliminary work before the main data collection is presented. 
Specifically, the generation of items towards the construction of a self-blame measure is 
presented, which was deemed necessary after identifying the predominantly single-item 
measures used in past research in the area. Following item generation, the measure was 
piloted within a patient population to identify potential problems with item clarity and 
comprehensiveness. The final set of items was then identified and used in the next phase of 
the study where its psychometric properties were assessed on a larger sample before entered 
in further analyses. In the second phase, relationships between self-blame and other illness 
attributions, self-efficacy, psychological adjustment (i.e. anxiety and depression), and diet 
and exercise health behaviours were examined. Furthermore, the effects of the level of 
event specificity (i.e. general condition vs. specific negative event relevant to illness) was 
examined. Results showed significant differences across illness groups and between general 
and specific self-blame. Also, the number of behavioural risk factors patients associated 
with their illness correlated highly with the levels self-blame. Diet and exercise levels were 
negatively correlated with self-blame in the diabetes group. No relationship was found 
between self-blame and self-efficacy or psychological adjustment. The strengths and
limitations of the study are discussed and suggestions for further research are made.
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Self-blame has been the focus of attribution research for the last 25 years. Janoff-Bulman 
and Wortman’s (1977) study on self-blame and coping in severe accident victims is 
considered the cornerstone for this line of research. In that study, it was found that, 
contrary to other findings, self-blame was a predictor of good coping, suggesting the 
functionality of self-blame. Various possible explanations for this relationship were 
proposed including control over one’s life (Wortman, 1976), preservation of the essential 
belief in a ‘just world’ (Lemer, 1980), and need to find meaning in significant events 
(Silver & Wortman, 1980). Whatever the explanation, self-blame was seen as arising from 
a need to minimise the uncertainty created after a negative event.
The majority of studies on self-blame have focused on victims of rape and severe 
accidents having led to spinal cord injuries (e.g. Nielson & MacDonald, 1988 ; 
Sholomskas, Steel & Plummer, 1990 ; Schultz & Decker, 1985 ; Meyer & Taylor, 1986 ; 
Janoff-Bulman, 1982). In physical illness, interest on self-blame is due mainly to its 
possible implication on psychological adjustment and recovery from physical illness. 
However, studies have been inconclusive on the existence and nature of the above 
relationship. With findings suggesting that the association between self-blame is positive 
(e.g. Bulman & Wortman, 1977), negative (e.g. Malcame et al, 1995) or non-existent (e.g. 
Taylor et al, 1984), it has been difficult to come to a conclusion about the effects of self- 
blaming behaviour on adjustment or recoveiy.
The diversity in findings has been attributed to a number of reasons. First, the samples 
used have differed in a number of dimensions such as type of disease or injury, mean age,
4.1 INTRODUCTION
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and time elapsed since the negative event (Gotay, 1985; Kiecolt-Glaser & Williams,
1987; Schultz & Decker, 1985). Second, the means of measuring psychological 
adjustment varied considerably, ranging from unstandardised observer ratings (e.g nurses) 
to self-ratings of coping, anxiety or depression (Bulman & Wortman, 1977; Sholomskas, 
1986). Finally, there has been great variety in the operationalisation and measurement of 
self-blame (Shaver & Down, 1986).
Regarding the latter issue, the most commonly used method of assessing self-blame has 
been by directly asking participants to rate their attributions of general, BSB and CSB on 
Likert scales. The single items used in the majority of research have been variations on the 
questions of a structured interview originally used by Janoff-Bulman (1979). Specifically, 
in Janoff-Bulman’s original research, general self-blame was assessed by asking 
participants to respond to the question ‘How much do you blame yourself for what 
happened?’ on a 7-point Likert scale. Responses were then converted into percentages and 
were considered in conjunction with percentage of blame assigned to four factors: self, other 
people, environment, and chance. CSB and BSB and were assessed by asking ‘If you 
assigned blame to yourself, how much would it be to the type of person you are, and how 
much to choosing the wrong thing in the situation?’. Responses were given on a 10-point 
scale with 1= ‘I am the type of person who has bad things happen to them’ and 10= ‘I chose 
the wrong thing to do in this particular* situation’. In addition to these aspects of self-blame, 
perceived avoidability was assessed by asking ‘To what extent do you believe you could 
have avoided what happened?’ rated on a 7-point scale with l=not at all and 7=completely.
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A number of limitations can be identified in the above measures. First, the four factors on 
which blame is assigned are limiting and not necessarily mutually exclusive. For example, 
people may view environmental factors as affected by chance, or others as part o f their 
environment. Assigning percentages to these factors is not informative enough, unless used 
in association with a qualitative framework such as interviews where there, is the possibility 
of probing. Second, BSB and CSB are assessed by the same item and are treated as a single 
dimension. Hence, a value on the relevant 10-point scale can only show a tendency towards 
one type of self-blame rather than the other and limits the type of analyses that could 
possibly be performed if the two were measured as separate dimensions (e.g. correlations 
between BSB and CSB). Third, these items were constructed by the investigator instead of 
consulting the target population to discover the ways they described self-blame.
Subsequent research has been substantially influenced by Janoff-Bulman’s methodology 
and has used these items or modified versions. For example, Frazier (1990) used modified 
items on BSB and CSB asking participants ‘How much do you blame things you did before 
the rape (e.g. walking alone at night)?’ and ‘How much do you blame things in your 
personality (e.g. being too trusting) that you feel you can’t change?’. Both items were 
scored on a 5-point scale. While these items measure BSB and CSB as separate dimensions, 
they are only single item measures of these constructs.
Apart from the methodological problems with self-blame measures, several conceptual 
issues discussed in the previous chapter have been raised by a number of researchers (e.g. 
Shaver & Drown, 1986). These emphasise the richness of the construct and the need for a 
multi-item measure that will allow a consistent and systematic approach.
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Sholomskas, Steil & Plummer (1990) considered all the above inconsistencies and 
designed a study specifically to replicate Bulman & Wortman’s ‘original self-blame, 
other-blame and coping relationship on a comparable sample and event, using both the 
original instruments and ones which could address the issues reviewed’ (pp.552). They 
found that other-blame to be a better predictor of poor coping than self-blame. Relevant to 
these issues is a recent systematic literature review on the relationship between 
attributions and adjustment to serious illness by Hall (2000). She found most attributions 
to be unrelated to psychological outcomes, attributing the confusion regarding this 
relationship to small, under-powered studies. It must be noted, however, that causal 
attributions lack the evaluative component present in self-blame (Brewin 1988) and 
therefore should not be considered a typical example of self-blame. Also, the above study 
focused only on the relationships between outcome, types of attributions, and sample size. 
It did not take into account the measurement of attributions and outcomes nor did it 
differentiate among the various types of illness (acute, chronic, accidents etc.).
A possible explanation for the above inconsistencies is that the nature of self-blame may 
vary from one situation to the other. It may be the case that the underlying psychological 
processes that can lead to self-blame are different for victims depending on the nature of 
the adverse event (e.g. rape versus accident versus chronic illness). Similarly, the same 
person may engage in self-blame for some aspects of the negative experience and not 
others, thus finding it easier to assess their role in more specific situations (e.g. high 
cholesterol indices in a blood test) occurring after and within the scope of a diagnosis. 
Although to the best knowledge of the present researcher comparative studies on self­
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blame have not been reported, indications of differences in self-blame across situations 
can be found when comparing relevant research findings. For instance, levels of self­
blame in cancer patients appear to be lower than in victims of violence. To illustrate, in 
Malcame et al (1995), mean self-blame of cancer patients was 1.90 (SD=1.01) for 
behavioural (BSB) and 1.56 (SD=0.98) for characterological self-blame (CSB) measured 
on a 5-point Likert scale (where 5= high self-blame). On the other hand, Frazier (1990) 
found mean self- blame of rape victims to be 2.64 (SD=10.45) for BSB and 2.62 
(SD=T.38) for CSB on the same 5-point scale. Although these differences may be due to 
different study designs, they indicate that the situation or condition may be a determinant 
of self-blame. Hence, further research is needed to evaluate this possibility. As an 
implication of this, it is worth exploring the effect that specificity of reference may have 
on levels of self-blame. Apart from looking at the overall situation and making 
comparisons across conditions, it is important to examine whether referring to an illness 
as a whole would yield different levels of self-blame than referring to a specific event 
within the illness (e.g. bad test results or a specific episode of health deterioration).
The discrepant results in prior studies on self-blame have also been attributed to the role 
of attributions and perceived control over the cause of the illness (Temien et al, 1986). 
Specifically, it has been suggested that the strength and direction of the relationship 
between adjustment and self-blame is mediated by perceived control over the perceived 
causes of an event. Various forms of perceived control have been studied including locus 
of control (Taylor, Lichtman & Wood, 1984) and perceived avoidability (Schulz & 
Decker, 1985; Davis, Lehman, Silver et al, 1996). Another concept closely related to 
issues of control is self-efficacy. In an experimental study of the relationship between
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self-blame, coping self-efficacy and abortion, Mueller and Major (1989) found that self- 
efficacy was moderately related to self-blame and predicted adjustment 3 weeks post­
abortion. However, this study employed an experimental design using counselling 
interventions. The degree to which these results generalise to different medical conditions 
needs further exploration.
Finally, it has been suggested that variables other than psychological adjustment may be 
affected by self-blame. Specifically, Cliristenssen et al (1999) stress the importance of 
investigating the relationship between self-blame and health behaviours. Although their 
study provides some evidence of such a relationship (i.e. more behavioural self-blame was 
associated with less smoking or drinking), it is based on a small sample (N=66) and 
focuses only on one patient group (head/neck cancer patients) and their related health 
behaviours (i.e. smoking and drinking).
The present study investigated self-blame across different chronic conditions.
To address the shortcomings of previous measures, a multi-item measure of self-blame was 
developed in consultation with members of the public and was administered to a sample of 
patients with diabetes or heart disease. The first step towards this goal included the 
generation of the appropriate items.
Once a multi-item self-blame scale was designed, levels of self-blame were compared 
among diabetes, heart disease and breast cancer patients. These particular groups of 
patients were chosen for two reasons. First, cancer, diabetes and heart disease are three of 
the most common chronic illnesses today. According to the national statistics provided by
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the Department of Health (DOH, 2000) out of 971 male deaths per 100,000 registered in 
the year* 2000, 378 were due to a circulatory condition with 227 specifically due to 
ischaemic heart disease. Cancer was the second most common cause of death accounting 
for 260 deaths. Female deaths showed a similar pattern, with 397 out of the 1043 deaths 
per 100,000 due to circulatory conditions and 236 due to cancer. Detailed tables of these 
statistics are given in Appendix I. Although diabetes does not appear to claim as many 
lives as cancer and heart disease, it is one of the most common medical conditions in the 
UK with over 1.4 million people already diagnosed and an estimated 1 million remaining 
unidentified (Diabetes UK, 2000). It can also lead to mortality through circulatory 
problems which have already been established as a leading cause of death above. All three 
conditions are therefore serious enough to warrant investigation. Another reason for 
choosing these conditions is that they carry different degrees of lifestyle involvement and 
are thus ideal for exploring the relationship between the behavioural attributions and self- 
blame. Specifically, both heart disease and diabetes have been linked to a number of 
behavioural risk factors such as diet and exercise. In contrast, breast cancer has been more 
certainly linked to uncontrollable factors such as heredity and age and less so to health 
behaviours such as diet, exercise and smoking.
Thus, looking at these serious and comparatively diverse medical conditions, the present 
study explored the relationship between self-blame and measures of psychological 
adjustment (anxiety and depression), self-efficacy, behavioural attributions and self-care 
activities (diet and exercise) through comparisons among the patient groups.
74
In order to investigate the effect that specificity of reference can have on reported levels 
of self-blame, self-blame was measured twice in this study: once with reference to the 
participants’ condition in general, and then regarding a specific recent negative event 
relevant to their condition (e.g. alarming symptoms).
The research questions addressed were the following:
a) Are there differences in levels of self-blame across different medical conditions?
b) Does the specificity of reference (i.e. referring to specific rather than general 
events) affect the levels of self-blame reported by participants?
c) What is the relationship between self-blame and psychological adjustment in the 
patient groups under study? What is the role of generalised self-efficacy in that 
relationship?
d) What is the relationship between self-blame and current health behaviours? (i.e. 
diet and exercise)?
Specific research hypotheses were tentative due to the novelty of the research questions 
and the markedly inconsistent findings in past research regarding self-blame and 
adjustment. Nevertheless, it was expected that self-blame would be significantly different 
across patient groups and references of different specificity. Regarding the relationship 
between self-blame and psychological adjustment, it was expected that, if a relationship 
were found, it would be moderated by general self-efficacy. Specifically, self-blame 
would lead to low adjustment only when generalised self-efficacy was low. Finally, it was 
expected that there would be a positive correlation between health care activities and self­
blame for the medical condition.
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4.2 PHASE I: ITEM GENERATION AND PILOTING
4.2.1 Ethical Approval
Access to the patient sample for this phase of the study was allowed following an 
application to the South West Surrey Local Research Ethics Committee accompanied by 
the consent of the relevant consultants. Approval was granted within approximately two 
months (Committee approval letter in Appendix II).
4.2.2 Participants
Non-patients: An opportunity sample of 15 members of the public (6 males and 9 
females) was recruited in order to obtain the items for the self-blame scale. Participants’ 
mean age was 35 years.
Patients: A total of 74 patients were recruited from the Royal Surrey County Hospital out­
patient clinics. Patients were diagnosed with either heart disease or diabetes. Their mean 
age was 50.5 years (SD=12.8) and their mean time elapsed since diagnosis was 6 years 
(SD=5.4). A breakdown of the patients’ characteristics is presented in
Table 4.1.
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Table 4.1: Characteristics of the patient sample (N= 74).
Diabetes Heart Disease
Male Female Male Female
Gender 20 10 25 * 19
Mean age in years 42.8 46.6 57.2 56
(SD) (13.8) (11.9) (8.1) (11.3)
4.2.3 Measures
Item generation: The self-blame items were generated both by reviewing existing 
literature and through informal conversation with members of the public. The latter 
involved asking people to state possible explanations for falling ill. When necessary, 
probing was used to bring the focus on issues of blame and responsibility. The items 
finally included in the study were selected a) on the basis of how often they appeared 
during the item generation process (items appearing less than twice were omitted) and b) 
on how relevant they were to issues of responsibility and blame.
A total of 20-items were finally selected from both past literature and the interview 
material (Table 4.2; also see Appendix III for actual questionnaire). Occasionally, items 
with exactly the opposite meaning to those already in the scale were included to control 
for response biases. All items were scored on 7-point Likert scales ranging from 1 
(‘strongly disagree’) to 7 (‘strongly agree5). An ‘I don’t know’ option was also available 
at the end of each response scale which corresponded to a ‘0’ score. The
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comprehensibility of the scale was tested on the patient sample of heart disease and 
diabetes patients.
Table 4.2: Items included in the study following item generation procedures.
1. Don't know what caused my illness 11. My illness is God's way of punishing me
2 .1 could have prevented getting ill 12. My illness is just a matter of bad luck
3 .1 am responsible for my own health 13.1 had nothing to do with getting ill
4 .1 feel guilty when I see my doctor 14.1 am not the only one responsible for my illness
5 .1 should have looked after myself better 15. My illness could have happened to anyone
6. People blame me for my illness 16. Other factors apart from me led to my illness
7 .1 deserve to be in this situation because of 17.1 don't feel responsible for getting my illness
who I am 18. Getting my illness was God's will
8 .1 am to blame for my illness 19.1 should have taken better care of myself and I
9 .1 don't deserve to be looked after would have never fallen ill
10.1 should have lived more moderately 2 0 .1 couldn't help getting sick
4.2.4 Procedure
Participants were approached while waiting for their outpatient appointments at the Royal 
Surrey County Hospital. They were asked to complete the questionnaire in the presence of 
the researcher and were encouraged to express any thoughts regarding the phrasing and 
content of the items. Once the questionnaire was completed, the researcher discussed the 
questionnaire with participants and noted any comments they had regarding the clarity of 
the items. Time spent with each participant ranged from 5-10 minutes.
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4.3 RESULTS FROM PILOT DATA
4.3.1 Item clarity and comprehensiveness
Certain items were characterised as problematic by the patients. Specifically, items so 
identified by 30% or more of participants were items 1, 4, 9, 11, 15 and 19. These were 
characterized as ‘odd’, ‘unclear’, ‘hard to answer’ or ‘irrelevant to the other items’. Some 
concern was also expressed regarding items 11 and 18 that included attributions to God. 
To investigate the extent to which the concerns expressed by the patients were reflected in 
the psychometric properties of the items the contribution of each item to scale reliability 
was consulted (Table 4.3). It must be noted, however, that reliability analysis was not an 
aim o f the study at this stage, and issues around scale construction and reliability (e.g. 
factor analysis, item total correlations etc.) were addressed in the next phase of the study.
Table 4.3: Contribution of items to scale reliability (scale alpha = .73).
Reliability if 
Item Deleted
1. Don't lenow what caused my illness
2.1 could have prevented getting ill.
3.1 am responsible for my own health.
4. Ifeel guilty when I see my doctor
5.1 should have looked after myself better.
6. People blame me for my illness
7 .1 deserve to be in this situation because of who I am
8.1 am to blame for my illness
9.1 don't deserve to be looked after
10.1 should have lived more moderately
11 .My illness is God's way ofpunishing me 
12. My illness is just a matter of bad luck
13.1 had nothing to do with getting ill
14.1 am not the only one responsible for my illness
.7482
.7001
.7372
.7393
.6926
.7084
.7358
.7050
.7345
.7202
.7333
.6997
.7185
.7026
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15. My illness could have happened to anyone .7324
16. Other factors apart from me led to my illness .7236
17.1 don't feel responsible for getting my illness. .7283
18. Getting my illness was God's will .7063
19.1 should have taken better care of myself .7261
20.1 could't help getting sick .7014
Note: Items in italics indicate the items already identified as problematic by the patient participants.
Coefficients in bold indicate improved reliability if item is deleted.
As seen in Table 4.3, some of the items already identified as problematic by the 
participants appeared to affect the scale’s reliability as well (i.e. items 1, 4, 9 and 15). 
Thus, they were removed from the scale. Items 11,18 and 19 were excluded on the basis 
of participants’ comments (the content of item 19 was essentially maintained through item 
5 which has similar but clearer meaning). All other changes involved minor 
improvements in the wording of the items. The final form of the scale is shown Part Two 
of the questionnaire in Appendix IV.
4.4 PHASE II: MAIN DATA COLLECTION
4.4.1 Participants and Recruitment Procedures.
In order to gain access to participants for the second phase of this stusy, the consultants of 
three clinics (i.e. diabetic, cardiac, and breast cancer) at the Royal Surrey County Hospital 
(Guildford, Surrey) were contacted. Each consultant was presented with the study’s aims, 
rationale and protocol as well as the researcher’s Curriculum Vitae, and was asked for his 
consent to approach patients during clinic hours. All three consultants allowed access to 
their patients without any objections to the study’s methodology.
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Once the consultants’ approval was granted, an application was sent to the South West 
Surrey Local Research Ethics Committee. Following a brief correspondence with the 
committee during which some necessary clarifications were made regarding the study’s 
methodology, ethical approval to conduct the study was granted. A copy of the approval 
letter is provided in Appendix V.
4.4.2 Measures
A copy of the measures used in this study is given in Appendix IV.
Demographic Characteristics
Patients were asked to report their age, gender, and occupation. The latter was then coded 
in four categories based on a simplified version of the Standard Occupational 
Classification (SOC, 2000). All professional and associate professional occupations (i.e. 
managers and senior officials, professionals, associate professional and technical 
occupations) were grouped in category 1. Category 2 included intermediate occupations 
(i.e. Administration and secretarial skilled trades, personal service, sales and customer 
care). Category 3 included all elementary occupations (i.e. process plan and machine 
operatives and elementary hade, plant, storage and administration and service 
occupations). Finally category 4 included all retired participants and housewives who did 
not report any prior occupation.
In this section patients were also asked to report their diagnosis or reason for appointment 
and the time of initial diagnosis if known.
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The 14 items obtained during the first phase of this pilot work were used here to assess 
patients’ self-blame about their illness. Participants responded on 7-point Likert scales, 
where 1= ‘strongly disagree’ and 7= ‘strongly agree5. The scale was completed twice, first 
with respect to their condition in general, and second with respect to a specific self­
selected negative event relevant to their condition (e.g bad test results, alarming 
symptoms etc.) that occurred within the last three months.
Risk Factors
A risk factor checklist containing 22 possible factors known to contribute to various 
chronic conditions was presented. Patients were asked to tick those factors that according 
to their subjective opinion contributed to their illness. Any number of factors could be 
ticked, and an ‘other’ option was available at the end of the list to allow factors not on the 
list to be added. In order to avoid bias in categorising a risk factor as behavioural, two 
independent judges categorised each risk factor on the list as either behavioural or non- 
behavioural in nature. Agreement was 99%. Specifically, risk factors o f diet, stress, 
alcohol, being overweight, smoking, and sexual behaviour were seen as behavioural. All 
other factors were considered non-behavioural.
Self-efficacy
The Generalized Self-efficacy Scale (Schwarzer & Jerusalem, 1993) was used to assess 
patients’ perceptions of their ability to successfully deal with problems. The Generalized 
Self-Efficacy Scale is a 10-item measure that is designed to assess optimistic self-beliefs 
to cope with a variety of difficult demands in life. It explicitly refers to personal agency,
Self-Blame measures
82
i.e. the belief that one's actions are responsible for successful outcomes. Internal validity 
has been reported to range from .82 to .93.
Measures of Psychological Adjustment
Psychological adjustment was assessed through the measurement of anxiety and 
depression using the Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS, Zigmond & Snaith, 
1983). The HADS is designed to measure anxiety and depression in general medical 
outpatient populations. It consists of seven depression and seven anxiety items selected to 
distinguish the psychological effect of physical illness. The HADS has good validity and 
reliability coefficients (as high as .77 and .76 respectively), is brief and simple, and is 
acceptable by patients (Bowling, 1995).
Diet and Exercise
Finally, a set of 7 items developed by Toobert & Gasgow (1994) assessing the patients’ 
adherence to dietary and fitness guidelines was included in the questionnaire. Of those, 5 
assessed participants’ dietary habits in terms of calorie control and consumption of fibre, 
fat, and sweets, and 2 assessed participants’ activity and exercise levels. Questions were 
rated on 5-point scales, with points on the scales representing either percentages or 
frequencies.
4.4.3 Procedure
Participants were recruited through three hospital outpatient clinics, Cardiac, Breast, and 
Diabetes, at the Royal Surrey County Hospital in Guilford (UK). Participants had to be 
less than 70 years old and have a specific diagnosis for the condition rather than a general
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01* suspicious complaint. Patients waiting for their follow-up appointment were 
approached by the clinic’s nurse and were told about the researcher’s presence. Those 
interested in knowing more about the study were introduced to the researcher, who 
informed them about the study and invited them to participate. All participants were 
informed of their right to withdraw from the study at any time and were required to 
provide written consent. Participants were provided with a 9-page self-administered 
questionnaire with an estimated completion time of 30 minutes. There were no limitations 
in the amount of time available for completion and all participants were encouraged to ask 
questions if necessary. Upon receipt o f the questionnaire, the researcher initiated an 
informal conversation with each participant to ensure that patients were not made 
uncomfortable by reading the questionnaire.
4.5 RESULTS
4.5.1 Sample
A total of 146 patients were approached by the clinics’ nurses and agreed to hear more 
about the study. Of those, 137 adults (47% male, 53% female; mean age 51.6 years, 
SD=12.03) agreed to participate. Thus, the response rate for this study was 94%. For the 
remaining 6%, the reasons for decline were illiteracy (N= 3), visual impairment (N=2) 
and questionnaire length (N= 4). Participants were diagnosed with one of the following 
conditions: diabetes (N=43, 67% male, 33% female; mean age 46.3 years, SD=14.3), 
breast cancer (N=55, 100% female; mean age 51.8years, SD=9.6) and heart disease 
(N=39, 89% male, 11% female; mean age 51.8 years, SD=8.4). In all three patient groups
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the majority of participants reported an intermediate occupation or better. Table 4.4 shows 
a breakdown of patient characteristics in the three illness groups.
Table 4.4: Patient characteristics for each patient group
Sex Occupation (N)*
1 2 3 4
Mean Age 
(years)
Mean time since 
diagnosis (years)
Diabetes 29 (male) 11 11 8 8 46.3 12.8
14 (female) (SD: 14.3) (SD: 12.6)
Breast cancer __ 16 17 5 16 51.8 2.8
55 (female) (SD: 9.5) (SD: 2.3)
Heart disease 35 (male) 12 4 7 14 51.8 4.2
4 (female) (SD: 8.4) (SD: 6.7)
*Note: 1: Professional Occupations 2: Intermediate Occupations 3: Elementary Occupations 
4: Retired or Housewives
The three patient groups differed significantly in age (F(2, 136)=11,7, pc.OOl) and 
Scheffe's post hoc multiple comparisons indicated that heart disease patients had a 
significantly higher mean age from both diabetes and breast cancer patients. Similarly, the 
groups differed in the time elapsed since diagnosis (F(2,132)=20,2, pc.OOl) with diabetes 
patients having a higher mean time since diagnosis from heart disease and breast cancer 
patients. Therefore these two variables were subsequently included in all relevant 
analyses.
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Two sets of factor analyses were run (Principal Components with oblique rotation), one 
for the general condition and one for the specific negative event. Initial solutions (i.e. 
eigenvalues >1) resulted in four components for general self-blame and three components 
for specific self-blame (see Appendix VI for relevant output). These solutions were not 
retained for the following reasons. First, examination of the scree plots (Appendix VI) in 
both cases indicated that a two factor solution would be more appropriate. This was 
reflected in the very small amount of variance explained by the last and smallest 
components (i.e. 7.3% in general self-blame and 8.6% in specific self-blame). Second, in 
both cases the last component consisted of only two loadings and could not be interpreted 
in any meaningful way to support retaining them. Therefore, different solutions were 
sought for varying the number of extracted components. Prior to extracting two factor 
solutions for both cases of self-blame, a three factor solution was extracted for general 
self-blame (see Appendix IV) to ensure that a potentially meaningful solution was not 
being overlooked. This solution suffered the same problems as previously, with the 
smallest component accounting for little percentage of the variance (i.e. 8.4%), including 
only two loadings and being hard to interpret.
The most meaningful solution consisted of two components in both cases of self-blame. 
The item communalities (i.e. the proportion of variance that each item has in common 
with other items) are shown in Table 4.5. Particularly low communalities were 
characteristic of items 7, 13 and 14.
4.5.2 Self-Blam e Scale
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Table 4.5: Item communalities for factor analysis obtained from reference to the general 
condition and the specific event.
General Specific
1. I could have prevented my condition .68 .79
2, I am responsible for getting my condition .63 .87
3. I deserve to be in this situation because of choices I .82 .75
made
4. People blame me for my condition .49 .59
5. I deserve to be in this situation because of who I am .42 .56
6. I am to blame for my condition .73 .77
7. My condition was God’s way of punishing me .17 .01
8. I am not responsible for my condition .34 .34
9. I should have taken better care of myself .67 .54
10.1 couldn’t prevent my condition .76 .53
11.1 should have behaved more moderately .41 .33
12.1 had nothing to do with getting my condition. .77 .78
13. My condition could have happened to anybody .001 .47
14. My condition was just a matter of bad luck .17 .30
The structural coefficients (or factor loadings) of the items are shown in
Table 4.6. They have been re-arranged in descending order for General- Component I. 
Regarding self-blame for the condition in general, component I accounted for 40.5 % of 
the variance and component II accounted for 10.3% of the variance (Cronbach’s alpha=
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.72 and .64 respectively). In the case of the specific negative event, component I 
accounted for 43% of the variance and component II for only 12% of the variance 
(Cronbach’s alpha= .89 and .74). Also, in both the general and the specific conditions, 
component II expressed exactly the opposite meaning of other items in the scale and its 
items had been included to avoid response bias (see section 4.2.3). The correlation of the 
components was also examined and was found to be negative (r=-.40, N=137, pc.OOl for 
the general condition and r=-.47, N=88, pc.01 for the specific event) verifying that the 
two components have captured the opposite meaning expressed by their items. Therefore 
the items loading on component II (i.e. items 12, 13,14 in Table 4.6) were excluded from 
further analyses.
Table 4.6: Pattern matrices showing the two-component solutions for general and specific 
self-blame.
General Specific
I
Component
II I
Component
n
1. I deseive to be in this situation because of 
choices I made
.89 -.05 .82 -.14
2. I am to blame for my condition .83 -.08 .74 -.30
3. I should have taken better care of myself .80 -.05 .54 -.37
4. I am responsible for getting my condition .79 -.03 .70 -.43
5. I could have prevented my condition .71 -.11 .69 -.40
6. People blame me for my condition .69 -.01 .80 .13
7. I deseive to be in this situation because of 
who I am
.66 .07 .79 .21
8. I should have behaved more moderately .63 -.01 .45 -.24
9. My condition was God’s way of punishing 
me
.43 .17 .32 .10
10. My condition was just a matter of bad luck -.35 .13 .06 .57
11. My condition could have happened to 
anybody
-.27 -.06 -.11 .64
12.1 couldn’t prevent my condition -.05 .85 -.11 .69
13.1 had nothing to do with getting my 
condition.
-.27 .76 -.01 .88
14.1 am not responsible for my condition .06 .60 .07 .60
Although the retained component was very similar in both the general and the specific 
conditions, it was not identical. Specifically items 10 and 11 loaded on opposite factors 
for the general and the specific conditions. These items also had very low communality 
indices when used for the general condition (items 13 and 14 in Table 4.5): Therefore, 
these two items were deleted to make the components equivalent. Therefore, the resulting 
scale consisted of 9 items (i.e. items 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9) according to
Table 4.6). and was perceived as measuring general self-blame (symbolized as GSBg 
when referring to self-blame for the overall medical condition and GSBsp when referring 
to the self-blame for the specific negative event). Internal reliability for this component 
was satisfactory for both conditions (Cronbach’s alpha= .89 for both GSBg and GSBsp). 
Composite scores for GSBg and GSBsp were calculated and entered in all relevant 
subsequent analyses.
4.5.3 Descriptive Analyses
Means and standard deviations for all measures used in this study are presented in Table 
4.7. In general, participants showed relatively low levels of self-blame for either their 
condition in general and the relevant negative event. Although low observed means raise 
concerns about floor effects, there were sufficient numbers of patients who rated their 
self-blame high enough to provide adequate range for conducting inferential statistical 
tests (Glinder & Compas, 1999). Specifically, 17-23% of patients scored higher than 3 on 
a 7-point scale on the self-blame scale.
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Table 4.7: Mean values for all psychological variables.
Mean
(SD)
Item Scale Potential Score Range
GSBg 1.99 1-7, 7=strongly agree 1-7 (7=max GSB)
(■2)
GSBsp 2.26 1-7, 7=strongly agree 1-7 (7=max GSB)
(1.4)
HADS (anxiety) 5.3 0-3, 3=(varies) 0-21 (8-10 borderline)
(4.1)
HADS (depression) 3.2 0-3, 3=(varies) 0-21 (8-10 borderline)
(3.3)
Self-efficacy 31.3 1-4, 4= exactly true 10-40 (40=max self-efficacy)
(3.3)
Diet 3.72
(.64) 1-5, 5 (varies) 1-5 (5=healthy diet
Exercise 2.5 1-5, 5(varies) 1-5 (5= max exercise)
(1.1)
Number of behavioral 1 Checklist 0-6
risk factors (1.1) (0=no, l=yes)
Anxiety and Depression levels were relatively low, self-efficacy levels were relatively 
high, and diet and exercise levels were average indicating moderate compliance to 
medical and healthy living guidelines. The correlations between all variables in the study 
are shown in Table 4.8. Since the three patient groups differed in age and time since 
diagnosis these variables were also included in the analyses.
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Table 4.8: Pearson’s correlations among main psychological and demographic variables 
(N in parentheses)
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8a 9 10
1) GSBg -
2) GSBsp .47**
(88)
-
3) HADS 
(anx)
-.09
(135)
.07
(88)
- -
4) HADS 
(depr)
-.05
(135)
.03
(88)
.66**
(135)
-
5) Self-
efficacy
-.03
(135)
.11
(88)
-.30**
(134)
-.29**
(134)
-
6) Diet -.05
(134)
-.18
(87)
-.34**
(133)
-.22*
(133)
.19*
(133)
-
7) Exercise -01
(135)
.16
(88)
-.25**
(134)
-.16
(134)
.12
(134)
.28**
(134)
-
8) No. of 
behavioral 
risk factors a
.65**
(137)
.18
(88)
-.09
(135)
-.13
(135)
.08
(135)
.04
(134)
-.04
(135)
9) Age .09
(137)
-.12
(88)
-.18*
(135)
-.06
(135)
.05
(135)
.15
(134)
.01
(135)
.03
(137)
-
10) Time since 
diagnosis
-.13
(133)
.20
(84)
.03
(131)
-.05
(131)
-.01
(131)
.02
(130)
.04
(131)
-.12
(133)
-.05
(133)
Note: * p<.05, **p<001,
a: Spearman’s correlations
Significant correlations were found between GSBg and GSBsp (r=.47, N=88, p<.01) 
indicating that the higher the self-blame for one’s medical condition the higher his/her 
self-blame for the negative event related to the condition. Also the Number of behavioural 
factors correlated significantly with GSBg (r= 65, N=137, p<.01) meaning that the greater 
the number of behaviour factors people identified as having contributed to their illness, 
the higher their levels of self-blame for their general medical condition.
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Participants’ age showed a low but significant negative correlation with anxiety (r=-.18, 
p<.05) suggesting that the lower the age the higher the anxiety. No other significant 
correlations were found between age and the remaining psychological variables.
Similarly, time since diagnosis did not correlate significantly with any of the other 
variables in the analysis.
4.5.4 Effects o f specificity o f reference and type o f medical condition on self-blame
Participants showed relatively low levels of self- blame for the medical condition in 
general. Specifically, when referring to their medical condition in general, participants’ 
mean self-blame score was 1.99 (SD = .20). Looking at the frequencies of participants’ 
responses, approximately 10% of the sample scored on the high end of the scale 
(indicating at least moderate levels of GSBg).
Regarding the specific negative event, 87 out of 137 participants (64%) responded to the 
relevant section. Of those, 55 (40%) clearly stated the specific event that their answer 
referred to, and 32 (24%) provided answers to the relevant section without specifying a 
negative event. The most common negative events reported were bad test results (e.g. 
high cholesterol or glucose levels), alarming symptoms (e.g. angina), and illness 
recurrence (e.g. metastasis of cancer). Table 4.9 shows the frequencies of the reported 
specific negative events. Here, mean self-blame was 2.26 (SD=1.44). Approximately 17% 
of the participants scored on the high end of the scale.
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Table 4.9: Frequencies of types of specific events mentioned by patients.
Frequency Percent
Bad test results 11 8.0 !
Alarming symptoms 22 16.1
Recurrence of illness 11 8.0
Infection 3 2.2
Other 8 5.8
Not specified 32 23.4
Total 87 63.5 |
To test for differences in self-blame across medical conditions and types of reference (i.e. 
general vs. specific), a mixed-factors ANOVA was carried out with medical condition as 
the between-subjects factor and specificity of reference as the within-subjects factor. 
Results showed significant main effects of both the type of medical condition 
(F(2, 85)=11.8, p<.001), and the specificity of reference (F(l, 85)=12.7, pc.Ol). Post hoc 
analysis (Scheffe test) of the between-subjects factor revealed that the breast cancer group 
showed significantly lower levels of self-blame from the heart disease and diabetes 
groups. All groups showed higher levels of self-blame for the specific negative event. No 
significant interactions were revealed
4.5.5 Behavioural risk factors and self-blame
Both the number and type of risk factors identified by patients were considered. Out of 
137 participants, 122 (90%) identified at least one risk factor. The mean number of risk 
factors was 2.4 (min = 0, max=l 1, SD = 1.6), with 52% identifying 2 to 4 risk factors. 
Figure 4.1 shows the frequencies of risk factors selected by the participants. The most 
frequent were stress, followed by heredity, age, and being overweight.
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The number of behavioural risk factors identified differed across the three medical 
conditions (Kruskal- Wallis x 2 =15.9, df=2, p<.001) with heart disease patients 
identifying more behavioural risk factors (mean=.56, sd= 50) than diabetes patients 
(mean=.42, sd=.50) and breast cancer patients (mean=. 07, sd= 26).
Figure 4.1: Frequency of risk factors perceived as relevant to illness (N=136)
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4 0
3 0
20
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O
When self-blame scores between patients who identified behavioural risk factors and 
patients who did not were compared, it was found that the former had higher GSBg (t=- 
7.77, df=135, p< .001) as well as GSBsp (t=-.2.63, df=86, p<.05).
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4.5.6 Relationship between self-blame, self-efficacy and psychological adjustment.
Correlations between self-blame (general and specific) and the psychological adjustment 
variables of depression and anxiety indicated that adjustment is generally unrelated to 
self-blame. Self-efficacy, was also unrelated to self-blame, and consequently did not 
appear the have any effect on the relationship between self-blame and adjustment.
When the above relationships were examined separately for each patient group 
relationships between the above variables remained statistically non-significant.
4.5.7 Self-blame and time elapsed since diagnosis
As already mentioned, Pearson’s correlations between self-blame in the whole sample and 
time elapsed since diagnosis yielded no significant results. When the same correlations 
were computed separately for each patient group results showed that GSBg correlated 
significantly with time since diagnosis in the diabetes group (r=.34, N=42, p<.05). There 
is therefore some indication of a link between time since diagnosis and self-blame in the 
diabetes group suggesting that as time passes diabetes patients show increased acceptance 
of responsibility for their condition.
4.5.8 Self-blame and diet/exercise
Regarding patient’s reported levels of diet and exercise, no significant correlations with 
self-blame were found when the whole sample was considered. Looking at each patient 
group separately however, a significant correlation was found between diet and GSBg 
(i=-.42, N=43, p<.01) and GSBsp (r=-49, N=30, pc.Ol) in the diabetes group suggesting
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that the higher the acceptance of blame for their illness or a relevant specific event, the 
less healthy the diet adopted by patients. For the same group, a significant correlation was 
found between GSBg and exercise levels (r= -.32, N=43, p<.05). No significant 
relationships between self-blame and diet/exercise levels were found in the other patient 
groups.
4.6 DISCUSSION
4.6.1 Phase I: Item generation and piloting
One of the criticisms in studies of self-blame has been the use of single item measures. 
This study aimed at generating additional items for the measure of self-blame in patients 
with chronic illness and piloting those items on patient populations to improve their 
clarity and comprehensiveness. Out of the 20 items yielded from informal inteiviews with 
members of the public, 7 items had to be deleted following feedback from a patient 
sample. The remaining 13 items underwent minor changes in wording and grammar. One 
item was added to include an explicit measure of behavioural self-blame, leading to a 14- 
item measure of self-blame.
Two interesting observations arise when looking at the content and phrasing of the items. 
First, both the words ‘blame’ and ‘responsibility’ appear in the list of items, indicating 
that they may be equally available in people’s vocabulary about illness avoidability.
While there are several studies in the literature indicate that this is the case (e.g. 
Sholomskas, Steil & Plummer, 1990), none of the studies aimed specifically at exploring 
this possibility. Since Shaver and Drown (1986) have cautioned about the potential
96
implications that differences in meaning may have on the conceptualisation and 
measurement of self-blame, a study is presented later in the thesis to explore people’s 
understanding and application of the above terms on different negative events including 
various illnesses.
A second observation is that many of the items include evaluative words such as T should 
have...’ and ‘I could have...’. Such phrases show not only a focus on the self, but also a 
critical approach towards issues of personal agency. There is thus some evidence of the 
existence of the attributional and evaluative components within the concept of self-blame 
discussed previously in the thesis (Brewin, 1985)
4.6.2 Phase II: Main data collection
The nature of self-blame in patients with different chronic illnesses and potential 
differences among these patient groups was explored. Specifically, using a multi-item 
measure of self-blame, this study investigated self-blame in diabetes, breast cancer and 
heart disease patients, and looked at differences in participants’ responses when self­
blame is regarded for the medical condition in general and a specific negative event 
related to the medical condition. This study also looked at the relationship between self­
blame and psychological adjustment and potential differences in these associations in the 
three patient groups. Additional measures of health related self-care (i.e. diet and exercise) 
were also explored as possible correlates of self-blame.
Results showed that levels of self-blame for developing the medical condition varied 
significantly across the three patient groups. Specifically, breast cancer patients showed
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lower levels of self-blame than patients in the other two groups. The question that results 
from this observation is why such a difference exists. Traditionally, self-blame is seen as 
an attempt to increase feelings of control over uncontrollable events (Janoff-Bulman,
1979). In this study, although measures of perceived control over the condition were not 
included, one would expect cancer to be the least controllable of the three conditions in 
terms of onset and recurrence and, thus, to involve a greater need for a sense of control 
leading to greater levels of self-blame. This, however, is not the case making the present 
findings beg for an alternative explanation.
One dimension along which breast cancer inherently differs from diabetes or heart disease 
is the degree of lifestyle involvement. Although some behavioural risk factors such as 
lack of exercise and being overweight have been associated with increased risk of breast 
cancer, they are not considered as strong predictors as age or heredity (Vogel, 2001). 
Furthermore, the need for lifestyle changes following diagnosis is unlikely to be of the 
same degree as for diabetes or heart disease patients. In the two latter cases, patients are 
expected to monitor or change habits such as diet and activity levels, since these factors 
are considered important predictors of disease onset and recurrence. Therefore, it is 
possible that self-blame levels in this study reflect differences in the degree of-lifestyle 
involvement associated with each condition.
A similar rationale may explain the results regarding the differences in self-blame when 
referring to the general condition or a more specific negative event. This study showed 
that, overall, levels of self-blame are higher when considering a specific event than the 
medical condition in general. It is possible that a post-onset complication (e.g. high
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glucose levels) is seen as part of the management of the illness or its consequences, is 
perceived as the patient’s own responsibility, and thus leads to higher levels of self-blame 
that the medical condition in general.
Another indication that patient self-blame may reflect the association between a given 
illness and lifestyle factors is given in this study by an exploration of the risk factors 
patients associate with their illness. Results showed that patients who identified at least 
one behavioural risk factor showed more self-blame than patients who identified no 
behavioural risk factors. It should be noted however that risk factors were assessed by 
using a checklist and therefore analyses has little quantitative value. Knowing the degree 
to which patients considered these factors as relevant to their medical condition might 
give better insight into the relationship between self-blame and risk factor involvement.
Regarding the relationship between self-blame and adjustment, results showed no 
relationship between the relevant variables in either the overall sample or the specific 
patient groups. As discussed in earlier chapters, previous research has consistently found a 
relationship between characterological self-blame and depression in chronic patients but 
similar findings for behavioural self-blame have not been consistent. The self-blame 
measure in this study was rather generic and did not differentiate between behavioural and 
characterological self-blame. Hence, claims can only refer to feelings of general self­
blame, which appeared to be unrelated to anxiety or depression. Inconsistent findings in 
this area have been attributed to timing considerations (Michela & Wood, 1986). In this 
study, the mean time since diagnosis was approximately 6 years, and evidence for a 
correlation between time since diagnosis and measures of general self-blame were 
relatively weak and group specific. It is possible that, a stronger association exists at the
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very early stages of the illness experience (i.e. at diagnosis) not captured by the design of 
this study. After some time, although self-blame may still be present in patients’ illness 
cognitions, it becomes generally unrelated to psychological adjustment.
Examination of the relationship between the time since diagnosis and self-blame revealed 
that as time passes diabetes patients tend to accept more blame for their illness. These 
findings make sense when the nature of the illness is considered. Diabetes is a disease that 
primarily requires lifestyle management in order to be kept in control. Patients with this 
condition have to constantly adhere to certain health behaviour guidelines in order to keep 
their glucose levels within limits and avoid hypo- or hyper- glycemic episodes. Therefore, 
it may be that the self-blame that diabetes patients show with time stems from an 
increasing acceptance of the responsibilities related to their condition and the 
accompanied awareness of their role in disease onset and management.
Finally, an examination of the relationship between self-blame and health behaviour 
yielded some interesting findings. In diabetes patients, a negative relationship was found 
between acceptance of blame and healthy eating. These results are especially interesting 
when considering the fact that diet is of central importance to this particular group of 
patients. A possible explanation for this finding may be that the direction of the 
relationship runs from dietary habits towards the acceptance of blame. In other words, 
diabetes patients who are failing to stick to the recommended dietary guidelines may be 
more ready to accept responsibility for their illness (or a specific negative event related to 
it) than patients who are more successful (intentionally or not) in sticking to a healthy
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diet. A similar explanation may apply in the case of exercise and its negative relation to 
self-blame in the same patient group.
By evaluating the results discussed in this section, several of the study’s strengths and 
limitations become apparent. On the positive side, this study utilised a new approach to 
the study of self-blame. Unlike the majority of the studies available in the literature, 
where a single group of patients is involved and the focus is on the self-blame-adjustment 
relationship, this study looked at self-blame comparatively across three medical 
conditions and investigated their similarities and differences regarding self-blame 
behaviour. Consequently, it has revealed the importance of the illness (or event) 
characteristics as possible explanations of self-blame and has shown the need for further 
investigation in this area.
On the other hand, a number of limitations are evident in this study and should be 
acknowledged. First, the sample used poses some restrictions in the analysis and 
interpretation of results. Specifically, while the overall sample size is acceptable for an 
exploratory study, the patient groups are rather small. Also, the medical conditions chosen 
did not have an even distribution of male and female participants and thus did not allow 
gender effects to be studied. Although it can be argued that the samples in this study 
reflected the sex distributions in the actual population, statistical restrictions for the study 
of gender differences remain. Second, the measure of self-blame used in the study was too 
generic to allow for the examination of some of the issues raised in previous chapters. 
Specifically, there was no opportunity to look for relationships involving behavioural and 
characterological self-blame. Although each type of self-blame was represented by a
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specific item in the scale, the creation of a behavioural and a characterological self-blame 
sub-scale did not result during the item generation phase or the factor analysis. Therefore, 
interpretation had to rely on a more generic measure of self-blame. Finally, the low self­
blame scores should be considered. While there was enough variability for the appropriate 
analyses to be run, the findings should be interpreted with caution. Furthermore, the 
obseived floor effects may be an indication of low sensitivity of the measure used. While 
low mean self-blame scores are common in the literature (e.g. Malcame et al, 1995; 
Nielson & McDonald, 1988), they have been surprisingly overlooked. It is possible that 
low levels of self-blame- especially in the presence of self-attributions- may suggest a 
reluctance to endorse negative evaluative comments about oneself even though personal 
agency is acknowledged. Clearly, more attention should be paid to the levels of self­
blame reported and the possible reasons for them.
The findings of this study give rise to a number of research questions that should be 
further investigated. Specifically, it is important to understand the origins of patient self- 
blame and determine the factors that affect its occurrence and intensity. Since self-blame 
differs among medical conditions, there may be variables related to the experience of the 
given illness (e.g. prior health behaviour, knowledge of medical facts) that determine the 
levels of self-blame. Similarly, individual characteristics such as sex may affect self­
blame and should be explored. Finally, rather than focusing 011 measures of psychological 
adjustment, the potential relationship between self-blame and health behaviours should be 
further explored.
102
In conclusion, the present study was designed to approach self-blame in chronic patients 
in a comparative manner and explore potential differences among different patient groups. 
Results revealed significant differences in self-blame among diabetes, breast cancer and 
heart disease patients, with cancer patients showing less self-blame than the remaining 
two patient groups. Also, self-blame tended to be higher when a specific negative event 
was considered than when patients referred to their illness in general. Overall, no 
substantial evidence of a relationship between self-blame and psychological adjustment 
was found. In spite of the study’s limitations, it has been shown that more research on the 
conditions that determine the presence and level of self-blame in patients needs to take 
place, and refinement of the existing theory must be considered.
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C H A P T E R  F I V E  
P R E D I C T O R S  A N D  O U T C O M E S  O F  B E H A V I O U R A L  
S E L F - B L A M E
SUMMARY
This chapter aims to construct and test a model of the predictors and outcomes of 
behavioural self-blame. Drawing mainly from the evidence of attribution research, a 
model is proposed that describes the paths leading from personal and situational 
characteristics to behavioural causal attributions and behavioural self-blame. Similarly, 
the paths from behavioural self-blame to psychological adjustment and behaviour change 
are also described. The model is then tested on a sample of patients with heart disease 
using path and regression analysis as applicable. Results show that a number of situational 
and personal variables affect self-blame mainly through their link with behavioural causal 
attributions. Evidence for the relationship between behavioural self-blame and adjustment 
or health behaviours is also presented but interpreted with more caution due to 
methodological restrictions.
5.1 INTRODUCTION
The significance of self-blaming behaviour lies in its potential relationship with 
psychological adjustment. To date, research on self-blame has focused almost entirely on 
clarifying this relationship, and attempting to replicate Janoff-Bulman’s (e.g. 1979; 1982) 
findings of a positive relationship between behavioural self-blame (BSB) and adjustment,
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and a negative relationship between characterological self-blame (CSB) and adjustment. 
However, research results have been inconsistent -especially regarding BSB- and attempts 
to replicate Janoff-Bulman’s original work have not been successful (Sholomskas, Steil & 
Plummer, 1990).
As mentioned in previous chapters, a number of reasons for these inconsistencies have 
been put forward including differences in sample characteristics, diversity of measures 
used, variations in time elapsed since the onset of the event, and differences in the 
operational definitions employed by different researchers. Two implications for research 
can be identified in the above explanations. First, there is a possibility that BSB is 
problem specific which would explain the variability in results across different population 
samples and timings. This possibility has been considered by Shaver & Drown (1986) 
after reviewing studies of self-blame in chronic illness. They argue that without close 
conceptual analysis of the variables involved, it is possible that self-blame may for 
example ‘have positive effects on coping with perinatal complications and immediate 
spinal cord injury, negative effects 011 adjustment to the disease of a spouse and no 
important influence on coping with breast cancer or long-term adjustment to permanent 
disability’ (pp. 699). Some evidence supporting the possibility of problem specificity 
regarding self-blame has also been demonstrated in the previous chapter of this thesis, 
where different levels of self-blame where expressed by different patient groups.
The second implication of the proposed reasons behind the inconsistencies in the self­
blame literature relates to the lack of operational definitions and conceptual clarifications. 
Specifically, it has been shown that most studies fail to differentiate between causality,
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responsibility and blameworthiness and use self-blame as synonymous with causal 
attributions or attributions of responsibility (Shaver & Drown, 1986). In the absence of 
empirical support for the similarity of these concepts, it is not possible to generalise from 
these findings.
A similar issue worth pursuing further is the relationship between causal attributions and 
self-blame. As already discussed earlier in the thesis, the distinction between causal 
attributions and self-blame (whether behavioural or characterological) has been proposed 
and empirically supported by Brewin (1988). Causal attributions involve locating the 
cause of an event. Self-blame presupposes a causal attribution to oneself and involves a 
moral evaluation of that attribution resulting in self-recrimination. In general, causal 
attributions can exist without the presence of self-blame, while self-blame requires a self­
attribution of causality. The empirical evidence for this distinction includes only a few 
clinically relevant studies. For example, Brewin (1994) found that in victims of industrial 
accidents causal self-attributions were associated with less tension and anxiety while 
moral self-blame was associated with quicker return to work. However, the evidence is 
limited and there is a need for a more integrative approach that clarifies the relationships 
between the two variables.
It thus becomes important to shift some of the focus placed on the outcomes of BSB onto 
its antecedents or predictors in order to clarify the way self-blame forms and functions. If 
BSB is ‘problem specific’, what are the specific circumstances under which it occurs? 
Regarding illness, are there any illness or patient characteristics that can predict the
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existence of self-blame? Also, what is the relationship between self-blame and causal 
attributions and how much do they have in common?
5.1.1 Conceptual model o f BSB
The goal of the present study was to test an integrative model of BSB and attempt to give 
BSB a clear, comprehensive place in the attributional process. Using the limited and 
rather fragmented evidence available in the literature, a conceptual model was drawn that 
incorporated both predictor and outcome variables of BSB (Figure 5.1). Behavioural 
causal attributions are treated as one of the main predictors of behavioural self-blame that 
often act as a mediator between predictor variables and BSB. A presentation of the 
variables in the model as well as the rationale for their inclusion is presented below.
Regarding the antecedents of BSB veiy little is known. With most studies focusing on the 
outcomes of self-blame, evidence on its antecedents is only circumstantial. In contrast, 
evidence on the antecedents of causal attributions is more available. However, it is veiy 
rarely that antecedents of attributions and self-blame are considered in the same study 
which, combined with the already existing conceptual lack of clarity, limits the 
understanding of the area even further.
In general, the antecedents of either concept can be grouped into two main categories: 
person characteristics and event characteristics. Person characteristics include such 
variables as demographics (i.e. age, sex etc.) and individual differences variables (e.g. 
coping style, personality type etc.). Event characteristics include variables like severity, 
controllability/avoidability and time elapsed since the occurrence.
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Demographic characteristics: In general, few sociodemographic factors have been shown 
to consistently predict attributions. Heinemann, Bulka and Smetak (1988) found that age 
was a significant predictor of responsibility attributions for spinal cord injuries. In a study 
of people with genital heipes, Manne and Sandler (1984) foimd that younger people were 
more likely to engage in self-blame than older ones. Moreover, Rodin (1986) suggested 
that older age may give rise to self-blame through the loss of control of certain health 
related activities. In contrast, Affleck et al (1987a) found that older men endorsed 
personal behaviour as a cause of their heart attack more strongly than younger men.
Other studies have found no association between age and attributions (e.g. Downey,
Silver and Wortman, 1985) but of those only one used a patient sample. Specifically, 
Koslowsky et al (1978) found that age, education, occupation, income, and religion did 
not predict attributions for myocardial infarction. Overall, the evidence seems to support a 
relationship between patients’ age and causal attributions even though the nature of the 
relationship is not very clear.
Sex has been investigated more extensively in attribution research with several studies 
aiming specifically to explore sex differences in causal attributions. For example, Vieyra 
et al (1990) found that women were more likely to attribute their infertility to themselves, 
reflecting findings in achievement literature in which women are more likely to attribute 
failure to themselves (Eccles et al, 1984). Similar findings were reported elsewhere (e.g. 
Abbey & Halman (1995), Juvonen & Leskinen, 1994; Hanninen & Aro, 1996).
5.1.2 Person characteristics
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In light of this evidence, the present model depicts age as an indirect predictor of BSB 
through its effect on causal attributions. In contrast, sex is expected to have both a direct 
and an indirect effect on self-blame since, apart from their tendency for self-attributions 
mentioned above, women are known to be more prone to emotion-oriented behaviours 
(e.g. Folkman & Lazarus, 1980)
Individual differences: The concept of CSB implies the involvement of more stable, 
unchangeable aspects of the self in the attributional process. In the present model, CSB is 
seen as both a direct and an indirect predictor of BSB since its esteem-related properties 
(Janoff- Bulman, 1992) would affect both the cognitive and emotional aspects of the 
attributional process.
Prior behaviour: Although it has not attracted much attention, a person’s behaviour prior 
to the negative event has been found to be a good predictor of self-blame. For example, 
Sholomskas, Steil & Plummer (1990) found that alcohol use was the best predictor of 
self-blame following a severe car accident. Similar results have been reported by 
Christensen et al (1999) regarding self-blame and prior alcohol and tobacco use in 
patients with head and neck cancer. However, neither of the studies differentiated between 
attributions and self-blame. On the contrary, they use causality and blame interchangeably 
in their work and discuss findings in terms of causal attributions. In the present model, 
prior behaviour is proposed to have an indirect effect on BSB through its effect on causal 
attributions.
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Severity/Consequences: Event severity (often measured through participants’ perceptions 
of event consequences) has been found to affect causal attributions and self-blame. 
Although results come from cross-sectional studies and report mainly correlations, it has 
been shown that a positive correlation exists between event severity and causal 
attributions (e.g. Affleck et al, 1987; Temien et al, 1996; Miller & Porter, 1983). 
Therefore, in this model illness severity is linked to behavioural attributions expecting 
that the more severe the event the greater the need for a comprehensive explanation.
Elapsed time: The few prospective studies in the area of illness attributions have found 
that self- attributions of responsibility change over time. For example, cancer patients’ 
levels of CSB but not BSB were found to be significantly higher 4 months after initial 
diagnosis (Malcarne et al, 1995), while a the proportion of spinal cord injured patients 
attributing responsibility to themselves was significantly smaller one year after the 
accident (Richards et al, 1997). However, it is not clear whether time affects self-blame 
directly or indirectly through the adoption of alternative attributions that do not implicate 
the self. For this reason, both links are adopted in the model and their statistical 
significance will be explored.
Type of diagnosis: Relating back to the argument that self-blame may be problem 
specific, several studies have reported significant differences in the levels of self-blame 
between different populations (e.g. Weinberg 1994; Frazier & Schauben, 1994). 
However, exploring the reasons behind these findings was outside the scope of those 
studies. Here, following the argument in the previous chapter that differences in self-
5.1.3 E ven t characteristics
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blame are in essence due to different explanations available (e.g. lifestyle factors), it is 
proposed that the type of diagnosis (e.g. MI, hypertension etc) will affect behavioural 
attributions and indirectly self-blame.
Control and avoidability: Perceptions of control and avoidability have beep proposed as 
potential determinants of self-blame. To illustrate, Davis et al (1996) found that perceived 
avoidability of spinal cord injuries contributed to self-blame even after controlling for 
participants’ causal attributions. A positive correlation between control and self­
attributions has also been reported (Abbey & Halman, 1995). Therefore, in the present 
model, perceptions of control are seen as a direct predictor of BSB.
5.1.4 Outcomes o f behavioural self-blame
Following the ample but quite unclear literature on the relationship between self-blame 
and psychological adjustment, the variables of anxiety and depression are treated as 
outcome variables in the present model. Furthermore, according to recent findings of a 
relationship between self-blame and behaviour change in patients with head and neck 
cancer (Christensen et al, 1999), the present model treats BSB as a predictor of changes in 
health behaviour. Specifically, it is proposed that, as a result of the evaluation of the 
instrumental role of the individual in engaging in the identified causes of the illness, BSB 
will affect the degree to which those behaviours have changed since the onset of the 
illness.
I l l
Figure 5.1: Conceptual diagram of the proposed relationships between BSB and its 
predictor and outcome variables.
To summarise, the present study tested the above model in order to clarify the conditions 
under which behavioural self-blame occurs and the possible implication it may have on 
other aspects of behaviour. The population sampled for the purposes of this study was 
patients diagnosed with some form of cardiovascular condition. The reason for this choice 
was that the particular group of conditions lends itself to the study of all the variables in 
the model. Apart from involving a relatively common category of medical problems, the 
general ‘umbrella’ of cardiovascular conditions’ covers closely related problems and 
syndromes (e.g. hypertension, angina, myocardial infarction) that may be due to 
behavioural (i.e. lifestyle) and/or non-behavioural factors, vary in severity, affect both 
men and women of a wide age range, be psychologically demanding and require lifestyle 
change. Therefore, it can be expected that all levels of the variables in the model will be 
represented in the particular population and thus tested properly.
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5.2 METHOD
5.2.1 Ethical Permission
Two Consultant-Cardiologists from the Royal Surrey County Hospital supported the 
study by allowing patient recruitment at their outpatient clinics. Ethical permission for the 
study was granted by the South West Surrey Local Research Ethics Committee (see 
Appendix VII for the approval letter). Approval was granted approximately three months 
after initial application.
5.2.2 Participants
Participants were recruited at two cardiac outpatient clinics. The inclusion criteria were 
age, willingness to participate and knowledge of a specific diagnosis. Specifically, 
participants up to and including the age of 75 could participate in the study. There were 
two reasons for the choice of this particular cut-off point. First, the length of the 
questiomiaire and the time required to complete it could be tiring for older people.
Second, the older the participants, the higher the likelihood of their symptoms being 
associated with older age, in which case most parts of the questionnaire might seem 
irrelevant. Participants below the age limit who were willing to participate had to be 
aware of a specific diagnosis in order to fill in the questiomiaire. Patients waiting for test 
results to confirm a diagnosis or seeing the doctors for the first time were excluded from 
the study.
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A six-page questionnaire was administered to the patients (see Appendix VIII). 
Specifically the questionnaire assessed the following:
Demographic and medical characteristics: Patients’ age, sex, occupation, diagnosis and 
type of treatment were recorded in the first section of the questionnaire. Ideally, this 
infonnation should have been obtained from the patients’ medical files. However, access 
to the files was not available, hi order to assess the accuracy of the participants’ responses 
to the diagnosis and treatment questions, the information obtained by 20 of the 
participants (chosen randomly during the data collection period) was verified by the clinic 
nurse. Accuracy was high (98%).
Self-blame: In order to assess BSB and CSB, the items found in the literature most 
consistently were used. Patients were asked how much they blamed their illness on things 
the did (their behaviour), and how much they blamed their illness on who they are (their 
character). Answers were given on a 5-point Likert scale with l=’not at all’ and 
5=’completely’ (see Part F of questionnaire in Appendix VIII). In contrast to the measure 
used in the previous study (chapter 4), these questions allowed for the differentiation 
between CSB and BSB and could potentially be used to make comparisons to findings 
from past research.
Causal attributions: A scale measuring participants’ specific causal attributions was 
generated specifically for the puiposes of this study. Seven factors commonly associated 
with the onset of heart disease were identified by reviewing medical literature on risk
5.2.3 M easures
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factors for heart disease (American Heart Association, 2002; British Heart Foundation, 
2002). These were: smoking, unhealthy diet, being overweight, little or no exercise, 
stressful lifestyle, and heredity. Chance was also included to offer an option for those 
participants who might feel none of the above risk factors could account for their illness. 
The latter two factors were not directly relevant to the proposed model. However, they 
were included in the scale in order to offer participants a reasonably broad and balanced 
range of choices that included both behavioural and non-behavioural attributions. 
Participants were asked to indicate the extent to which they felt their condition was 
caused by the above factors by rating them on a 5-point Likert scale where l=’not at all 
due to it’ and 5=’a lot due to it’ (see Part B of questionnaire in Appendix VII). Issues 
regarding scale reliability are dealt with in the results section.
Avoidability of risk factors: Each of the risk factors mentioned above was rated on 
perceived avoidability (e.g. T believe an unhealthy diet is a habit I can avoid). 
Additionally, participants rated the perceived avoidability of their behaviour and character 
(e.g. ‘I believe I can change my behaviour if I want to’, ‘I believe I can change my 
character if I want to’). As with the causal attribution items above, the main focus here 
was on perceived avoidability of behavioural factors. Answers were given on 5-point 
Likert scales with l=‘strongly disagree’ and 5=cstrongly agree’ (see Paid C of 
questionnaire in Appendix VII).
Prior behavioural risk and risk change: In order to assess behavioural risk prior to illness 
onset, patients were asked to report the degree to which they engaged in certain risk 
behaviours associated with heart disease prior to their illness. The scale was a modified
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version of the Toobert & Glasgow (1994) scale used in the previous chapter. Items 
referred, to participants’ weight (e.g. Before the onset of my condition... I was 
overweight), diet (e.g. ...I was following a calorie controlled diet), exercise (e.g. ...I 
exercised regularly), smoking (e.g .. .1 used to smoke), and stress (e.g. .. .1 led a stressful 
life). Answers were rated on a 5-point scale with 1= Not at all and 5= A lot (see Part A of 
questionnaire in Appendix VII). Using responses to these items, a risk index was created. 
Every response equal or higher than 3 was considered an indication of a risky behaviour 
and was given a point of 1. Responses equal or lower than 2 were considered an 
indication of little or no risk and were given a point of 0. Thus, a composite index score 
was obtained that ranged form 0 (little or no risk) to 9 (high risk).
In order to assess perceived behaviour change, the same health behaviour items were 
repeated later in the questionnaire (see Part E of questiomiaire in Appendix VII), this time 
enquiring about behaviour since the onset of participants’ condition (e.g. ‘Since the onset 
of my condition I have been overweight’). Each response was subtracted from its earlier 
(baseline) equivalent giving an index of positive, negative or no behaviour change. A 
positive score indicated improved health behaviour, while a negative score indicated a 
decrease in the health behaviour. A score close or equal to zero indicated no change.
Consequences: Perceived consequences of the medical condition was assessed by 
including the ‘consequences’ subscale from Weinman et al’s (1996) Illness Perceptions 
Questionnaire (IPQ; see Part D of questiomiaire in Appendix VII). The IPQ is a relatively 
well validated and reliable measure that has been used with patients with heart disease. Its 
sub-scales can be used individually. The ‘consequences’ sub-scale consists of seven items
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referring to the perceived impact of illness on one’s life. Items are scored on a 5-point 
scale with 1= strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree. In the present sample, the sub­
scale yielded a satisfactory Chronbach’a alpha of .73.
Anxiety/Depression: Participants’ anxiety and depression levels were measures with the 
Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) by Zigmond and Snaith (1983; see Part 
G of questionnaire in Appendix VII). The scale includes 7 items for anxiety and seven for 
depression each ranging from 0= no anxiety/depression to 21= high anxiety/depression. 
Internal reliability for the anxiety and depression scales was satisfactory (alpha= 86 and 
.76 respectively).
5.2.4 Procedure
Patient recruitment took place in the cardiology outpatient clinic at Royal Surrey County 
Hospital. The procedure followed for patient recruitment and questionnaire administration 
was identical to that followed in Study 1-Part II (see Chapter 4).
5.2.5 Analyses
Correlations and factor and reliability analyses were conducted where appropriate in order 
to prepare the data for further analysis. Path analysis of the proposed model was 
conducted using LISREL, a structural equation modelling program. The maximum 
likelihood (ML) technique was used for parameter estimation, and the goodness of fit of 
the model with the observed data was estimated using a variety of fit indices reported by 
LISREL. Specifically, the model %2, the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation Index
117
(RMSEA), the Non-Norm Fit Index (NNFI), the Standardised Root Mean Square 
Residual (SRMSR), and the Goodness of Fit Index (GFI) were used. The RMSEA looks 
at the precision of fit and should ideally be smaller than 0.05. The NNFI is a relative fit 
index that compares the specified model with a baseline model and also penalizes for 
model complexity. NNFI should ideally be greater than 0.90. The GFI compares the 
existing model fit with a null model and represents the percent of covariances explained 
by the covariances implied by the model. It should be higher than 0.95. Finally, the 
SRMR is based on standardised residuals, looks at the average difference between 
predicted and observed variances or covariances and should be smaller than 0.05.
Overall, well fitting models should have small and non-significant %2 and as many of the 
other fit indices above or below the suggested cut-off point as appropriate.
Sample size considerations: Obtaining the correct sample size is veiy important in 
LISREL. The x2 statistics used can be affected by sample size with too large samples 
risking unfounded rejection and too small risking unfounded acceptance. There are 
several suggestions of preferred sample size in the literature and rules of thumb are often 
used. Stevens (1996) suggests at least 15 cases per measured variable, while 50+(8*n) is 
commonly found in the literature with n meaning the number of variables in the model. 
An alternative suggestion is to have five participants per estimated parameter in the 
model. Here, with 15 variables in the model and 14 parameters to estimate, a sample size 
of 120-170 participants is adequate.
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5.3 RESULTS
5.3.1 Participants
A total of 160 patients participated in the study. Of those, 115 were men (72%) and 45 
were women (28%). Their mean age was 61.3 years (SD: 7.4 years). The mean time 
elapsed since diagnosis was 6.1 years (SD=9.4). The majority of patients (62%) were 
following up on an incident of myocardial infarction (MI) or unstable angina. The 
remaining participants (38%) were diagnosed with less aggressive, often asymptomatic 
conditions such as atrial fibrillation and high blood pressure. At least half the sample 
(51%) was on medication for their condition and approximately 40% had had 
Percutaneous Transluminal Coronary Angioplasty (PTCA) or Coronary Artery Bypass 
Graft Surgery (CABG).
5.3.2 Scales and reliabilities
Causal attributions: Principle Component Analysis with oblique rotation, revealed two 
components.
Table 5.1 shows the item communalities and pattern matrix.
Component 1 accoimted for 34% of the variance (before rotation) and included all 5 
behavioural attributions (i.e. smoking, unhealthy diet, being overweight, little or no 
exercise and stressful lifestyle) central to the purposes of the study. Reliability 
(Cronbach’s alpha) for the additive scale including items loading more than .3 on this 
component was .70. Component 2 accounted for 18% of the variance (before rotation) and 
included the attributions to heredity and chance. The two items correlated at i— -.25. The
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two components had a low correlation of r=-.19. As explained earlier, this component was 
not relevant to the proposed model and its items were only offered to counterbalance the 
questions on the behavioural attributions. Therefore, it was not included in subsequent 
analyses.
Table 5.1: Item comnumalities and structural coefficients for causal attribution 
items.
Communalities
Pattern matrix 
Component I Component II
unhealthy diet .67 .82 ~0
overweight .53 .70 .~0
smoking .37 .62 .11
little exercise .44 .67 ~0
stressful life .28 .48 -.16
heredity .70 -.10 -.85
chance .55 -.12 .71
Perceived control of risk factors: Principle Component Analysis with oblique rotation of 
the behaviour control items revealed two components. Table 5.2 shows the item 
communalities and pattern matrix. Component 1 included all the behaviour items (i.e. 
diet, smoking, stressful lifestyle and behaviour) and accounted for 33% of the variance. 
Component 2 included the non behavioural items (i.e. character, heredity and chance) and 
accounted for 20% of the variance. Cronbach’s alpha for component 1 was relatively low 
(alpha=.68) but not far from the acceptable levels. The two components had a low 
correlation of r=-.13. As already explained, Component 2 was not relevant to the scope of
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this study and was excluded form further analysis. A composite score indicating perceived 
behaviour control was obtained but its effects were interpreted with caution due to its 
marginally acceptable reliability coefficient.
Table 5.2: Item communalities and structural coefficients for perceived control items.
Communalities
Pattern matrix
I II
smoking .54 .74 -.18
behaviour .64 .73 .25
diet .37 .61 -.15
stress .54 .59 .37
character .46 .28 .58
chance .61 -.13 .79
heredity .58 ~o .77
5.3.3 Descriptives
Means and standard deviations for all the main variables in the study are shown in Table 
5.3. In general, participants showed relatively low levels of both types of self-blame. Prior 
risk behaviour was reported at average levels on the 0-9 scale and levels of anxiety and 
depression were relatively low. Regarding reported behaviour change since the onset of 
the condition, smoking showed the largest positive change, followed by stress. People 
tended to perceive their condition as rather long lasting, of average impact on their lives, 
and quite controllable.
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Table 5.3: Means and standard deviations o f main variables
Variable Mean Stand.Deviation Min-Max
Potential
range
BSB 2.25 1.20 1-5 1-5
CSB 1.99 1.12 L5 1-5
Behavioural
attributions 9.87 3.71 5-23 5-25
Behaviour
Control 15.5 2.50 5-20 5-20
Prior risk 
behaviour 4.73 2.1 0-9 0-9
Consequences 21 4.9 10-35 7-35
Anxiety 5.7 4.4 0-21 0-21
Depression 3.76 3.24 0-21 0-21
Behaviour change
Calorie controlled diet 1.08 1.35 (-3 )-(4 ) (-4)- (+4)
Fat consumption .80 1.01 (-2 )-(4 ) (-4)- (+4)
Weight ~0 1.08 (-4 )-(3 ) (-4)- (+4)
Smoking 1.10 1.49 0-4 (-4)- (+4)
Exercise -.40 1.48 (-4 )-(4 ) (-4) - (+4)
Stress 0.74 1.17 (-2 )-(4 ) (-4)- (+4)
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Before examining the hypothesized paths between self-blame and its predictor variables, 
the relationships among all the variables were considered. As shown in Table 5.4, BSB 
showed a high to moderate significant correlation with CSB (r= 59, p<.01)5 behavioural 
attributions (r=69, p<.01), prior risk behaviour (r=.51, p<.01), and change in diet and 
smoking habits (r=.34, pc.Ol and 1-.25, p<01 respectively). Behavioural attributions 
followed a similar pattern. Also, there was no relationship between BSB and 
psychological adjustment (i.e. anxiety and depression) and there was only a weak 
correlation between anxiety and CSB (r=20, p<.05).
The correlation between CSB and anxiety (r=.20, p<.05) verified, though weakly, the 
negative relationship between CSB and adjustment. Regarding BSB and adjustment, 
Janoff-Bulman (1992) suggests that this can be properly explored only by calculating the 
partial correlation of BSB and adjustment measures, controlling for CSB. When this was 
done however, no significant correlations were foimd between BSB and anxiety (1- - . 1 2 , 
p= 13) or depression (1--.O6, p=.43).
5.3.4 Relationships among variables
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To allow for a more clear examination of the paths involved, the model was tested in three 
phases. First, the predictors of self-blame were examined by dividing the variables into 
two conceptually distinct sub-models (i.e. person characteristics vs. event characteristics). 
Each sub-model was examined for adequate fit and potential modifications were 
considered. Then, the sub-model including the outcome measures was examined and 
finally the sub-models were combined in one overall model tested globally.
The first sub-model (Figure 5.2) fit the data with x2==0.15 (df=2, p=.921), RMSEA= ~0, 
GFI=1.00, NNFI=1.04, SRMR=0.0038. Looking at the standardised solution (weights 
have been standardised to allow for variability in the measurement scales of variables), 
this sub-model shows that the higher the level of behavioural attributions the higher the 
level of self-blame (P=.52). Sex, here a dummy variable, is positively associated with the 
level of behavioural attributions (y=.20) but negatively associated with BSB (y=-.28).
CSB has significant effects on BSB both directly (y=.25) and indirectly through its effect 
on attributions (y~40). Prior risk behaviour had a significant indirect effect on BSB 
through behavioural attributions (y=48). Finally, the path coefficient for age was non 
significant (y=-.05).
5.3.5 M odel testing
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Figure 5.2: Path diagram of the relationships among person characteristics, illness 
attributions and BSB.
* Statistically significant paths
The second sub-model included the event characteristics (Figure 5.3). There was adequate 
goodness of fit with %2=3.31 (df=4, p=.51), RMSEA= ~0, GFT=0.99, NNFI=1.02, 
SRMR=0.03. The type of diagnosis affected self-blame indirectly through its effect on 
behavioural attributions (y= 44). In turn, behavioural attributions influenced BSB (p=. 68). 
Perceived consequences had an indirect effect on self-blame through its effect on 
behavioural attributions (y=.13). Time since diagnosis and behaviour control yielded 
positive but non-significant path coefficients.
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Figure 5.3: Path diagram of the relationships among event characteristics, illness 
attributions and BSB.
Finally, the third sub-model containing the outcome variables was tested (i.e. the paths 
extending to the right of BSM and behavioural attributions in Figure 5.1). However, 
analysis of the fitted covariance matrix (i.e. Z matrix) was not positive definite. Attempts 
to explain and address the problem of the non positive definite covariance matrix included 
examination of the following: high multicollenearity of the variables, outliers causing too 
much variability in the data, and Haywood cases (i.e. negative estimated error terms for 
an indicator of a latent variable). However, none of the above explained the problem. The 
problem persisted even after attempting to change the combination of the exogenous 
variables by excluding variables that appeared to correlate the least with the others. 
Proceeding with LISREL, when a matrix has been found to be non-positive definite may 
result in an arbitrary solution, therefore this section was excluded from the model and was 
analysed separately adopting a more exploratory, data-driven approach using regression 
analyses.
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The remaining two sub-models were combined in a final overall test. The overall model 
included those variables with significant paths in the sub-models (i.e. sex, CSB, prior risk, 
diagnosis, and consequences) as the exogenous variables, and BSB and behavioural 
attributions as the endogenous variables. The final model (Figure 5.4) fitted the data well 
with x2=2.03 (df=3, p=.57), RMSEA= ~0, GFI=1.00, NNFI=1.01, SRMR=0.O1. 
According to it, there were three direct and five indirect significant paths to BSB. 
Behavioural attributions, sex and CSB had a direct effect on BSB (J3=-.53, y=-.28 and 
y=24 respectively). All other effects on BSB were mediated by behavioural attributions. 
Specifically, there was a positive effect of sex (y=35), CSB (y=.29), prior risk (y=.55) and 
type of diagnosis (y=.44) on behavioural attributions. Finally, there was a positive effect 
of illness consequences on behavioural attributions though the path coefficient was not 
statistically significant.
Figure 5.4: Final path model of predictors of BSB
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Following examination of the model and confirmation of a good fit, it is important to 
examine alternative theoretical models that would fit the data equally well. An alternative 
model that could potentially change the theoretical understanding of self-blame is one 
where an additional path would indicate an effect of BSB on behavioural attributions (i.e. 
creating a loop where BSB ‘causes’ behavioural attributions which in turn ‘cause’ BSB). 
When this model was tested the fit improved even further (%2 =73, df=2, p= 69) but the 
added path was not significant. Since the improved fit was apparently due to loss in 
degrees of freedom and model parsimony was compromised, the alternative model was 
not considered adequate.
5.3.6 Outcome measures
As mentioned earlier, the use of LISREL was not possible for this section of the model 
due to the covariance matrix being non positive definite. Since attempts to remedy the 
problem were not successful, it was decided to proceed with regression analysis. It must 
be noted however, that results in this section should be inteipreted with caution since the 
above problem would theoretically stand for regression analysis as well.
Eight hierarchical regressions, one for each outcome measure in the study, were run. In 
order to examine the unique contribution of BSB to the outcome variables, behavioural 
attributions were entered first on a separate block. As shown in Table 5.5, significant 
regression equations were obtained when changes in diet, fat consumption and smoking 
were each regressed on behavioural attributions and BSB. For diet and fat consumption 
change behavioural attributions explained approximately 12% of the variance while for
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smoking they explained 10% of the variance. No significant regression models were 
obtained for exercise and weight change, anxiety and depression.
Table 5.5: Hierarchical regressions of behaviour change and psychological adjustment 
variables on attributions and BSB.
Model F Adj. R2 Beta
Caloric diet change 10.66** .12
Attribution .35**
BSB -.002
Fat consumption 2.57 .02
Attribution .11
BSB .09
Weight change 2.21 .03
Attribution .17
BSB -.01
Smoldng change 9.31** .10
Attribution 29**
BSB .05
Exercise change 1.28 .01
Attribution .15
BSB -.04
Anxiety .33 .01
Attribution .08
BSB -.03
Depression .18 .01
Attribution -.06
BSB .06
5.4 DISCUSSION
The present study proposed a theoretical model of behavioural self-blame and attempted 
to clarify its position in the attributional process for illness. It was proposed that BSB is 
mainly a result of causal attributions for one’s illness which in turn can be influenced by a
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number of patient and event characteristics. It was also proposed that some of these 
characteristics can influence BSB directly without the mediating role of attributions.
The proposed model fit the data well and revealed that as expected, three variables 
directly affect BSB: the patient’s sex, CSB, and the level of behavioural attributions 
themselves. More specifically, while being male was positively associated with 
behavioural attributions, it was negatively associated with BSB. This indicates that while 
men tend to acknowledge behaviour attributions more strongly, they do not feel as 
blameworthy as women. This finding could be a reflection of the inaccurate but popular 
preconception that heart disease predominantly affects men. Men find it easier to accept 
the illness and the behaviours that may have contributed to it without feeling 
blameworthy about it. Regarding CSB, the model showed it can have a direct positive 
effect on self-blame but also an indirect effect through behavioural attributions. This is 
consistent with the definition of CSB as a more stable internal assignment of blame that is 
often accompanied by depression and can thus affect both the attribution of causality and 
the evaluation of one’s role in bringing about those causes. Finally, verifying the claims 
of Brewin (1985), BSB is directly affected by behavioural attributions. The model depicts 
and verifies the notion that after one identifies one’s action as the cause of an event, one 
can then engage in an evaluation of that action and decide how instrumental he or she 
really was in causing the event.
Regarding the other predictor variables in the model, the type of diagnosis and the amount 
of risky health behaviour prior to the illness appear to have an indirect effect 011 BSB 
through their effect on attributions. It is plausible that suffering from a condition that is
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associated with a number of risk behaviours or having actually adopted those behaviours 
in the past will make a series of behavioural causal attributions available to the patient 
during the search for explanation and meaning.
The perceived consequences of the illness did not prevent the model’s fit but also did not 
yield statistically significant paths. Illness consequences or perceived severity have been 
previously linked with causal attributions (e.g. Tennen, Affleck & Gershman, 1986) so it 
was theoretically unfounded to delete the paths. However, more research is needed to 
establish their true contribution to the model.
Finally, age, time since diagnosis and perceived control had to be excluded from the 
model. In the present sample, these variables did not correlate with the remaining 
variables o f the model and prevented further analysis. Since some evidence exists that 
justified their inclusion in the model, more research in needed to clarify their role. 
Regarding time since diagnosis in particular, it has failed to correlate with self-blame in 
all samples examined so far in the thesis. It therefore seems possible that the only timing 
that may affect self-blame (and its relationship to adjustment) is right after the actual 
event or diagnosis. At that time, the search for an explanation is peaking, the situation 
makes the individual particularly vulnerable to anxiety and depression and self-blame 
may be found to affect adjustment levels. Soon after that, and once an explanation has 
been adopted, the effects of timing possibly diminish.
After examining a slightly different model, one that shows a bi-directional relationship 
between BSB and attributions, the relationship between attributions and self-blame was
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further clarified. It was found that while statistically the model fit the data even better, its 
parsimony was affected by adding a non significant path. Therefore, to the extent that one 
can rely on the data and accept the non-significance of the added path, the original view 
of BSB as an evaluation step that follows the causal search is supported and is consistent 
with evidence in the literature (e.g. Martin & Lee, 1992).
Regarding the outcome variables originally included in the model, LISREL path analysis 
was not possible due to calculations resulting in a non-positive definite covariance matrix. 
This meant that the values in the calculated matrix were such that prevented certain 
algebraic calculations (e.g. inversion of matrix may be impossible due to division by zero 
values). Thus no conclusion could be reached through this type of analysis. However, 
following a data driven approach, it was found that the recently proposed relationship 
between BSB and behaviour change (Christensen et al, 1999) can be explained by the role 
of behavioural attributions in the behaviour modification process. According to the 
regression analyses changes in diet and smoking are predicted by one’s behavioural 
attributions rather than one’s levels of BSB. This suggests that behaviour change is not 
necessarily a result of an evaluation of one’s causal behaviour. Acknowledging the risk 
one was in before the illness and subsequently changing his or her behaviour may be a 
result o f pressure or compliance. Also, it must be noted that since no objective measures 
of behaviour change were obtained the above relationship should be interpreted with 
caution. It may be the everyday intention to change rather than actual change that is 
reflected in these measures. Clearly, more work is required to ascertain the role of 
attributions and self-blame in behaviour change, especially when considering the potential 
benefits it may have on clinical application (Michela & Wood, 1995).
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In evaluating the methodology and findings of the present study, a number of strengths 
and limitations can be identified. One o f the study’s strengths is the fact that, to the best 
knowledge of the researcher, it is the first study to explore the predictors of BSB and 
propose a comprehensive theoretical model of illness attributions and self-blame. With 
the majority of studies focusing on the relationship between self-blame and adjustment 
and the inconsistencies regarding the methodology and the findings, the need for a 
broader approach to self-blame was necessaiy. This study clarifies not only the role of 
BSB in relation to causal attributions, but also the conditions under which they both occur 
in the context of the illness experience. Also, it follows up on the idea of a relationship 
between self-blame and behaviour change and offers an alternative explanation. Finally, it 
attempts a shift from a purely data-driven approach (though such an approach was in one 
instance inevitable) to understanding self-blame towards a theory-driven one that may 
prove more promising in resolving some of the inconsistencies.
Looking at the limitations of the study, it must be noted that the model tested in this study 
is only one of a potentially infinite number of models that could fit the data. Accepting a 
model in LISREL means that the model is plausible, not true. According to Maruyama 
(1998) ‘data never can confirm a model; they can only fail to disconfirm it’ (pp. 272). 
Further validation of the model is required, preferably with larger samples and alternative 
models ruled out before the present model can be irrevocably accepted. Finally, the 
present model tested a large number of parameters with few degrees of freedom. Its 
parsimony was therefore compromised and goodness of fit was easier to achieve. A more
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parsimonious model would have been more desirable and theoretically more significant, 
but the evidence available was not clear enough to support a more economical model.
Another limitation of the present study is the measures o f behaviour change. Both the 
baseline and the ‘since the onset’ measures of health behaviour are self-repc5rts and were 
not validated by more objective indices (e.g. actual weight entries). Therefore, they are 
subject to biases and may not reflect the true change in participants’ health behaviours. I f  
a link between self-blame, attributions and behaviour change is to be explored further, it 
is important that it be accompanied by objective measures o f the behaviour in question so 
that effects can be assessed more precisely.
To sum up, this study has examined the predictors of self-blame and has provided 
evidence of a unidirectional relationship between attributions and BSB. It has also 
examined the effects of attributions and self-blame on perceived behaviour change and 
has offered both conceptual and empirical clarifications. In the following chapters, a 
comparison between patient and non-patient populations on issues of self-blame are 
examined and the role of the illness experience is juxtaposed with the illness 
representations of the general public to investigate the potential role of preconceived 
notions of responsibility in illness and misfortune in the attribution process.
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C H A P T E R  S IX  
P E R C E P T I O N S  O F  B L A M E  I N  N O N - P A T I E N T S
S U M M A R Y
This chapter introduces two studies investigating self-blame in non-patient populations. 
Specifically, it presents the common background and method of the studies given in 
Chapters Eight and Nine as well as the research questions investigated. The main issues 
raised and explored in this and the following chapter are a) whether self-blame is a 
response observed only in people dealing with a traumatic event (possibly due to their 
need to enhance feelings of control), b) whether there is grounds for generalising the 
original findings on self-blame in victims of different misfortunes, and c) whether there is 
indeed reason for concern regarding the interchangeable use of the terms of ‘blame’, 
‘responsibility’, control, and ‘avoidability’ as it has been suggested in the literature.
6 .1  I N T R O D U C T I O N
So far, the evidence presented in this thesis points towards a situational conceptualisation of 
behavioural self-blame. In other words, it has been shown that the intensity of self-blame 
depends largely on factors such as the patient’s lifestyle prior to illness, the relevance of that 
lifestyle with the condition suffered and so on. Thus, it could be said that in patient 
populations self-blame is a result of a ‘rational’ or ‘pragmatic’ exploration of the potential 
factors that may have lead to the illness and a recognition of the link (or lack of) between a 
given illness and lifestyle. In this chapter, the focus shifts from patient to non-patient
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populations and the plausibility of the above approach is examined by looking at the illness 
representations of people free of illness.
Therefore, the next phase of the present research explored four main issues. The first is 
whether the relationship between lifestyle risk factors and behavioural self-blame found in 
patients is true for non-patient populations. If it is, then an indication will exist that self­
blame is a result of a more generalised way of thinking common both to patients and non­
patients.
Second, in line with the previous issue, an exploration is presented of whether the tendency 
for self-blame is evident only in patients when compared to their non-patient counterparts.
If the explanation of behavioural self-blame as one’s way of increasing one’s sense of 
control is correct (Janoff-Bulman, 1992) then it is expected that behavioural self-blame for a 
particular event or illness will be more evident in people whose sense of control has been 
challenged (i.e. patients). Despite lack of relevant evidence in the previous studies of a 
relationship between controllability and self-blame, perceived controllability is included in 
this study in order to investigate comparatively (i.e. between patients and non-patients) its 
potential role in illness explanations.
The third issue examined is that of perceptions of self-blame regarding different negative 
events. Specifically, researchers appeal* to assume that Janoff-Bulman’s theory, which 
originated from work on paralysed victims of severe car accidents and rape victimes, is 
applicable to other situations such as chronic illness patients and seek to replicate her results 
without ensuring that situations are indeed comparable. It is thus important to investigate
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how similarly or differently various negative events are perceived, and to evaluate the extent 
to which treating different misfortunes as comparable negative events indeed reflects the 
representations of the general public.
Finally, from a more methodological perspective, the study will investigate the similarities 
and differences between the concepts of blame and responsibility, and control and 
avoidability. As reviewed earlier in the thesis, Shaver & Drown (1986) claim that 
differentiating among causality, responsibility and blame in research and application may 
affect the construct validity of ‘self-blame’. Using the tenns interchangeably may reduce 
clarity and thus contribute to a theoretical vagueness resulting in lack of consistency and 
predictive value. Although a literary analysis of the term may support the authors’ views, it 
is also important to examine the participants ’ understanding of the term. Being able to 
differentiate between responsibility, blame and cause does not imply that when presented 
with each tenn alone participants have its literal meaning in mind. For example, asking 
patients with a history of an unhealthy lifestyle whether they blame themselves for their 
ciurent illness may not be inappropriate if, in retrospect, ‘not doing the right thing’ seems to 
them just as culpable as an intentionally harmful act. Moreover, Shaver & Drown (1986) do 
not provide a comprehensive review of the literature and consequently offer only 
suggestions on how the relevant concepts should be approached, rather than evidence on 
research findings. Indeed, there is contradicting evidence that participants actually 
differentiate among the three tenns of responsibility, causality and blame (e.g. Wortman, 
1983; Sholomskas, Steil & Plummer, 1990; Drown, 1985).
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To conclude, the study presented in the following two chapters aimed at investigating the 
following research questions:
1. When matched on all relevant characteristics, do patients and non-patients show a similar 
tendency for self-blame for a given illness?
2. What are people’s representations of negative events along the dimensions of 
responsibility, blame, control and avoidability? Are the resulting patterns for each 
dimension similar to each other?
3. Are there any differences in people’s perceptions of different types of events (e.g. 
illnesses, accidents etc), or are there any other underlying characteristics of events (e.g. 
severity) that may influence their representations?
4. Do people distinguish among the concepts of responsibility and blame, and control and 
avoidability? How likely is it that these concepts are used interchangeably?
6 .2  M E T H O D
6.2.1 Participants and recruitment
A random sample of 1000 members of the public residing in the Surrey and London area 
was contacted by post. The sample’s information had been previously purchased by the 
Department of Psychology, University of Surrey from a market research support company.
In a cover letter accompanying the questionnaire, recipients were given information about 
the aims of the study and how their address was obtained. They were informed about issues 
of anonymity and confidentiality, and were encouraged to fill in the questionnaire survey
139
and return it within two weeks. Due to financial constraints, no reward was offered for 
participation and 110 reminder letters were sent.
For the purposes of the matclied-pairs design of the study, the patient sample presented in 
Chapter Six was used. Patients and non patients were matched on gender, occupation and 
lifestyle risk factors. Gender and lifestyle risk factors were considered because they were 
found to have a significant effect on self-blame in the studies reported earlier in this 
thesis. Occupation was considered due to suggestions (but no conclusive evidence) in the 
literature that socio-economic factors may affect people’s perceptions of control and 
responsibility, with people o f lower socio-economic status (SES) feeling less responsible 
or in control of unhealthy behaviours (Blaxter, 1993). Because data in previous studies in 
the thesis was not detailed enough 011 this to allow for an examination of the relationship 
between self-blame and socio-economic status, participants in this study were matched on 
this variable to account for potential effects.
6.2.2 Measures
A six-page questionnaire was used that consisted of two parts. Part I included the 
measures that were used in the patient-non-patient comparisons (reported in Chapter 7). 
Part II included the measures used to assess non-patients’ illness representations on the 
dimensions of responsibility, blame, control and avoidability (reported in Chapter 8). The 
questionnaire is included in Appendix VII.
Self-blame: In order to answer the first two research questions of this study, measures of 
self-blame, lifestyle risk factors and perceptions of control were assessed. However, since
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this group had not experienced any serious illnesses for which self-blame could be
assessed, a hypothetical scenario was presented. Specifically they were presented with the
following instructions:
Imagine yourself in the following situation: You have recently been experiencing 
disturbing chest pains. After being admitted to the hospital and undergoing the 
appropriate examinations, you are diagnosed as suffering from heart disease. 
Keeping in mind that in all other respects your life is exactly the same as in reality, 
please read the following statements carefully and respond by ticking (a/) the box 
that best describes how you feel.
Following these instructions, participants were asked to provide ratings of behavioural 
and characterological self-blame (using the same items as Chapter Five).
Behavioural risk factors: In order to assess participants’ degree of risky lifestyle, they 
were asked to indicate the degree to which they engaged in certain risk behaviours 
associated with heart disease (i.e. being overweight, following a calorie controlled diet, 
eating foods high in fat/fibre/sugar, exercising regularly, smoking cigarettes, leading a 
stressful life, and leading a physically active life). The scale used was identical to the 
scale used for the study reported in Chapter 5, with responses ranging from l= ‘not at all* 
to 5=’a lot’. As in Chapter 5, a 9-point risk index was calculated following re-coding of 
values where appropriate. Every response equal or higher than 3 was considered an 
indication of a risky behaviour and was given a point of 1. Responses equal or lower than 
2 were considered an indication of little or no risk and were given a point of 0. Thus, a 
composite index score was obtained that ranged form 0 (little or no risk) to 9 (high risk).
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Perceived controllability of health behaviours: Participants perceived controllability over 
the above health behaviours as well as their general behaviour and character were 
assessed. Each controllability item was scored on a 5-point scale ranging from ‘strongly 
disagree’ (1) to ‘strongly agree’ (5) as in Chapter Five.
Illness representations and perceptions of blame, responsibility, control and avoidability: In 
order to investigate research questions 3-4, participants were asked to rate a list of negative 
events on a number of scales regarding issues of responsibility and control. Specifically, a 
total o f fourteen different negative events identified from the literature on self-blame were 
used as the stimuli in this study. These events included illnesses (e.g. AIDS, heart disease), 
violent events (e.g. rape) and other potentially life threatening situations (e.g. severe bum 
injuries; see APPENDIX VIII). In order to increase the measure’s sensitivity to participants’ 
representations of the events, slightly different aspects of the same event were included on 
the list. For example, rather than including ‘cancer’ as a single, general event, two types of 
cancer varying in the degree of associated personal involvement were included (i.e. breast 
cancer and lung cancer).
The 14 events were rated in response to 4 different questions. These were the following:
1) How much do you think the sufferer is responsible for causing the event?
2) How much do you think the sufferer is to blame for the event?
3) How much do you think the sufferer could have avoided the event?
4) How much do you think the sufferer has control over the cause of the event?
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Answers to these questions were given on a five-point scale with l= ’not at all’ and 
5=’ completely’. Participants’ responses were then analysed separately for each of the four 
questions using Cluster analysis and multi-dimensional scaling
Finally, participants were asked to report whether they had ever experienced one or more of 
the negative events on the list.
6.2.3 Choice o f  Analyses
Pearson’s correlations, regression analysis and t-tests were used in order to investigate 
research questions 1 and 2. A path analysis testing the model proposed in the previous 
chapter was also considered but was dismissed due to the relatively small response rate and 
consequently sample size of the survey (see relevant Results section).
Multidimensional Scaling (MDS) was used to investigate participants’ representations of 
the 14 negative events. Interpretation of each plot was assisted by cluster analysis as 
suggested by Shephard, Romney and Nerlove (1972). These methods of analysis were 
chosen because of their ability to provide measures of similarity and/or proximity in a clear 
way. In MDS, data are represented in a readily interpretable and communicable visual form 
(i.e. plots of points in multidimensional space) and few assumptions about the data are 
made. The aim of MDS is to identify distinct regions in the output plot that can reveal 
meaningful partitions of the space. Cluster analysis was used to discover natural groupings 
based upon the original data and ensure an objective way of interpreting and labelling the
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results. Also since cluster analysis is a non-dimensional method (Shephard et al, 1972) it 
can provide solutions that are not captured in two- or three- dimensional space.
Finally, in order to test for significant differences between perceptions of a) blame and 
responsibility and b) avoidability and control for the 14 negative events a series of t-tests 
was performed.
For purposes of clarity and organization the findings of the present study are presented in 
two separate chapters. Chapter Seven presents the findings and discussion regarding 
research questions 1 and 2. Chapter Eight presents the findings and discussion of research 
questions 3 and 4.
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C H A P T E R  S E V E N  
I N V E S T I G A T I N G  S E L F - B L A M E  I N  N O N - P A T I E N T S :  
C O M P A R I S O N S  W I T H  P A T I E N T S
S U M M A R Y
This chapter presents the results of the first part of a study using a non-patient sample to 
study self-blame. Specifically, a comparison of self-blame levels is presented between 
patients and non-patients matched on all relevant characteristics. A total of 85 pairs were 
studied and results showed higher levels of self-blame (both BSB and CSB) in the non­
patient group as well as different regression models with behavioural risk factors predicting 
BSB only in the patient group. Possible explanations of these findings are discussed and the 
limitations of the study are considered.
7 . 1  A N A L Y S E S  A N D  R E S U L T S
7.1.1 Participants
One hundred and forty-four (N=144) non-patients responded to the questionnaire giving a 
response rate of approximately 14%. This was not surprising, considering the limitation in 
resources that did not allow for follow-up reminders or calls to maximize response rates. Of 
the 144, five reported having experienced one of the negative events listed in the grid and 
were excluded from the analysis leaving a sample of 139. Of these, 47 were men and 92 
were women. Mean age for the overall sample was 58.6 (SD: 12.8) years.
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For the analyses reported in the present chapter, this sample was juxtaposed to the patient 
sample reported in Chapter Five. Patients and non-patients were matched on personal 
characteristics found in the previous study to be predictors of self-blame. Specifically, of 
the five factors seen as predictors of BSB in the final model of Chapter Six (i.e. sex, CSB, 
risk behaviour, diagnosis and consequences), participants were matched on-sex and 
behavioural risk factors. CSB was treated here as a dependent variable for exploratory 
purposes so matching was not appropriate. Another variable that was considered for 
matching was participants’ occupation as an indicator of socio-economic status (SES) 
using the major groups of the Standard Occupational Classification (SOC 2000).
Although analyses in both samples (as well as data presented in previous chapters) did not 
reveal any relationships between SES and self-blame or lifestyle risk factors, SES was 
taken into account to ensure similarity in the general lifestyle of participants and the 
extent to which that can affect their perceptions of and knowledge about illness. Hence, 
although SES was not allowed to limit the matching only to pairs with corresponding 
SES, it was allowed to guide the matching procedure as much as possible. To illustrate 
the way matching criteria were applied, a woman credit controller with a lifestyle index of 
6 would be allowed to match with a woman medical secretary with a lifestyle index of 6 
since both occupations fall under the general group of ‘administrative and secretarial 
occupations’.
A total o f 85 matched pairs were found in the maimer described above. As shown Table 
7.1, 27 pairs matched perfectly on sex, behavioural risk and occupation, 18 pairs matched 
on sex, behavioural risk and occupation class, and 40 pairs matched only on sex and 
behavioural risk.
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T a b le  7 .1: Matching characteristics of the samples in this study. Perfect matching is 
denoted by (V).
N pairs 
(patient-non-patient)
Sex Behavioural Risk Exact occupation Occupation class
27 V V
18 V V V
40 V V
Once all possible matched pairs had been obtained, the matched sample’s characteristics 
were obtained. As a whole, the sample included participants with a mean age of 58.1 (SD: 
12). The most frequent occupation categoiy reported was professionals. Table 7.2 shows 
a breakdown of the main characteristics for the patient and non-patient groups.
T a b le  7.2: Demographic characteristics of patients and non-patients.
Characteristics Patients Non-patients
N 85 85
Sex Male 39 39
Female 46 46
Age (years) Mean 61.0 55.2
SD 7.3 16.7
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Table 7.2 (Cont.): Demographic characteristics of patients and non-patients.
Characteristics Patients Non-patients
Occupational Classification 8 8
Managers & Senior Officials 15 24
Professional 7 14
Associate Professional 6 12
Protective Service 8 7
Administrative & Secretarial 2 2
Skilled Trades 1 3
Personal Service 2 1
Process, Plan & Machine Operatives - 3
Elementary Occupations 11 6
7.2 DIFFERENCES BETWEEN PATIENTS AND NON-PATIENTS
The means and standard deviations of the main variables in the study are presented in 
Table 7.3. It can be seen that non-patients have generally scored higher on all variables 
except perceived controllability of stress and character.
In order to check for significant differences in self-blame between patients and non­
patients, matched-pairs t-tests were used. Significant differences were found for both 
BSB (t=2.98, df=166, p<.01) and CSB (t=2.23, df=166, p<.05), with patients scoring 
lower than non-patients. However, due to the large positive correlation between BSB and 
CSB, the extent to which the above t-tests were examining two different types of self­
blame or group differences on essentially one variable could be seen as debatable. 
Therefore, a multivatiate analysis of variance (MANOVA) was appropriate. Lack of a
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priori power analysis for the particular test, and in light of the small numbers of 
participants in each group, the test was to be interpreted with caution. The analysis was 
carried out with BSB and CSB as the dependent variables and the type of population (i.e. 
patients, non-patients) as the independent variable. Results showed that there were no 
significant main effects for either BSB (F(l, 91)=2.87, ns) or CSB (F(l,91)=.88, ns).
Since the results of the MANOVA could be due to lack of statistical power, it was 
concluded that they would be used as indications for caution when interpreting the results 
of the matched-pairs t-tests.
Regarding differences in perceived controllability of risk factors, independent sample t- 
tests revealed that no significant differences between the two groups.
Table 7.3: Mean and standard deviation of the main variables in the study for each group.
Variable Mean (SD)
Patients Non-Patients t-value
BSB 2.01 (1.15) 2.51 (1.01) 2.98**
CSB 1.85 (1.02) 2.21 (1.12) 2.23*
Controlability
Diet 4.17 (.64) 4.24 (.77) .63
Smoking 4.42 (.81) 4.62 (.79) 1.68
Stress 3.12(1.03) 3.07 (1.05) -.30
Behaviour 3.63 (.89) 3.85 (.85) 1.61
Character 2.51 (.97) 2.42 (1.13) -.54
Note: *p<.05, **p<.01
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When looking at the relationships between self-blame (both BSB and CSB) and lifestyle 
risk, some interesting differences were detected. As shown in Table 7.4, BSB is positively 
correlated with lifestyle risk for both patients and non-patients (i-.25, p<.05 and 1- . 23, 
p<.05 respectively). CSB correlated significantly with lifestyle risk only for the non­
patient group. Because of the strong correlation between BSB and CSB , partial 
correlations were calculated between BSB and lifestyle risk in non-patients, controlling 
for CSB. It was found that the relationship between BSB and lifestyle risk was no longer 
significant (r=. 12, N=81, p=ns).
Furthermore, a significant negative correlation was foimd between BSB and stress 
avoidability in the patient group (r=-.31, N=84, p<.01) but not in the non-patient group. 
This means that patients who view a stressful lifestyle as avoidable tend not to blame 
themselves for their illness, a pattern not evident in the non-patient sample. However, 
when CSB (which also shows a negative correlation with perceived stress avoidability) is 
controlled for, the relationship between BSB and stress avoidability becomes non­
significant (r=-.14, df=81, p=ns). It was found, thus, that it is CSB that is responsible for 
this relationship yielding a negative correlation of r=-.23, N=81, p<.05 when BSB is 
controlled for.
7.2.1 Relationships between self-blame, lifestyle risk  and  control: differences in
patterns
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Table 7.4: Pearson’s correlations between self-blame, lifestyle risk and perceived control
for patient and non-patient groups (82<N<85).
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1. BSB
patient -
non-patient -
2. CSB
patient .58** -
non-patient .61** -
3. HEALTH RISK
patient .25* -.05 -
non-patient .23* .24* -
CONTROLLABILITY
4. DIET .03 -.11 .09
patient .18 .23* -.14 -
non-patient
5. SMOKING
patient -.02 -.12 -.13 .17 -
non-patient .09 .15 -.21 .45** -
6. STRESS
patient -.31** -.36** -.03 -.01 .23* -
non-patient .02 .02 -.26* 41** 29** -
7. BEHAVIOUR
patient -.07 -.20 .13 .24* .23* .27* -
non-patient .13 .01 -.11 .27* .07 40** -
8. CHARACTER
patient -.18 -.12 -.07 .03 .02 .40** 41**
non-patient .02 -.02 -.02 .05 -.05 .25* .24*
Note: * p<.05, **p<.01
Variables were entered in two separate hierarchical multiple regressions -one for each 
group- in order to compare the strength that the independent variables had in predicting 
BSB in each group. In each regression, CSB was entered as the first step (block), lifestyle 
risk as the second, and all five control items as the third. Results (Table 7.5) showed that 
for both groups, CSB was a significant predictor of BSB (beta=58, p<.001 for patients 
and beta= 57, pc.OOl for non-patients). Lifestyle risk was a significant predictor of BSB
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only for the patient group (beta= 28, p<.01), and control items did not predict BSB for 
either group.
Table 7.5: Hierarchical regressions of BSB 011 CSB, lifestyle risk and control items for 
both groups.
B e t a
P a t ie n ts  
t  A d j .  R 2 F B e t a
N o n -p a t ie n t s  
t A d j .  R 2 F
C S B .58 6 .2 4 * * .40 8 .7 4 * * .5 7 6 .0 7 * *  .3 5  7 .4 6 * *
R i s k .28 3 .1 4 * * . 1 1 1 . 1 5
C o n t r o l l a b i l i t y •
Diet .06 .68 0 4 .3 7
SmoJdng . 1 1 1 . 1 6 .0 0 3 .03
Stress - . 1 0 - 1 . 0 2 -.0 5 -.4 2
Behaviour .03 .3 1 . 1 4 1 .4 5
Character - .0 7 -.6 6 .0 1 . 1 3
. Note: * p<.05, **p<.01
7.3 DISCUSSION
The first part of the present study looked at similarities and differences in self-blame and 
its correlates between patients and non-patients. Using a matched-pairs design, it 
examined whether the groups differ a) in the amount of self-blame they are ready to 
accept regarding an illness (i.e. heart disease) and b) the predictors of behavioural self- 
blame.
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Regarding differences in self-blame, there was some evidence that non-patients were 
ready to blame themselves for a potential heart attack more than their patient counterparts. 
This was true for both behavioural and characterological self-blame. However, as 
mentioned in the results section, these finding were subject to certain statistical 
limitations. Therefore the discussion that follows should be seen as an opportunity to 
address potentially relevant theoretical issues rather than a particular interpretation of 
evidence.
The explanation of the differences between the matched groups may lie in the actual 
illness experience. Specifically, non-patients responded to the hypothetical scenario using 
an illness representation formed through ways other than the actual illness experience. 
They do not have a personal experience to draw from and thus form their illness 
perceptions indirectly (e.g. through the experiences of others) resulting in more crude 
conclusions about blame and responsibility issues. In contrast, patients, having gone 
through the illness experience, have been exposed to the actual situation, and are more 
aware of the factors it involves. The above point could be illustrated using the example of 
acquisition of infonnation about a chronic illness. Non-patients are likely to receive 
information on a disease quite passively, as targets of health campaigns or by exposure to 
media coverage. The infonnation they receive is likely to be simplified in order to be 
generalisable to the public, and often out of context. In contrast, patients diagnosed with a 
specific condition, possibly having undergone diagnostic tests yielding a specific patient 
profile, are likely to receive more accurate, detailed and specific infonnation about their 
condition and what caused it. They may also be more likely to have a personal interest in 
fine-tuning their knowledge since it can directly affect the progression of their illness.
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Therefore, it is possible that the difference detected in this study is due to different 
knowledge about illness and perhaps different illness representations.
The differences in the regression models found in the two groups provide some support 
for the above explanation. In non-patients, lifestyle risk did not predict BSB indicating 
that, though scoring higher on self-blame, non-patients did not take into account their own 
lifestyle and possible risk behaviours when responding to the self-blame items. In 
contrast, patients replied on a more pragmatic basis, and their lifestyle risk score predicted 
their BSB scores.
The present findings, however, can be interpreted through the scope of other theoretical 
perspectives as well. The Just World Hypothesis (Lemer, 1980) and other theories 
stressing the importance of control over future events (e.g. Wortman, 1976) could propose 
that non-patients scored higher on self-blame driven by the need to attribute a common 
and potentially fatal disease to a controllable agent (i.e. themselves) regardless of whether 
their lifestyle justified making such a connection. In contrast, patients may have had these 
assumptions challenged and made more accurate attributions using actual knowledge 
drawn from their experience.
Conversely, the different levels of self-blame between patients and non-patients may be 
seen as patients’ tendency to underestimate the degree to which their health behaviour and 
lifestyle contributed to their illness, compared to their non-patient counterparts.
Consistent with coping literature but in contrast to the control-enhancing theoretical 
explanations of self-blame in victims of misfortune (Janoff-Bulman, 1992), it may be that
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patients engage in a denial-like pattern of causal thinking and downplay the role of 
personal health behaviour in their illness in order to avoid guilt or feelings of 
responsibility. Although this explanation is possible, it does not seem very likely when 
the results of previous studies in this thesis and timing issues in the patient group are 
considered. Specifically, the evidence presented so far in the thesis suggests-a relationship 
between lifestyle involvement and self-blame (Chapters Four and Five) with higher 
lifestyle involvement implied by an illness relating to higher levels of self-blame. If 
coping or defence mechanisms were in play, one would expect similar levels of self­
blame in different patient groups, unless there were reasons to believe that these 
mechanisms were used more by some patient groups and less by others. Moreover, coping 
and defence mechanisms are typically used relatively early in stressful situations and tend 
to diminish once adjustment has been achieved (Lazarus, 1966; Folkman & Lazarus,
1980). With the mean time since diagnosis for the patient group being approximately five 
years and psychological adjustment scores at acceptable levels, there would be no reason 
to expect any coping or defence mechanisms in operation at the time of data collection. 
Clearly, more work is needed to explore the possible underlying mechanisms behind these 
intriguing differences.
There are certain limitations in this study that should be noted. First, the low response rate 
of the non-patient population limits the generalisability of results. However, the sample 
size is large enough to provide adequate statistical power of the results and warrant further 
investigation. Second, the variables on which the patients were matched with non-patients 
are sufficient only to the extent that the studies presented earlier in the thesis are reliable 
and valid. Since, to the best knowledge of the author, there are no other studies available
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that investigate the determinants of self-blame, pair-matching in this study had to rely on 
the results of the path analysis in Chapter Six. A potentially better way (but perhaps not as 
feasible methodologically) of examining those differences would be to use a within- 
subjects repeated measures design and look at people’s tendency for self-blame regarding 
an illness before and after a diagnosis.
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C H A P T E R  E IG H T  
P E R C E P T IO N S  O F  B L A M E , R E S P O N S IB IL IT Y  A N D  
C O N T R O L  F O R  N E G A T IV E  L IF E  E V E N T S  IN  N O N -P A T IE N T S
SUMMARY
This chapter explores people’s understanding o f negative events and investigates the way 
the represent them in terms o f blame, responsibility, avoidability and control dimensions. A  
lis t o f 14 negative events including accidents and illnesses was presented to the same 
participants described in the previous chapter, who were asked to rate them on the above 
dimensions. Data was analysed using Cluster Analysis and Multidimensional Scaling. 
Results showed a clear differentiation between illnesses and other negative events in 
people’s representations. Also, negative events were grouped along the dimensions 
according to the levels o f responsibility in a manner that verified earlier findings in the 
thesis about the relationship between lifestyle involvement and perceptions o f blame.
Results are discussed in reference to theoretical and methodological criticisms presented 
earlier in the thesis.
8.1 ANALYSES AND RESULTS
For this phase o f the study, the entire sample o f non-patients (N=139) presented at the 
beginning o f Chapter Eight was used. As mentioned, the sample consisted o f 47 men and 92 
women. The mean age for the overall sample was 58.6 (SD: 12,8) years.
Looking at the mean ratings o f the 14 events on responsibility, avoidability, control and 
blame (Table 8.1), it can be seen that AIDS had the highest means on all four dimensions
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followed by lung cancer. Childhood diabetes had the lowest scores followed by breast 
cancer and then rape.
Table 8.1: Means and standard deviations o f ratings o f responsibility, avoidability, 
control and blame for each negative event (events w ith the lowest and highest mean are in 
bold).
Event Blame Responsibilit Avoidability Control
Heart Disease mean 2.67 2.94 3.03 2.87
SD 1.10 .93 .97 .96
High Blood Pressure mean 2.36 2.45 2.67 2.55
SD 1.01 .98 1.04 .99
Adult diabetes mean 2.24 1.99 1.99 2.18
SD 1.24 1.99 1.08 1.16
Childhood Diabetes mean 1.29 1.16 1.23 1.16
SD .78 .44 .62 .46
Lung cancer mean 3.38 3.55 3.65 3.44
SD 1.20 1.12 1.05 1.07
Breast cancer mean 1.41 1.28 1.49 1.36
SD .76 .58 .84 .65
Stroke mean 2.14 2.22 2.22 2.21
SD 1.04 .98 .98 .97
AIDS mean 3.61 3.89 3.98 3.82
SD 1.24 1.08 1.05 1.07
Rape mean 1.60 1.48 1.79 1.71
SD .88 .84 .94 .94
Domestic violence mean 2.02 2.05 2.62 2.10
SD 1.10 1.01 1.16 1.00
Paralysis (car accident) mean 1.72 1.54 1.72 1.73
SD .90 .81 1.01 .90
Paralysis (sports accident) mean 2.27 2.21 2.58 2.34
SD 1.19 1.16 1.36 1.22
Bum injuries (work) mean 2.43 2.55 2.81 2.69
SD 1.03 1.16 1.21 1.13
Bum injuries (home) mean 3.06 3.29 3.51 3.34
SD 1.15 1.23 1.22 1.22
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Multidimensional Scaling CMP S'): MDS analysis was ran in order to depict the 14 
negative events in multidimensional space and investigate any underlying dimensions in 
participants’ representations o f the events. The choice o f the number o f dimensions 
suitable for a given data set must offer a balance between statistical and substantive 
criteria (Everitt &  Dunn, 1991). Statistical criteria focus on goodness o f fit measures 
while more substantive criteria focus on the interpretability o f the solutions. Regarding 
goodness o f fit measures, the common guidelines for acceptable stress and R2 measures 
were followed (explained below). Regarding interpretability, practical criteria o f clarity 
and sim plicity were employed.
Four classical metric MDS solutions were obtained, one for each o f the four questions, 
using the SPSS ALSCAL procedure and employing the Euclidean distance. The goodness 
o f fit measure for MDS analyses is expressed by the solution’s stress and R2 values. 
According to Kruskal (1964, cited in Everitt &  Dumi, 1991) stress levels lower than 0.15 
are excellent w ith values close to zero being ideal. Similarly, R2 values approaching 1 are 
perfect. In  all four cases, unidimensional solutions gave the lowest stress values. 
However, since participants did not make explicit judgements o f similarities or 
differences on the stimuli, but rather rated the events on four 5-point scales, they were, in 
a way, forced to think along a specific dimension at a time (e.g. blame for the sufferer). 
Hence, it was not surprising that unidimensional solutions would yield the best fit values. 
It was decided that accepting these solutions would be less informative that 2 or 3- 
dimensional ones. For that reason, 2-dimensional solutions were preferred when stress
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values allowed it. Table 8.2 shows the S-stress (SPSS ALSCAL’s variant o f a stress 
measure) and R2 values obtained for each 2-dimensional solution.
Table 8.2: Stress and R2 values o f the 2-dimensional solutions
S-stress R2
Blame .07 .98
Responsibility .06 .98
Control .04 .99
Avoidability .08 .97
Figure 8.1 shows the 2 -dimensional MDS plot for all 14 events rated on the sufferer’s 
blame for causing the event. It is important to note that MDS plots are simple 
configurations in space and therefore could be rotated in anyway provided that the relative 
distances among the points in the plot are maintained. Events placed on the far le ft o f the 
plot (such as childhood diabetes, breast cancer or rape) were perceived as different from 
events on the far right o f the plot (such as AIDS). Looking at the mean ratings for each 
event (shown both in Table 8.1 and on the plot o f Figure 8.2) it becomes obvious that the 
horizontal dimension is the amount o f blame participants see as attributable to the sufferer. 
For example, a rape victim  or a patient w ith breast-cancer is seen as less blameworthy than 
a patient w ith lmig-cancer or AIDS. Thus, the space could be partitioned in  three main areas 
showing the groupings according to the degree o f blame assigned by participants.
Furthermore, there appears to be an alternative partitioning o f space when looking along the 
vertical dimension o f the plot. A ll illnesses can clearly be separated form all other events as
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demonstrated by the dashed horizontal line on the plot. W ith events like ‘adult diabetes’ or 
‘heart disease’ at opposite ends from ‘paralysis from a sports accident’ or ‘burn injuries in 
the workplace’, it is plausible that the vertical dimension depicts participants’ categorization 
o f the events into a specific context o f actual illnesses versus other health-affecting hazards. 
Therefore diseases are grouped together at the top o f the plot while at the bottom one finds 
events that, regardless o f how blameworthy the sufferer is, occurred as accidents during 
everyday activities.
Figure 8.1: Two-dimensional plot depicting the 14 negative events rated on the degree o f 
blame assigned to the sufferer.
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When responses to the ‘responsibility’ question were analysed (Figure 8.2), the solution was
very similar. The spread o f the events along the horizontal dimension followed the same
pattern as the previous plot w ith those events perceived as low on responsibility appearing
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on the le ft side o f the plot (e.g. breast cancer), those perceived as high on responsibility on 
the right side o f the plot (e.g. AIDS) and those perceived as average on responsibility 
appealing in the middle. Regarding the vertical dimension, again, illnesses were clearly 
separated from other accidents and hazards, and were depicted at the top o f the plot.
Figure 8.2: Two-dimensional plot depicting the 14 negative events rated on the degree o f 
responsibility assigned to the sufferer.
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Overall, considering issues o f blame and responsibility for the 14 negative events yielded 
very similar representations, revealing a common underlying way o f understanding the two 
dimensions and making judgements along them.
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Looking at the representations o f avoidability and control o f the 14 negative events a similar 
picture is presented. As shown by their mean ratings, avoidability o f events (Figure 8.3) is 
depicted when moving horizontally along the plot w ith rape and childhood diabetes seen as 
less preventable than AIDS, lung cancer, or burn injuries happened at home. Once more, the 
vertical dimension differentiated between illnesses and other events, w ith illness depicted at 
the top o f the plot.
Figure 8.3: Two-dimensional plot depicting the 14 negative events rated on the degree o f 
avoidability the sufferer is perceived to have.
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Finally, Figure 8.4 shows the representation o f the events rated on the control the sufferer 
is typically perceived to have over the occurrence o f the event. Although the events on 
this plot are slightly more dispersed than in the previous plots -perhaps suggesting a more
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complicated way of categorising events- the main principles are the same. Horizontally, 
one moves from the less controllable occurrences 011 the left o f the plot, to the more 
controllable one at the right. Illnesses are once again separated from the other events and 
appear towards the top o f the plot.
Figure 8.4: Two-dimensional plot depicting the 14 negative events rated on the degree o f 
control the sufferer is perceived to have over the occurrence o f the event.
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Cluster analysis: Hierarchical agglomerative clustering o f the 14 negative events
(employing between-groups linkage and squared Euclidean distance) was run for each o f
the four questions (i.e. blame, responsibility, control and avoidability) in order to facilitate
a more extensive and objective interpretation o f the MDS plots. A ll variables were
measured on the same scale so no transformations were required. In  clustering techniques,
it is occasionally d ifficu lt to decide on the appropriate number o f clusters. Two strategies
164
were used to determine the number o f clusters. First, the Euclidean distance schedule was 
examined for large increases in  coefficients between agglomeration steps (agglomeration 
schedules are shown in Appendix IX ). This can be also done more inform ally by 
examining the differences between fusion levels in the dendrogram produced by the 
statistical program (Everitt, 1993). Large changes are taken to indicate a particular 
number o f clusters. Second, cluster profiles were examined for meaningful cluster 
differences and judgements were made on the basis o f interpretation.
Inspection o f the agglomeration coefficients and assessment o f the face validity o f the 
dendrograms suggested a three- or four- cluster solution for all four questions. In order to 
test the stability o f the clusters across different algorithms, all four analyses were re-run 
using the within-group linkage clustering method. Stability was measured in terms o f 
'transfer o f cluster membership’ (i.e. minimal transfer o f membership across different 
clustering methods). Clusters were highly stable with no change in cluster membership 
when comparing the between and w ithin group linkage methods.
Regarding the ratings o f blame, analysis yielded three clusters as shown in  the 
dendrogram in Figure 8.5. The first cluster (Cluster I) included child diabetes, breast 
cancer, rape, paralysis after a car accident and domestic violence. A ll five events can be 
seen as relatively unforeseeable and possibly attributable to uncontrollable factors such as 
chance or heredity. In contrast to Clusters II and II I there appears to be little  or no lifestyle 
involvement regarding the occurrence o f the events and thus sufferers are not responsible 
for them. The second cluster (Cluster II) included high blood pressure, stroke, adult 
diabetes, heart disease, paralysis due to a sports accident and both examples o f severe
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bum injuries (i.e. at home and at work). These events are less unexpected than those o f 
Cluster I since some measures can be taken to prevent their occurrence. For example, a 
healthy diet or moderate exercise can buffer against heart disease or adult onset diabetes. 
Sim ilarly, following health and safety instructions can potentially prevent bum injuries. 
Finally the third cluster (Cluster III) included only lung cancer and AIDS. It seems 
meaningful to conclude that the events in this cluster are seen as preventable possibly due 
to the behavioural risk factors (e.g. smoking, unprotected sex etc.) relating almost 
causally to the events.
Figure 8.5: Dendrogram showing the three cluster solution yielded from the analysis o f 
events rated on ‘blame’ .
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When the three cluster solution was superimposed on the relevant MDS plot (Figure 8.6), 
the solution verified the interpretation given initia lly regarding the horizontal lay-out o f 
events.
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Figure 8.6: Cluster solution superimposed on MDS solution for ‘blame’ rating of events.
Following the same steps, the 14 events rated on responsibility were then examined. Here, 
the cluster solution was more ambiguous than in  the previous case. As shown by the 
dendrogram in Figure 8.7, either a three or a four cluster solution could be retained. The 
four cluster solution resembled the MDS solution more than the three cluster one and was 
more interpretable. Thus, four clusters were analysed. As in the case o f blame, Cluster I 
included child diabetes, breast cancer, rape, both examples o f paralysis and domestic 
violence. These events were most likely seen as low on responsibility o f the sufferer. 
Cluster II included adult diabetes, stroke, heart disease and high blood pressure. These 
events were seen as different from those in Cluster I and judging by their mean scores
167
were seen as involving more responsibility o f the sufferer. Cluster III included only two 
events, burn injuries at home and at work, which in the corresponding analysis for blame 
were included in Cluster II. This cluster appears to demonstrate the separation between 
illnesses and accidents seen in the MDS plots described earlier. Finally, Cluster IV  
includes lung cancer and AIDS, the two events seen by participants as involving the 
highest degree o f responsibility from the patients perspective.
Figure 8.7: Dendrogram showing the four* cluster solution yielded from the analysis o f 
events rated on ‘responsibility’ .
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n
When this cluster* solution was superimposed on the corresponding MDS plot (Figure 
8.8), it fit the configuration o f the plot well. Clusters matched the naturally occurring 
groupings o f the point and overall the solution was very similar to that o f blame ratings.
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Figure 8.8: Cluster solution superimposed on MDS solution for ‘responsibility’ rating of
events.
In  a similar manner to that presented above, the concepts o f avoidability and control were 
examined. Regarding avoidability three clusters were identified (Figure 8.9). Cluster I 
included child diabetes, breast cancer, rape, paralysis from a car accident, adult diabetes, 
and stroke. These events were seen as low on avoidability. Cluster II included heart 
disease high blood pressure, domestic violence, burn injuries at work and paralysis from a 
sports accident. Compared to Cluster I, these events appeared to involve average levels o f 
avoidability as indicated by their mean scores (Table 8.1). Finally, Cluster II I included 
lung cancer, AIDS and burn injuries at home representing events high on avoidability.
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Figure 8.9: Dendrogram showing the four cluster solution yielded from the analysis o f 
events rated on ‘avoidability’ .
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The MDS solution for the avoidability ratings matched the cluster solution satisfactorily. 
As shown in Figure 8.10, when the three clusters were superimposed on the relevant plot 
they appeared to follow  the vertical separ ation o f space given in Figure 8.3. A  small 
difference was noted regarding adult diabetes and stroke which in the cluster solution 
appeared as similar to low responsibility events such as breast cancer and rape, while in 
the earlier interpretation o f the MDS plot were seen as closer to average responsibility 
events such high blood pressure or domestic violence (depicted towards the middle 
vertical section o f the plot).
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Figure 8.10: Cluster solution superimposed on MDS solution for ‘avoidability’ rating of
events.
Finally, a cluster analysis o f the 14 events rated on participants’ perceptions o f control 
that the sufferer would typically have over the event revealed three clusters (Figure 8.11). 
Cluster I  included child diabetes, breast cancer, rape, domestic violence and paralysis 
from a car accident. As with previous analyses, this cluster was interpreted as representing 
events o f low control o f occurrence. Cluster II included both examples o f burn injuries, 
heart disease, high blood pressure, adult diabetes, stroke and paralysis from a sports 
accident. This cluster was seen as including the events o f average control. Cluster III 
included only AIDS and lung cancer as the events whose onset the sufferer has the highest 
level o f control over.
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Figure 8.11: Dendrogram of the three cluster solutions of events rated on ‘control’.
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Comparing the cluster solution w ith the MDS plot (Figure 8.12) showed a picture similar 
to that found in earlier comparisons. The clusters matched the vertical separation o f space 
thus verifying the interpretation o f one o f the dimensions o f the MDS analysis.
To summarise, four very similar three-cluster solutions were yielded from the cluster 
analysis o f the 14 negative events for each o f the four questions regarding the sufferer’s 
perceived responsibility, blame, control and avoidability.
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Figure 8.12: Cluster solution superimposed on MDS solution for ‘control’ rating of
events.
From the above comparisons, it has been shown that people have specific ways o f grouping 
negative events in their minds w ith a) most illnesses clearly perceived as different from 
other misfortunes and b) different representations o f different illnesses when those are rated 
on the same scale. However, these results do not show whether there are significant 
differences between ratings o f blame and responsibility or avoidability and control when the 
same event is considered. To test for significant differences between perceptions o f a) blame 
and responsibility and b) control and avoidability for each event, two sets o f 14 repeated 
measures t-tests were performed. In  order to compensate for the increased chances o f Type I 
error, the Bonferroni correction was applied and as a result the significance criterion was 
reduced to a= 0036. Results are reported in the Table 8.3. Regarding perceived blame and
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responsibility o f the 14 negative events, no significant differences were found. When 
comparing perceptions o f avoidability and control, only lung cancer, domestic violence and 
paralysis from a sports accident showed significant differences. Specifically, all three events 
were associated w ith higher avoidability than controllability.
Table 8.3: T-tests for differences in mean scores between i) blame and responsibility and 
ii) control and avoidability for each negative event.
Event t-values
Blame -  Responsibility Avoidability-Control
Heart disease 2.87 2.26
Hypertension 1.28 1.40
Adult diabetes -2.24 -.75
Childhood diabetes -1.84 1.52
Lung cancer 1.92 3.34*
Breast cancer -2.74 1.77
Stroke .87 .000
AIDS 2.62 1.36
Rape -1.72 1.21
Domestic violence .09 6.27*
Paralysis (due to car accident) -2.31 .32
Paralysis (due to spoils accident -.78 3.39*
Bum injuries (in the kitchen) 1.45 1.47
Bum injuries (at work) 2.65 1.75
*p<.0036 following Bonferroni correction
8.2 DISCUSSION
This study has investigated people’s representations o f negative life  events when issues o f 
responsibility, blame, avoidability and control are considered. The aim was to investigate 
the plausibility o f applying Janoff-Bulman’s theory on different populations and attempting 
to generalize on the functionality o f self-blame under the assumption that self-blaming
174
behaviour would be similar in different negative events. Furthermore, this study directly 
addressed the criticism o f potential conceptual differences between the terms ‘responsibility 
and ‘blame’ .
The results yielded by this study generally support the idea o f blame being event- or 
situation-specific suggested in the previous chapters o f this thesis. As shown by the cluster 
analysis and the MDS plots, there is a tendency for people to group negative events 
according to the degree o f blame, responsibility, avoidability and control associated w ith 
each event. Consequently, some events are seen as low on these four characteristics (e.g. 
rape, breast cancer), others as average (e.g. heart disease, bum injuries at work) and others 
as high (e.g. AIDS, lung cancer). Furthermore, on all MDS plots there is a clear distinction 
between illnesses -always appearing at the top o f the plot- and other misfortunes -appearing 
at the bottom. This suggests that in people’s minds illness carries different properties from 
other misfortunes regardless o f the degree o f responsibility, blame, control or avoidability 
associated w ith them. There is therefore little point in attempting to generalize about issues 
o f blame across illnesses and non-illness events. Some generalization however may be 
appropriate w ithin groups o f illness (or other events) as shown by the MDS plots and cluster 
analyses.
Janoff-Bulman’s (1979) work originated from her work w ith rape victims and people w ith 
spinal cord injuries from severe accident victims. In the present study, both o f these events 
appear very close to each other on the MDS plots across all four ratings. I f  the properties 
that people perceive as common for these events are true for the actual victims o f the events 
then the consistency in the applicability o f the theory is expected. However, when similar
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attempts were made by researchers to apply the theory 011 other events problems stated to 
arise. For example, the event o f breast cancer -seen as equally blameless as rape on the 
horizontal dimension but at a distance from rape on the vertical dimension- has shown great 
inconsistencies in the literature o f self-blame. There is therefore further evidence on that 
self-blame is event specific.
Regarding the potential differences between responsibility and blame suggested by Shaver 
and Drown (1986) results showed no significant differences between the two concepts on 
any o f the 14 events. This suggests that in everyday conversation people do not differentiate 
between the tenns ‘blame’ and ‘responsibility’ and using the terms interchangeably in self- 
report measures has no noteworthy effects on participants’ responses. These findings are in 
accordance w ith studies by Sholomskas, Steil &  Plummer (1990) and Hall (2000).
However, Shaver and Drown*s (1986) suggestions should not be entirely dismissed. The 
fact that people do not appear to differentiate between blame and responsibility in 
quantitative or qualitative self-report measures does not mean that they are not able to do so 
in different contexts. For example, people might give different responses i f  probed to 
concentrate on the differences between the two concepts. Alternatively, in situations where 
the above issues are discussed in depth or there is a variety o f opinions stated (e.g. in  focus 
groups) these differences may be more like ly to come up. Therefore, a distinction must be 
made between people’s tendency to make such distinctions and their ab ility  to do so i f  the 
situation supports this. While this study has shown that the former has little  chance o f 
occurring, more work is needed to investigate the latter.
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Regarding the distinction between avoidability and control, only three events yielded 
significant differences. Specifically, lung cancer, domestic violence, and paralysis from a 
car accident were rated higher on avoidability than on control. However, looking at the table 
o f means (Table 8.1) it can be observed that the differences between means for these events 
are very small. To illustrate, the difference between the avoidability and control mean 
ratings on a 5-point scale was for lung cancer 0.21, for domestic violence 0..52 and for 
paralysis from a sports accident 0.24. Although these differences are significant statistically, 
it  is debatable whether they reflect significant psychological differences. Thus, until they 
are investigated further, the present results should be interpreted w ith caution.
These findings have specific implications for research. The fact that people tend to not 
differentiate among the four concepts o f blame, responsibility, avoidability and control may 
sim plify the interpretation o f the relevant literature. Also, the way people tend to represent 
the negative events studied suggests that issues o f responsibility for illness differ from those 
o f other negative events and thus comparisons among events may be misleading. O f course, 
it must be noted that the sample used in this study constitutes o f healthy individuals and not 
patients. There may be motivational differences between patients and non-patients that have 
yet to be identified. Perhaps, non-patients see no personal relevance in discussions about 
illness and can use relevant tenns w ith less sophistication or complexity. In contrast, 
patients may place more importance in the precise meaning o f the words and be more 
particular when using the terms studied here. The scarce evidence in the literature suggests 
that this is not the case but clearly more work is needed in this area.
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There are a number o f lim itations in this study that should be considered. First, the 
relatively small response rate prevents the safe generalisation o f results. Although the in itia l 
sample was a random sample o f the south-east population o f England, there was only a 14% 
response rate possibly due to lack o f follow-up reminders and incentives. Second, due to 
financial and time constraints only non-patient populations could be recruited for this study. 
Therefore it is not clear whether the results regarding participants’ perceptions o f blame for 
and control o f negative events would apply to patient populations as well. In other words, it 
is important to establish the similarities and differences o f such representations between 
patient and non-patient populations or alternatively ascertain the effects that the illness 
experience (or lack of) has on perceptions o f blame when all other relevant characteristics o f 
individuals are controlled for.
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CHAPTER NINE
GENERAL DISCUSSION
SUMMARY
This chapter reviews the findings presented in the previous chapters and synthesises them 
to provide answers to the general research questions posed at the beginning o f the thesis. 
The implications o f the findings for psychological theory and practice are discussed. The 
issues o f self-regulation as part o f adjustment to the threats posed by illness are 
introduced as plausible mechanisms underlying and explaining the relationships reported 
in the present studies. The motivational and cognitive elements o f self-blame are 
considered and ways to reconcile the contradictory evidence o f past and present studies 
are discussed. The chapter closes w ith a review o f the limitations o f the research and a 
b rie f section o f concluding remarks.
9.1 SUMMARY OF RESULTS
This thesis has investigated the concept o f self-blame (placing more emphasis on the 
behavioural type) by addressing a number o f methodological and conceptual limitations 
found in  the literature. It attempted to place self-blame against a specific theoretical and 
conceptual background and give it a place in existing models o f illness behaviour and 
cognition. More importantly, this thesis posed some novel research questions regarding 
self-blame and addressed them both empirically and theoretically.
179
The first two theoretical chapters (Chapters Two and Three) reviewed the literature on 
causal attributions and self-blame for illness and identified the main theoretical and 
methodological shortcomings regarding self-blame. They also proposed a more specific 
theoretical conceptualisation o f the concept, by placing the, often confused, concepts o f 
self-blame and causal attributions in the broader theoretical model o f self-regulation 
theory proposed by Leventhal (Leventhal &  Nerenz, 1985). In that model, self-blame is 
seen as a specific type o f causal attribution for one’s illness. Causal attributions, in turn, 
fa ll in  the more general domain o f illness perceptions, which is one o f the main 
components o f Leventhal* s model. The usefulness o f having a concrete position for self­
blame in  a theoretical model as well as its conceptualisation through attribution theory 
was introduced in these chapters.
Study 1 was designed to approach self-blame from a perspective close to the one seen so 
far in  the literature while introducing a series o f new ideas. Therefore, the study looked at 
self-blame and its relationship to psychological adjustment, this time comparatively 
across three patient groups (heart disease, diabetes, and breast-cancer patients). Other 
variables such as self-efficacy, number o f perceived behavioural risk factors and diet and 
exercise levels were also included in the study and were investigated in  relation to self­
blame. Results showed significant differences between self-blame among the three patient 
groups and no overall relationship to adjustment. Also, the number o f perceived 
behavioural risk factors reported by the patients was positively correlated w ith self-blame. 
Finally, diet and exercise were negatively correlated to self-blame but only in the case o f 
diabetes patients. These findings provided support for the idea that self-blame may be 
situation specific and its level or role may differ from one patient group to the next. It
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was, thus, necessary to investigate the possible predictors o f self-blame and examine the 
conditions under which it occurs.
Study Two tested a theoretical model o f the predictors and consequences o f self-blame. 
The model was designed by bringing together findings from the attribution and self-blame 
literature and focused mainly on behavioural self-blame which is the type o f self-blame 
that has yielded the most inconsistent results. A  number o f personal and situational 
characteristics were included in the model and an emphasis was placed in showing that 
causal behavioural attributions (i.e. a judgement between the cause and effect relationship 
between two events) can lead to behavioural self-blame (i.e. a moral evaluation o f the 
potential role o f oneself in causing an event) but should not to be confused w ith it.
Results from data collected in a suivey o f 160 heart disease patients showed that the 
proposed model including the predictors o f self-blame fit the data well and revealed that 
gender, characterological self-blame and behavioural attributions were the best direct 
predictors o f behavioural self-blame. Also, the type o f diagnosis, prior risky health 
behaviour affect behavioural self-blame indirectly through their impact on behavioural 
attributions. The consequences o f self-blame were studied using a more data-driven 
approach and showed that it is behavioural causal attributions, rather than self-blame, that 
predicted changes in some aspects o f health behaviour. Psychological adjustment could 
not be predicted by either behavioural attributions or behavioural self-blame.
Studies Three and Four used a sample o f non-patients in two ways. First, the sample was 
matched in all relevant dimensions w ith the heart-disease patient sample o f Study Two 
and comparisons were made between patients’ actual levels o f self-blame and non­
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patients’ levels o f potential self-blame under the hypothetical event o f a heart attack. 
Results indicated (though not entirely reliably) that non-patients engaged in higher levels 
o f both behavioural and characterological self-blame than their patient counterparts. Also, 
unlike patients, non-patients did not show any relationship between behavioural self­
blame and lifestyle risk factors, indicating that their self-blame scores regarding a 
potential diagnosis o f heart disease resulted from factors other than an evaluation o f their 
current lifestyle. Second, non-patients were asked to rate a series o f negative life  events 
including illnesses and accidents along the dimensions o f responsibility, blame, 
controllability and avoidability. This was done to look at the way non-patients represent 
these events in their minds when such dimensions are considered and also to test for 
differences in scores that would signify a different understanding between the dimensions. 
Cluster and multidimentional scaling analyses showed that people group or rate these 
events in specific meaningful ways when they rate them on the above dimensions. They 
also differentiate between illnesses and other events, suggesting that an illness is 
perceived a type o f misfortune unlike other negative events such as rape or severe 
accidents. Finally, this study also showed that people tend to treat the concepts o f blame 
or responsibility and control or avoidability as very similar (at least quantitatively) and 
therefore criticisms regarding their interchangeable use should not warrant too much 
concern.
9.2 BRINGING IT ALL TOGETHER
When the above findings are combined, they can offer some interesting insight into the 
study o f self-blame. This section w ill bring together the above results and to contribute to
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addressing the research questions stated in the introductory chapters o f the thesis (Section 
3.4). They are dealt w ith here in the same order as in Chapter Three.
9.2,1 Sample Diversity
The extent to which the in itia l findings o f Janoff-Bulman’s work (1979) should generalise 
-  or be expected to hold- across different populations was criticised and tested in this 
thesis. Past literature had hinted at differences in self-blame across different sample 
groups (e.g. Forsythe &  Compas, 1987) but findings have been rather incidental. Here, it  
was consistently found that self-blame varies among patients with different illnesses (i.e. 
heart disease, diabetes, breast cancer) as well as patients w ith different symptoms w ithin 
the same illness category (i.e. angina vs. heart attack in heart disease). What appeared to 
be the explanatory pattern behind these differences was that in both cases the condition 
associated w ith the greatest number o f behavioural risk factors was also associated w ith 
the highest levels o f self-blame. This was also true for the non-patient samples that rated 
illnesses highly associated w ith lifestyle (e.g. AIDS) as more blame-relevant than 
illnesses unrelated to lifestyle (e.g. childhood diabetes).
Therefore, there is evidence that self-blame (or blame in general) is situation-specific and 
it is this characteristic o f self-blame that may explain much o f the inconsistent results in 
the literature. If, as shown here, self-blame is more prominent in some patient groups and 
less in others, then it is possible that its relationship to adjustment follows a similar 
pattern, whereby it is stronger in some patient groups (and thus more detectable by the 
often under-powered studies available) and weaker or non existent in others.
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This thesis proposed that the predictors o f self-blame must be clarified i f  the relationship 
between self-blame and adjustment is to be meaningfully explained. The literature review 
showed that characterological self-blame is seen as an esteem-related reaction to a 
negative event, stemming from self-esteem deficits and tendencies towards self-criticism 
(Abramson, Selingman &  Teasdale, 1978; Janoff-Bulman, 1979). It is more in line w ith 
attributional style and has been consistently linked to negative adjustment.
Regarding behavioural self-blame, one o f the most common theoretical assumptions 
behind its functionality is that it enhances feelings o f control (e.g. Janoff-Bulman, 1979). 
Specifically, focusing on one’s own actions regarding a negative event means focusing on 
the changeable aspects o f one’s behaviour and therefore increasing the perceptions o f 
avoidability o f similar future events. This assumption somids plausible but has not been 
supported by conclusive evidence. In  the present thesis, the issue o f control was 
approached in various ways throughout the studies by measuring such variables as 
perceived controllability/avoidability o f specific risk factors, behaviour, and character. 
General self-efficacy was also measured as an alternative, though indirect, way o f tapping 
on one’s sense o f control over d ifficu lt situations. None o f the measures yielded any 
significant relationships w ith self-blame, behavioural attributions or adjustment. Indeed, 
there were other variables that predicted self-blame as shown by the measurement model 
in Chapter Six. Being male, engaging in characterological self-blame, having a diagnosis 
associated w ith a number o f health behaviours and, indeed, having engaged in these risky 
behaviours predicts self-blame either directly or indirectly by affecting the type o f 
behavioural attributions made. Therefore, behavioural self-blame seems to be a more
9.2.2 R easons f o r  self-blam e
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pragmatic approach to causal search, affected by various factors (e.g. sex, type o f 
diagnosis, behavioural attributions). In order for a person to express behavioural self­
blame, there needs to be a formation o f behavioural attributions which in turn are a 
product o f personal, rather stable factors as well as situational ones.
9.2.3 T i m i n g
The time elapsed since diagnosis has often been presented as a possible explanation for 
the inconsistent findings regarding the relationship between self-blame and adjustment. In 
her systematic review, Hall (2000) concluded that the associations between attributions 
and adjustment diminish w ith time. However, she ascribes that to the fact that many o f the 
studies she reviewed were conducted many years after the event. Indeed, the few 
longitudinal studies available on the subject show very little  evidence o f a decline in  the 
associations between self-blame and adjustment over time (e.g. Downey, Cohen-Silver &  
Wortman, 1990). As Hall (2000) concludes, it is likely that the effects o f time on self­
blame depend on the content o f attributions, the type o f outcome assessed and the nature 
o f the event.
This thesis did not present any longitudinal studies for practical reasons discussed in  an 
earlier chapter. However, the cross-sectional study that compared self-blame in three 
different patient groups (Chapter Four) provides some support for H all’s (2000) 
conclusions. Time since diagnosis was significantly correlated w ith self-blame in patients 
w ith diabetes with self-blame increasing w ith time. This was not true for patients w ith 
heart disease or breast cancer. As discussed in the relevant chapter, these findings make 
sense when the nature o f the illness is taken into account. The everyday lifestyle 
management that diabetes demands o f its patients often becomes more demanding w ith
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time. It is often the case that people develop diabetic complications and/or start taking 
insulin (e.g. Type II  diabetes patients not previously on insulin). Thus, patients see their 
condition as more serious and hence reflect more on their behaviour becoming 
increasingly aware o f their role in managing their illness. They may therefore be more 
like ly to express self-blame than other patients and their levels o f self-blame w ill tend to 
increase w ith time. While this relationship does not include psychological adjustment, it 
does show once again the highly situation-specific nature o f self-blame and the 
plausibility o f a more pragmatic approach to certain aspects o f the construct.
9.2.4 Self-blame and adjustment
While the focus o f this thesis was on ‘unpacking’ the concept o f self-blame (mainly 
behavioural self-blame) and clarifying the conditions under which it occurs, some 
attention was paid to the relationship between self-blame and adjustment. This was 
investigated both in the comparative study (Chapter 4) and in the model testing study 
(Chapter 5). In the former, no relationship was found between general self-blame and 
adjustment in the overall sample as well as each patient group separately. Similarly, in 
the latter study, neither attributions nor behavioural self-blame showed any statistical 
significance in predicting anxiety or depression. There was therefore, no evidence o f a 
relationship between general or behavioural self-blame and adjustment. Only 
characterological self-blame was moderately correlated with anxiety verifying the fairly 
well established relationship between this type o f self-blame and psychological 
adjustment. It is therefore the relationship between adjustment and behavioural self-blame 
that remains controversial.
186
However, the absence o f a relationship between behavioural self-blame and adjustment 
might be explained by timing. The fact that the sample was captured many years after a 
diagnosis was made may account for the lack o f evidence for a relationship. One may 
even argue that only i f  a study is conducted at the time o f diagnosis or at most a few 
weeks later, could the relationship between behavioural self-blame and anxiety be 
investigated. This argument, however, has some basic flaws. In all samples, there were 
enough people diagnosed in the last year to allow for the detection o f such a relationship. 
I f  time actually affects the relationship between self-blame and adjustment, one would 
expect a low to moderate correlation between self-blame and adjustment in the samples 
used in this thesis. No indication o f such a relationship was found.
Furthermore, even i f  this relationship may only be detected in the very early stages o f the 
illness experience, how informative would it really be regarding self-blame? In the first 
days after a diagnosis, patients are like ly to experience symptoms o f anxiety and these are 
like ly to affect every aspect o f their behaviour. Scores on any psychological adjustment 
scale are more indicative o f the stressful situation than the person and it is likely that 
many o f the correlations obtained at a time like this w ill change a soon as the in itia l 
reactions to diagnosis begin to subside. Therefore, unless one is interested in the process 
o f attributional search at the time o f diagnosis, there is little  point in aiming to capture 
people’s scores at that particular time. Scores captured at more stable times are like ly to 
be more informative o f the strength and nature o f the relationship under investigation. 
This was the approach in the studies presented here and revealed no relationship between 
general or behavioural self-blame and psychological adjustment in heart disease, diabetes 
and breast cancer patients.
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Parallel to uncovering specific relationships between self-blame and other situational or 
personal characteristics, this thesis has tested the plausibility o f criticisms regarding the 
operationalisation and measurement o f self-blame. One o f the main criticisms has been 
the interchangeable use in the literature o f the concepts ‘cause’, ‘responsibility’ and 
‘blame’ (Shaver and Drown, 1986). Furthermore, the comparison o f findings across 
different situations (e.g. illnesses vs. accidents) was also criticised in the early chapters o f 
this thesis. Data collected to address these issues supported only the latter criticism 
(Chapter 7). Specifically, people do not differentiate between the concepts o f blame and 
responsibility in any statistically significant way. The same was true for the concepts o f 
‘control’ and ‘avoidability’ . These findings have important practical implications for 
those investigating the literature on self-blame. Since the main concern behind this 
criticism was that the wrongful use o f the tenns interchangeably may account for the 
inconsistent findings, evidence provided here do not support these concerns and make the 
explanation o f the situation-specificity o f self-blame an even more plausible one.
Regarding the second criticism (i.e. the validity o f comparison o f findings across different
situations), it was shown that people clearly differentiate illnesses from all the other
misfortunes presented to them. There is therefore evidence that, in tenns o f the
representations people use to make inferences regarding issues o f responsibility and
control, illnesses are perceived as different from other negative events. These differences
could possibly refer to the personal meaning that the event may have, the threat for life  it
represents or that it does not entail the element o f luck in the same way. Regardless o f
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9.2.5 C onceptual clarifications o f  self-blam e
what makes illnesses stand apart from other misfortunes in people’s minds, it is a 
distinction that should be reflected in the methodology o f relevant studies and explored 
further, preferably w ith more qualitative means.
9.3 IMPLICATIONS FOR THEORY
The most central aim o f this thesis was to revisit the theory on self-blame, focusing 
mostly on behavioural self-blame, and contribute to a more comprehensive description o f 
the processes involved.
W ith past research approaching behavioural self-blame as a motivational process and 
evidence in the present thesis suggesting more cognitive properties, how can these rather 
contradictory findings be explained? Is behavioural self-blame the outcome o f a need for 
control over future misfortune or is it a cognitive self-evaluation that is unrelated to 
psychological adjustment? The answer lies in the theoretical and empirical approach one 
adopts when studying self-blame.
Early in this thesis, Leventhal’s self regulation model (Leventhal &  Nerenz, 1985) was 
presented as a potentially useful theoretical framework that can embody many o f the 
concepts and processes self-blame was expected to associate with. Indeed, this model can 
be used as a prism through which the empirical findings presented earlier can be 
interpreted and give rise to an alternative theoretical identity for self-blame. But simply 
placing self-blame among the various causal explanations people include in their illness 
representations is a rather superficial way o f looking at this concept and does not
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accommodate the findings presented in this thesis w ith much precision. Going back to 
Leventhal’s model as presented in Chapter Two, one could easily identify how illness 
characteristics can influence self-blame as reported by the measurement model in Chapter 
Six: all the relevant variables are included in the same box titled Threat representation. 
The same is true for the relationship between causal attributions and behaviour change, i f  
the latter is interpreted as a form o f coping: the model already includes the bi-directional 
arrow between ‘threat representation5 and ‘coping’ . However, where would the personal 
characteristics (e.g. gender, characterological self-blame, prior risk) figure in the model? 
These are the sort o f characteristics that not only predict behavioural self-blame, but could 
also affect other components o f the self-regulation model such as symptom interpretation. 
How could the model account for this?
A  plausible answer lies in the idea that the dynamic relationships described in Leventhal’s 
model are actually influenced by deeper processes involving the self. Leventhal, Idler and 
Leventhal (1999) recently acknowledged these processes as central to the illness 
experience. Specifically, when illness becomes apparent, it generates a series o f 
psychological reactions. As already described in the model, an interplay begins between 
cognitive (i.e. illness interpretation and representations), emotional (i.e. fear, anxiety) and 
behavioural (i.e. coping) reactions. During this interplay, the self is required to assimilate 
the new status quo imposed by the illness experience and adjust to the situation to regain 
psychological balance. When an illness symptom or a diagnosis arises, people w ill 
attempt to interpret it and assign meaning and importance to it. This interpretation w ill be 
affected by the individual’s emotional reaction to the illness as well as his or her 
illness/threat representations. W ithin these representations, a causal search w ill begin for
190
the reasons behind this illness and the idea o f self-blame may be entertained. It is at this 
stage that behavioural self-blame might be the result o f motivational processes that aim to 
protect the self. Although blaming oneself may sound more like a self-mutilating than a 
self-protective mechanism, one has only to review the evidence on the complex structure 
o f the self (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) to recognise that an apparently dysfunctional behaviour 
may indeed be serving a functional role. While self-blame is about placing the burden o f 
fault on one’s behaviour, it may be, in that way, protecting other more important aspects 
o f the self by providing a sense o f stability and fairness. Indeed, aspects o f self-regulation 
such as personal control (i.e. behaviour, cognitive, decision, information and retrospective 
control), the need for accuracy and consistency might all be better served by behavioural 
self-blame -an internal and potentially controllable explanation- than other or chance 
blame which are external and less controllable.
A ll these dynamic processes are more relevant at the earlier stages o f an illness when the 
search for explanation is novel and quite crucial. As time progresses, however, most 
people manage to adjust to the new reality and adopt a new (or modified) ‘illness-related’ 
self. They reach this stage after a long, complicated process o f self-regulation and 
adaptation to illness. With time, and as patients reach the standard milestones o f medical 
care (i.e. diagnosis, treatment plans, follow-up assessments) more information becomes 
available and, w ith time, several aspects o f the illness is re-assessed. Always through an 
interplay among interpretations, representations, emotional reactions and coping 
mechanisms, individuals find a way to balance the pre-diseased and the diseased self, 
possibly in the face o f the new illness-related self. The illness explanation w ill inform 
and be informed by the person’s current identity, and behavioural self-blame, i f  present,
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w ill reflect this causal search. A t this stage, motivational processes may be less active. 
Indeed, they may work in a way opposite to that in earlier stages o f the illness, and 
restrain people from fu lly  accepting their role in contracting their illness. In contrast, the 
cognitive characteristics o f self-blame are more evident and clearly relate to causal 
attributions and behaviour change. According to the model tested in Chapter Six, a patient 
might ask the following questions: As a man (woman) what has my role been in falling 
ill?  What does this diagnosis mean to me? What risky behaviours did I engage in before 
my illness? Do I believe these behaviours caused my illness? To what extent am I  to 
blame for my illness? This process can explain the rather pragmatic basis o f behavioural 
self-blame revealed in the studies reported earlier.
Viewing self-blame through the broader prism o f self-regulation may explain the lack o f a 
relationship between behavioural self-blame and adjustment and its new-found relevance 
to behaviour change. Psychological adjustment to a threat is achieved when progression 
through the various stages o f the self-regulation process runs smoothly, and a functional 
new or modified self emerges (Kanfer &  Hangennan, 1981; Rosenbaum &  Ben-An,
1985). It is in essence the resolution o f the threat posed by illness and the incorporation o f 
the new status quo in everyday life. This is done irrespective o f whether the person has 
engaged in behavioural self-blame. Interpreting illness as the product o f controllable or 
uncontrollable factors w ill have no impact on adjustment as long as that interpretation fits 
well w ith one’s sense o f self. On the other hand, having constructed a self that is seen as 
instrumental in causing the illness (or in not trying to avoid it) can be the first step in 
motivating oneself to change one’s lifestyle and control illness recurrence. Therefore the 
proposed theoretical framework can account for the relationship between causal
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attributions and reported behaviour change found in this thesis as well as the relationship 
between behavioural self-blame and behaviour change reported by Christensen et al 
(1999).
The differences in self-blame across different patient groups can also be explained 
through this theoretical framework. In this case too, self-blame reflects the search o f 
causal explanations for one’s illness which is influenced by both the pragmatic (e.g. is my 
cancer/diabetes/heart disease hereditary?) and the psychological (e.g. what does it  mean to 
be a cancer/diabetes/cardiac patient?) aspects o f an illness or illness identity. These 
aspects w ill tend to be homogeneous w ithin an illness but heterogeneous across different 
illnesses and thus give rise to different levels o f self-blame across medical conditions.
Furthermore, the idea o f self-reconstruction can explain the differences in self-blame 
between patients and non-patients. What these differences may reflect is really the 
presence or absence o f the process o f self-regulation. Non-patients replied to a 
hypothetical scenario, and had not experienced the presence o f a real threat. Thus, they 
most likely responded to the questions using information they had accumulated from 
indirect sources rather than personal experience with heart disease. The consequence o f 
that is that, while non-patients answered the relevant questions free o f any self-regulatory 
motivations or cognitions that a real illness would put in motion, patients responded in  the 
face o f real threat to their self-perception. This would explain the lower levels o f 
behavioural self-blame observed in patients. A  personal experience w ith a given illness 
may make any personal claim regarding the illness less threatening. In  other words, a 
patient may be more threatened by the admission to health-threatening behaviours and/or
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self-blame than a non-patient, precisely because o f the personal relevance that such an 
admission carries. Patients may therefore be motivated to ‘downplay’ their self-blame 
compared to non-patients because o f the potential impact self-blame may have on their 
identity.
Overall, behavioural self-blame can prove to be as dynamic in nature as any other aspect 
o f the self-regulation concept. And its dynamic nature can become even more complex 
when the social network w ithin which the illness experience unfolds is considered. For 
example, both the cognitive and the motivational aspects o f self-blame are likely to be 
influenced by current social representations o f illness. The way a given illness is 
portrayed by peers, media, and scientific communities may influence the degree to which 
an individual w ill adopt or deny self-blame. These limited degrees o f freedom o f self­
regulation have yet to be defined and measured appropriately in studies involving the 
illness experience.
To conclude, a theoretical framework in which self-blame (especially behavioural self­
blame) is seen as the product o f the dynamic self-regulation process that is put in motion 
by an illness experience may be more helpful than the unidirectional, unidimensional 
approach adopted in past literature. O f course, a lot o f work remains to be done before this 
theoretical framework becomes a theory. As with the self-regulation model in general 
(Leventhal, Idler &  Leventhal, 1999), the key variables need to be specified and many 
sub-models o f relevant variables examined in detail. Factors such as self-efficacy and 
self-esteem not mentioned above but w ith known relationships to identity should be 
included and their relationship to self-blame explored from the point o f view o f illness
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identity. Finally, it is important for future researchers to incorporate explicitly  as many 
aspects o f the illness experience as possible at least at the level o f theoretical 
understanding o f an illness related concept. Narrowing down to few specific variables 
may be practical from an empirical point o f view but it may be a hindrance in  
understanding the implications o f the findings.
9.4 IMPLICATIONS FOR PRACTICE
Research on self-blame can contribute significantly to psychological practice in health. 
While so far the focus has been on identifying the effects o f self-blame on adjustment, the 
need for a shift o f focus on other outcomes has been supported here. One o f the most 
important findings in this thesis is the relationship between behavioural attributions and 
behaviour change. As proposed by Christensen et al (1999) and Grove (1993), evidence in 
this area may be particularly useful for those medical populations whose illness aetiology 
and progression depends largely on health behaviour. It may allow for the identification 
o f individuals at greater risk o f engaging in health damaging behaviours due to their 
causal explanations and overall representations o f their illness. Clearly, however, more 
work is needed in this area before this relationship can be offered as a useful tool to health 
professionals working with in the area o f chronic illness.
From a more general perspective, this thesis has demonstrated the highly individual 
nature o f chronic illness. Illness explanations, representations and most likely identities 
can differ not only across different illnesses but also across different conditions w ithin the 
same illness category. This points towards the need for highly personalised interventions
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for any kind o f psychological support to patients w ith chronic illness. Less directly, it also 
raises important points, previously discussed in  the literature by Donahue &  McGuire 
(1995) and Kirkwood &  Brown (1995), regarding the communication o f illness causes 
and the awareness o f responsibility in health and illness. In future studies, it would be 
worth to investigate how much o f the self-blame displayed by patients is a result o f a 
wider culture o f blame created in  an attempt to motivate people to adopt healthier 
lifestyles.
9.5 LIMITATIONS
The limitations relevant to each study have already been mentioned in previous chapters 
and, thus, w ill only be summarised here. On several occasions there were some 
considerations regarding the samples used. Specifically in the first study (Chapter 4) the 
patient groups may not have been large enough to test for differences o f potentially 
smaller effect. Also, with one o f the conditions being breast cancer, there was an 
unavoidable imbalance in the men/women ratios across the three patient groups, and sex 
differences could not be tested in  that study. In  the studies involving non-patients 
(Chapters Six and Seven), sample considerations involved the low response rate which 
consequently affected the generalisability o f results. Regarding the adequacy o f measures 
used, it  was acknowledged that, in the first study, the developed measure was one o f 
general self-blame and did not differentiate between behavioural and characterological 
self-blame. Furthermore, in the second study (Chapter Five) the measure o f behaviour 
change was based on participants’ subjective estimates and was thus vulnerable to biases. 
Finally, in  the same study, the model tested can only be seen as plausible -not true. Many
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different versions o f the model must be tested on new data before more general 
conclusions can be drawn. Also, the model should ideally be more parsimonious (i.e. have 
greater degrees o f freedom). In this study, reduced parsimony was a result o f lack o f a 
clear' theoretical basis for self-blame which lead to some ambivalence regarding the 
parameters to be estimated.
Apart from the limitations relevant to each study, there are several shortcomings o f the 
overall work presented in this thesis that must be noted. First, the findings discussed here 
rely entirely on quantitative data collected w ith the use o f questionnaires. While the use o f 
such data has the potential o f making more global claims with confidence, it tends to 
oversimplify the psychological processes underlying the scores. In retrospect, the use o f 
qualitative data in addition to the quantitative data available could have been more 
informative o f the reasons behind self-blame.
Another shortcoming is the use o f cross-sectional designs throughout this thesis. A  
longitudinal design could have shed light on the changes that people undergo following 
an illness diagnosis and consequently the way those changes affect self-blame. 
Unfortunately the adoption o f such a design was not possible for practical reasons (see 
Chapter Three).
Finally, the measurement o f self-blame is an important methodological lim itation o f the 
studies presented here. In the p ilot work presented in Chapter Four, an attempt was made 
to use a multi-item measure o f self-blame. While that measure was sufficient for the 
puiposes o f that study, it did not differentiate between behavioural and characterological
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self-blame and was therefore not used in subsequent studies. Consequently, the majority 
o f the studies presented earlier rely on single-item measures o f behavioural and 
characterological self-blame and thus face the criticisms related to the validity and 
reliability o f the measures. While the present findings are comparable to past research 
using the same items, there is still the need for a standardised m ulti-item  measure o f self­
blame and its sub-types that w ill ideally differentiate between self/behavioural attributions 
and self-blame. The limitations o f the available alternatives were acknowledged early in 
the thesis but construction and standardisation o f such a measure was beyond the its 
scope.
9.6 CONCLUSION
The studies presented in this thesis focused on the concept o f behavioural self-blame and 
attempted to ‘unpack’ its role in the illness experience. According to the findings, 
behavioural self-blame is a situation-specific representation o f the role one has played in  
acquiring a chronic illness. It appears to have a more ‘pragmatic’ nature than that 
proposed in  the literature and is generally unrelated to adjustment. Both theoretically and 
empirically, it  fits well w ithin the framework o f illness representations and illness 
identity, which is offered as a new way o f understanding and conceptualising self-blame.
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A P P E N D I X  I  
M A L E  A N D  F E M A L E  D E A T H  R A T E S  F R O M  S E L E C T E D  C A U S E S
In d icators  o f th e  N ations Health: M ale death  rates b y  selected  causes  
E n g lan d  R ates per 100 ,000  pop u lation
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
All causes
All Malignant Neoplasms (ICD 140-208)
Stomach (ICD 15 1)
Colon, rectum, rectosigmoid junction & anus (ICD 
153-4) ■
Pancreas (ICD 157)
Lung (ICD 162)
Prostate (ICD 185)
Diabetes mellitus (ICD 250)
All Circulatory diseases (ICD 390-459)
Ischaemic heart disease (ICD 410-14)
Cerebrovascular disease (ICD 430-8) 
Pneumonia (ICD 480-6)
Bronchitis and allied conditions (ICD 490-6)
Chronic liver disease and cirrhosis (ICD 571)
All accidents and adverse effects (ICD E800-E949)
Road vehicle accidents (ICD E 8 10-29) 
Suicide (ICD E950-9, E980-9, excluding E988.8)
1,060.51,045.3 1,024 .4 1,0 14 .0  1,000.7 971.9
282.2 279.2 271.6 273.2 264.5 260.4
16.4 16.3 15 .5 15.0 14.4 13 .5
30.9 30.3 30.1 29.6 28.3 28.1
10.8 11.0 10.8 10.9 10.7 1 1 .3
79.7 77.4 74.0 73.5 69.9 68.3
34.3 34.2 32.9 33.1 32.7 31.4
1 1 .1 11.0 10.5 10.6 10.7 10.2
450.9 442.1 422.6 412.6 396.9 378.1
28 1.7 273.1 258.4 2 5 1.3 238.3 227.0
85.9 86.3 83.6 82.0 78.7 73.9
83.7 83.5 86.6 82.9 88.4 88.7
63.4 60.0 60.0 57.8 58.8 53.8
8.3 8.6 9.6 10.7 10.9 11.0
22.5 22.8 .24.4 23.5 23.1 24.4
8.6 8.9 9.4 8.9 8.3 9.0
14.9 14.2 13.8 15.5 15.0 14.2
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Ind icators  o f the  Nations H ealth : Fem ale  death  rates by selected  causes  
E ngland  R ates p er 100,000 population
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
All causes 1,102.4  1,099.4 1,091.2  1,0 78 .510 77.0 10 4 3.3
All Malignant Neoplasms (ICD 140-208)
Stomach (ICD 15 1)
Colon, rectum, rectosigmoid junction & anus (ICD 
153-4)
Pancreas (ICD 157)
Lung (ICD 162)
Breast (ICD 174)
Uterus (ICD 179-82)
Diabetes mellitus (ICD 250)
All circulatory diseases (ICD 390-459)
Ischaemic heart disease (ICD 4 10 -14 )
Cerebrovascular disease (iCD 430-8) 
Pneumonia (ICD 480-6)
Bronchitis and allied conditions (ICD 490-6)
Chronic liver disease and cirrhosis (ICD 571)
All accidents & adverse effects (ICD E800-E949) 
Road vehicle accidents (ICD E810-29)
249.4 248.9 244.8 242.6 239.0 236.7
10.3 9.4 9.6 9.2 8.5 7.9
29.0 28.7 27.6 26.9 26.3 24.9
1 1 .5 11.4 1 1 .2 1 1 .1 11.6 1 1 .5
42.0 41.8 40.8 41.6 41.4 41
47.2 45.9 45.0 43.8 42.9 42.1
9.9 9.9 9.4 9.1 8.7 9
12 .5 11.9 1 1 .7 1 1 .5 1 1 .5 1 1 .3
471.0 464.9 445.9 439.0 419.4 397.5
225.9 220.0 208.5 203.9 190.3 179
140.9 14 1.3 135.3 134.1 130.7 122,2
125.7 124.5 130.7 122.8 132.2 126.6
43.0 43.0 44.0 43.3 45.6 42.9
5.4 5.7 6.2 6.3 6.7 6.8
16.0 16.6 17.0 16.1 17.0 17.3
3.7 3.5 3.4 3.3 3.2 3.2
4.9 4.8 4.7 4.8 4.8 4.9Suicide (ICD E950-9, E980-9 excluding E988.8)
Source: Department of Health (http://www.doh.gov.uk)
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Q U E S T I O N N A I R E  U S E D  F O R  P I L O T I N G  T H E  S E L F - B L A M E  
S C A L E  ( P H A S E  I ,  C H A P T E R  4)
A P P E N D IX  I I I
This is a questionnaire exploring peoples feelings about their illness. Please, read each 
statement carefully, and tick the box that best describes how you feel about 4he statement. 
Please be as honest as you can. Your answers are strictly confidential. If at any time 
you feel any distress or anxiety while completing the questionnaire please feel free to say 
so, and I will be more than glad to discuss any relevant issue with you.
Alternatively, for any queries or comments contact me at 01483-300800, ext.2892 during 
office hours.
Thank you for agreeing to take part in this study.
Before you go on with the questionnaire, I need some general information from you that 
will help me understand your answers better.
Age:..................................
Male / Female (delete as applicable)
Reason for being in the hospital/clinic:..................................................................................
Occupation:
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Strongly
Disagree
Disagree Slightly
Disagree
Neither 
Agree nor 
Disagree
Slightly
Agree
Agree Strongly
Agree
I don’t 
know
1 ) 1  don’t know what caused 
my illness.
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
2) I could have prevented 
getting my illness.
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
3)1 am responsible for my own 
health.
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
4) Whenever I see the doctor I 
feel guilty.
□ □ □ □ □ t l □ □
5) I should have looked after 
myself better.
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
6) People around me blame me 
for my illness.
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
7) I deserve to be in this 
situation because of who I am.
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
8) I am to blame for my illness. □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
9) I don’t deserve to be looked 
after.
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
10) I should have lived a more 
moderate life.
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
11) My illness is God’s way of 
punishing me.
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
12) Getting my illness was just 
a matter of bad luck.
□ □ □ □ □ □ □
13) I don’t think I had 
anything to do with getting ill.
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
14) I am not the only one 
responsible for my illness.
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
15) My illness could have 
happened to anybody.
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
16) Apart from me, a lot of 
other tilings (factors) led to my 
ilhiess.
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
17) I don’t feel responsible for 
my illness.
□ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
18) Getting ill was God’s will. □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
19) I should have taken better 
care of myself or I would have 
never fallen ill.
□ □ □ □ □ □  • □ 1 \
20) I couldn’t help getting sick. □ □ □ □ □ □ □ □
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A P P E N D I X  I V
Q U E S T I O N N A I R E  U S E D  IN  P H A S E  I I  O F  S T U D Y  1  ( C H A P T E R  4)
A B O U T  Y O U . . . .
Male O  Female O
Age:...............................................................
Occupation:.................................................................................
Diagnosis /Reason for appointment......... . ....................................
Time since initial diagnosis:..........................................................
P A R T  O N E
Please tick any of the following items that you believe have contributed to your medical 
condition.
Age Diet
Alcohol Polution
Heredity Emotions
Medication Environment
Smoking High blood Pressure
social class Being Overweight
Gender Sexual Behaviour
Occupation Depression
Hormones Cholesterol
Food additives Stress
Personality other...........................
vims/germs etc
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Take a minute to think about your medical condition in general. Then, read carefully the 
following questions and answer as honestly as possible by either filling in the blanks or 
by putting a circle around the number that best describes your answer.
P A R T  T W O
Strongly Strongly
Disagree_____________ _______  Agree
1)1 could have prevented my condition
1 2 3 4 5, 6 7
2) I am responsible for my condition 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3) I deseive to be in this situation 
because of choices I made
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4) People around me blame me for my 
condition
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5) I deserve to be in this situation 
because of who I am
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6) I am to blame for my condition 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7) My condition could have happened to 
anybody
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8) My condition was God's way of 
punishing me
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9) I don't feel responsible for my 
condition
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10) I should have taken better care of 
myself
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11)1 couldn't prevent my condition 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12) I had nothing to do with my 
condition
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13) I should have behaved more 
moderately
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
14) My condition was just a matter of 
bad luck
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Please, take a minute to think about a negative incident related to your medical condition 
that occurred within the last three months(e.g bad test results, alarming symptoms etc). 
Please, name that negative incident:.........................................
P A R T  T H R E E
Strongly
Disagree
Strongly
Agree
1)1 could have prevented the incident 1 2 3 4 5" 6 7
2) I am responsible for the incident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
3) I deserved to be in that situation 
because of choices I made
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
4) People around me blamed me for the 
incident
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
5) I deserved to be in that situation 
because of who I am
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
6) I am to blame for the incident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7) This incident could have happened to 
anybody
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
8) ThT incident was God's way of 
punishing me
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
9) I don't feel responsible for the incident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
10) I should have taken better care of 
myself
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
11)1 couldn't prevent the incident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
12) I had nothing to do with that incident 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
13) I should have behaved more 
moderately
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
14)The incident was just a matter of bad 
luck
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
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Below is a list o f statements dealing with your general feelings about yourself. Please, put 
a circle around the answer that best describes how you feel.
P A R T  F O U R
Not at all 
true
Exactly
true
1)1 can always manage to solve difficult 
problems if  I try hard enough
1 2 3 ) 4
2) If someone opposes me, I can find the 
means and ways to get what I want.
1 2 3 4
3) It is easy for me to stick to my aims 
and accomplish my goals.
1 2 3 4
4) I am confident that I could deal 
efficiently with unexpected events.
1 2 3 4
5) Thanks to my resourcefulness, I know 
how to handle unforeseen situations
1 2 3 4
6) I can solve most problems if I invest 
the necessary effort.
1 2 3 4
7) I can remain calm when facing 
difficulties because I can rely on my 
coping abilities.
1 2 3 4
8) When I am confronted with a 
problem, I can usually find several 
solutions.
1 2 3 4
9) If I am in trouble, I can usually think 
of a solution.
1 2 3 4
10) I can usually handle whatever comes 
my way.
1 2 3 4
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Please read each of the following items and circle the reply that comes closest to how you 
have been feeling in the past week.
P A R T  F IV E
1) I feel tense or ’wound up':
i) Most of the time
ii) A lot of the time
iii) From time to time/Occasionally
iv) Not at all
2) I still enjoy the things I used to enjoy:
i) Definitely as much
ii) Not quite so much
iii) Only a little
iv) Hardly at all
3) I get a sort of frightened feeling as if  
something awful is about to happen:
i) Very definitely and quite badly
ii) Yes, but not too badly
iii) A little, but it doesn’t worry me
iv) Not at all
4) I can laugh and see the funny side of 
things:
i) As much as I always could
ii) Not quite so much now
iii) Definitely not so much now
iv) Not at all
5) W orrying thoughts go through my mind:
i) A great deal of the time
ii) A lot of the time
iii) From time to time, but not too often
iv) Only occasionally
6) I  feel cheerful:
i) Not at all
ii) Not often
iii) Sometimes
iv) Most of the time
7) I can sit at ease and feel relaxed:
i) Definitely
ii) Usually
iii) Not Often
iv) Not at all
8) I feel as if  I am slowed down:
i) Nearly all the time
ii) Very often
iii) Sometimes
iv) Not at all
9) I get a sort o f frightened feeling like 
'butterflies’ in the stomach:
i) Not at all
ii) Occasionally
iii) Quite Often
iv) Veiy Often
10) I have lost interest in my appearance:
i) Definitely
ii) I don't take as much care as I 
should
iii) I may not take quite as much care
iv) I take just as much care as ever
11) I feel restless as I have to be on the move:
i) Very much indeed
ii) Quite a lot
iii) Not very much
iv) Not at all
12) I look forward with enjoyment to things:
i) As much as I ever did
ii) Rather less than I used to
iii) Definitely less than I used to
iv) Hardly at all
13) I get sudden feelings o f panic:
i) Very often indeed
ii) Quite often
iii) Not very often
iv) Not at all
14) I can enjoy a good book or radio or TV  
program:
i) Often
ii) Sometimes
iii) Not often
iv) Very seldom
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The questions below ask you about your self-care activities over the last 7 days. If you 
were ill during that time, please think back the last 7 days that you were not ill. 
Answer the questions as honestly and accurately as you can. Tick the answer that 
applies to you.
P A R T  S IX
1. How often did you follow your recommended diet or general dietary guidelines over 
the last 7 days?
a. Always b. Usually c. Sometimes d.Rarely e. Never
2. What percentage of the time did you successfully limit your calories as 
recommended in healthy eating for weight control?
a. 0% b. 25% c. 50% d.75% e. 100%
3. During the past 7 days, what percentage of your meals included high fibre foods 
such as fresh fruits, fresh vegetables, whole grain breads, dried beans and peas, bran 
etc?
a. 0% b. 25% c. 50% d. 75% e. 100%
4. During the past 7 days, what percentage of your meals included high fat foods such 
as butter, ice cream, oil, nuts and seeds, mayonnaise, avocado, deep-fried food, salad 
dressing, bacon and other meat with fat or skin?
a. 0% b. 25% c. 50% d. 75% e. 100%
5. Dining the last 7 days, what percentage of your meals included sweets and deserts 
such as pie, cake, jelly, soft drinks (regular, not diet drinks), cookies, biscuits?
a. 0% b. 25% c. 50% d. 75% e.100%
6. On how many of the last 7 days did you participate in at least 20 minutes of 
physical exercise?
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
7. What percentage of the time did you participate in exercise sessions (other than 
what you do around the house or as part of your job)?
a. 0% b. 25% c. 50% d. 75% e. 100%
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L E T T E R  O F  E T H I C A L  A P P R O V A L  F O R  P H A S E  I I  O F  S T U D Y  1  
_ _ ____________________ ( C H A P T E R  4)
A P P E N D IX  V  ---------
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Postgraduate Medical Centre,
The Royal Surrey County Hospital, Egcrton Road 
G uildford, Surrey GU2 5XX  
Tel: 0X483 571122 ext 4382 Fax: 01483 303691
Chairman: Professor D L  Russell-Jones MD FRCP Co-ordinator: Mr J  K erslakc
Our Ref: EC3 5/99
20 September 1999
M s I Manaras
School o f  Human Sciences
University o f  Surrey
GUILDFORD
GU2 5XH
Dear M s Manaras
Self-blam e in chronic patients
I am pleased to be able to inform you that at its meeting on 14 September 1999 the Ethics 
Committee approved the above study subject to the following conditions:
. (i) The title o f  the study should be changed to “Feelings and thoughts related to medical
conditions”. This avoids any conflict between the information on the Patient 
Information Sheet and the study title.
(ii) N o deviations from or changes o f  the Protocol should be initiated without prior written 
approval o f the Committee.
(iii) The Committee should be provided with a copy o f  the report on the outcome o f  the 
study or a copy o f  any published document.
(iv) I f  the start of the project is delayed more than one year from the date o f  approval the 
Protocol should be resubmitted to the Committee for further review.
Yaurs sincerely
A P P E N D I X  V I  
O U T P U T  F O R  E X P L O R A T O R Y  F A C T O R  A N A L Y S E S  
R E P O R T E D  I N  C H A P T E R  F O U R
A. Scree plots from Principle Com ponents Analyses carried out on a) the general 
and b) the specific self-blam e items.
a) general self-blame
S c r e e  P lo t
Com ponent Number
b) specific self-blame
S c r e e  P lo t
C om ponent Number
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B. Pattern matrices for a) four and c) three factor solutions of general self-blame
a) Four factor solution
Component
1 2 3 4
could prevent condition .800
am responsible 
choices I made
.801
.841
people blame me .699
who I am .511 .440
I am to blame .799
god's punishment .779
not responsible .366 .447 -.440
should have cared for self .748
could'nt prevent condition 
should have behaved more .731
.962
-.360
moderately
had nothing to do with it .853
could happen to anybody 
was just bad luck -.485
.821
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization, 
a Rotation converged in 14 iterations.
b) Three factor solution
Component
1 2 3
could prevent condition .790
am responsible .787
choices I made .896
people blame me .691
who I am .676
I am to blame .833
god's punishment .452 .698
not responsible .587
should have cared for self .799
could'nt prevent condition .870
should have behaved more .619 -.534
moderately
had nothing to do with it .769
could happen to anybody .490
was just bad luck -.352
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. 
Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser Normalization, 
a Rotation converged in 5 iterations.
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C. Pattern matrices for three factor solution of specific self-blame items.
Pattern Matrix
Component
1 2 3
could prevent condition .776
am responsible .795
choices I made .867
people blame me .731 -.372
who I am .734
I am to blame .805
could happen to anybody .571
god's punishment -.743
not responsible .729 .540
should have cared for self .671
could'nt prevent condition .656
had nothing to do with it .868
should have behaved more moderately .560
was just bad luck .512
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Oblimin with Kaiser 
Normalization.
a Rotation converged in 11  iterations.
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A P P E N D I X  Y I I  
L E T T E R  O F  E T H I C A L  A P P R O V A L  F O R  S T U D Y  2 ( C H A P T E R  5)
--------------------- S O U T H  W E S T  S U R R E Y  L O C A L  R E S E A R C H  E T H I C S  C O M M I T T E D
Postgraduate M edical Centre,
The Royal Surrey County Hospital, Egerton Road 
Guildford, Surrey GU2 7XX  
Tel: 01483 571122 ext 4382 Fax: 01483 303691
Chairm an: Professor D L  Russell-Jones M D  FRCP Co-ordinator: M r J  Kerslake
Our Ref: EC49/00
17 May 2000
Ms I Manaras 
Department o f  Psychology 
University o f  Surrey 
GUILDFORD 
GU2 5XH
Dear Ms Manaras
Predictors o f sclf-blamc in chronic patients
Thank you for submitting the above study which was considered by the Ethics Committee at 
its meeting held on 16 May 2000.
The Committee made the following comments.
(i) With regard to the initial approach to patients, the Committee would welcome a 
more detailed explanation o f  the actual process involved. It would not be 
appropriate for you to be put in contact with patients without their prior consent. 
This means that the initial approach would need to come from the consultant or a 
member o f  his team working on his behalf. You may, therefore, need to revise 
your documentation to cover that point. For example, by revising the Patient 
Information Sheet for dispatch by the consultant or a member o f  his team or by 
producing, for his signature, a covering letter for the Patient Information Sheet. 
Patients responding positively could be asked to make contact with you direct.
(ii) The Patient Information Sheet states in the third paragraph that “No-one (except 
me) will be able to identify which questionnaire is the one you answered”. Why 
do you need the “except me “ qualification? I f  you do not need it, it should be 
removed.
I f  you would care to respond to the above points, together with any necessary revised 
documentation, I will ask the Committee Chairman to consider taking Chairman’s Action to 
approve the study if he considers your responses satisfactory.
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A P P E N D I X  V m  
Q U E S T I O N N A I R E  U S E D  I N  S T U D Y  2 ( C H A P T E R  5)
UniS
' L ^ c l v o l o g x j  i j ?
r  '  A
This study has been approved by the South West 
Surrey Local Research Ethics Committee a n d  
R S C H  Consultants 
Dr, E. L e a t h a m  a n d  Dr. T.P.Chua.
V __________________ ____________________
PATIENT  INFO RM A TIO N SHEET  
‘Feelings and thoughts related to medical conditions’
Dear Sir/Madam,
As a PhD student at the University of Surrey carrying out research in Health Psychology, 
I am investigating some aspects of people’s feelings about their medical condition in 
order to understand the thoughts and emotions involved in various diseases such as heart 
disease. Knowing more about patients’ experiences is critical for health care 
improvement. It allows health professionals to provide better physical and psychological 
care for their patients by identifying possible signs of distress early and handling them 
effectively. This is why I need your help.
If you agree to participate in this study, you will be asked to complete a questionnaire 
regarding your thoughts and feelings towards your medical condition. This will require 
about 30 minutes of your time. If at any time before, during or after the completion of 
the questionnaire you need to ask me any questions, please do so. I would very much like 
to hear any comments and thoughts you may have about the questionnaire.
Please try to answer all the questions included in the questionnaire. The information you 
provide will be treated in strict confidence. It will not be disclosed to third parties and 
no-one (except me) will be able to identify which questionnaire is the one you answered.
Participation is completely voluntary. Refusing to take part in the study will NOT result 
in any penalties for you, and you will continue to receive the same care offered by your 
doctor. Also, once you have agreed to participate in the study, you are free to withdraw 
at any time.
However, I hope you will agree with me that that it is important to understand better how 
patients feel about their illness and that you will be willing to take part in this study. 
Your help is very important for the success of this research.
♦If you decide not to take part in the study, please return the questionnaire to me. 
♦If you decide to participate, please go on to the next page
Thank you for your time 
The Researcher
Irene Manaras (MSc)
235
CO NSENT FORM  
‘Feelings and thoughts related to m edical conditions’
I have received and read a copy of this consent form and have had the 
opportunity to read and ask questions about the project. I realise that my participation 
is voluntary and that I may withdraw from the project at any time without penalty, and 
still receive the same care offered by my doctor. I am aware and agree that my GP will 
be notified about my participation in this study. By signing below, I agree to 
participate in the questionnaire suivey carried out by Miss Irene Manaras, from the 
University of Surrey, under the terms stated above.
Participant's name: 
GP’s name:
Signature:
Date:
Before vou start, please fill in the following:
a) Age:..................................
b) b) Sex: Male Q] Female Q
c) Diagnosis:........................................................................................
d) When were you first diagnosed?......................................................
e) What type of treatment have you had for your 
condition?
1 |None [^Medication
| | Angioplasty U] By-pass
| |Other
f) Is there an incidence of the same condition in your 
family? | | Yes | 1 No
g) Are you currently on any medication? | |Yes | | No
If yes, what for? ...................................................................
h) What is the highest qualification you obtained since high-school?
i) Occupation:
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Please, indicate the extent to which 
,' ' you believe your condition was I
caused by the following factors by
i /  !\ * .t .putting a tick (y) m the appropriate 1 
box. . - V , P ?•
   ......
BEFO RE the on set o f  m y condition:
1)
2)
I was overweight
CU Not at all □  Somewhat
CU A little CU Quite
□ a lot
I was following a calorie controlled diet.
CU Not at all LU Somewhat CHa lot
CU A little CD Quite
3) My meals included high fat foods such 
butter, ice cream, oil, nuts, mayonnaise, deep 
fried food, bacon and other meat with fat or 
skin.
CU Not at all CD Somewhat CHa  lot
CU A little CU Quite
4) My meals included high fibre foods such as 
fresh fruit, fresh vegetables, whole grain 
breads, beans, peas etc.
CU Not at all C J Somewhat CHa  lot
CU A little CU Quite
5) My meals included sweets and deserts such 
as pie, cake, cookies, biscuits etc.
I I Not at all CU Somewhat CDa  lot
CU A little CU Quite
6) I exercised regularly.
C ] Not at all CD Somewhat
CD A little CU Quite
□ A  lot
7) I led a physically active life.
H Not at all CU Somewhat CHa  lot
CD A little CU Quite
1) Smoking
□  N ot at all due to it CD M ostly due to  it 
CU A little due to it CU A lot due to  it
□  Som ew hat due to it
2) Unhealthy diet.
CU N ot at all due to it CU M ostly due to it 
CU A little due to it CU A lot due to  it 
CU Som ew hat due to  it
2) Being overweight.
CU N ot at all due to it O  M ostly due to it 
CU A little due to it CU A lot due to it 
CU Som ewhat due to it
4) Very little or no exercise.
CU N ot at all due to it CD M ostly due to it
□  A little due to it □  A lot due to  it
□  Som ewhat due to  it
5) Stressful lifestyle.
□  N ot at all due to  it CU M ostly due to it
□  A little due to  it □  A lot due to it 
CU Som ewhat due to  it
6) Heredity.
CU N ot at all due to it CU M ostly due to  it
□  A little due to  it □  A lot due to it 
CU Som ew hat due to it
7) Chance.
CU N o t a t a ll d u e  to  it CU M o s tly  d u e  to  it 
CD A  little  d u e  to  it CU A  lo t d u e  to  it 
CU S o m e w h a t d u e  to  it
8) I used to smoke cigarettes.
CU Not at all CU Somewhat
D  A little CU Quite
□ a lot
9) I led a stressful life.
I I Not at all CU Somewhat CHa lot
CU A little CU Quite
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PLEASE TURN OVER
; + ■ > '  1 ^ . : . g
Please, read the following statements 
and then tick (V) the box that best 
describes how you feel.S'"' i • • v v
1) I believe a bad diet is a habit I can avoid.
CU Strongly disagree CU Agree
CU Disagree CU Strongly agree
□  Neither agree nor disagree
2) I believe smoking is a habit I can avoid.
Cn Strongly disagree C] Agree
C] Disagree CD Strongly agree
Cn Neither agree nor disagree
3) I believe I can avoid a stressful lifestyle.
C] Strongly disagree CD Agree
Cn Disagree CD Strongly agree
□  Neither agree nor disagree
4) I believe that I can change my behaviour if I 
want to.
Cn Strongly disagree 
□  Disagree 
Cn Neither agree nor disagree
□  Agree 
Cn Strongly agree
I believe I can change my character 
(personality) if  I want to.
D Strongly disagree CD Agree
Cl Strongly agree
CD
C] Disagree 
Cn Neither agree nor disagree
6) I believe I can avoid hereditary conditions.
D  Strongly disagree CD Agree
□  Disagree □  Strongly agree
O  Neither agree nor disagree
7) I believe I can avoid conditions that happen 
by chance.
Ll Strongly disagree Cl Agree
□  Disagree □  Strongly agree
Cn Neither agree nor disagree
, .•.. ^
Please, assign one of the following 
■ nuinbers to each of the statements
'. below: ; ;
a » I’1 =  s t r o n g l y  d i s a g r e e
2 = disagree' ^
3 = neither a?• « '
4 = agree
r d i s a g r e c
5 =' strongly agree
1. My illness is a serious condition.
2. My illness has had major 
consequences on my life.
3. My illness has become easier 
to live with.
4. My illness has not had much 
effect on my life.
5. My illness has strongly affected 
the way others see me.
6. My illness has serious economic 
and financial consequences.
7. My illness has strongly affected 
the way I see m yself as a person.
SINCE the onset o f my condition:
1) I have been overw eight
CD Not at all CU Somewhat CHa  lot
CU A little [Zl Quite
2) I am followinga calorie controlled diet.
CU Not at all U  Somewhat CD A lot
CD A little CD Quite
PLEASE TURN OVER
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3) My meals include high fat foods such 
butter, ice cream, oil, nuts, mayonnaise, deep 
fried food, bacon and other meat with fat or 
skin.
EH Not at all EH Somewhat EHa  lot
EH A little EH Quite
4) My meals include high fibre foods such as 
fresh fruit, fresh vegetables, whole grain 
breads, beans, peas etc.
EH Not at all EH Somewhat EHa  lot
EH A little EH Quite
1) I feel tense and wound up.
□  m ost o f  the tim e □  from  tim e to tim e
EH a lot o f  the tim e □  not at all
2) I still enjoy the things I used to enjoy.
EH definitely as m uch EH only a  little
EH not quite so m uch EH hardly at all
5) My meals include sweets and deserts such as 
pie, cake, cookies, biscuits etc.
Ll Not at all L  Somewhat L a  lot
L  A little O  Quite
6) I have been exercising regularly.
EH Not at all EH Somewhat EHa  lot
EH A little EH Quite
7) I have been leading a physically active life.
EH Not at all EH Somewhat EHa  lot
EH A little EH Quite
8) I have been smoking cigarettes.
dl Not at all EH Somewhat EH A lot
EH A little EH Quite
9) I have been leading a very stressful life.
EH Not at all EH Somewhat EHa lot
EH A little EH Quite
3) I get a sort of frightened feeling as if  
something
awful is about to happen.
□  m ost o f  the tim e EH from  tim e to tim e
□  a lot o f  the tim e EH not at all
4) I have lost interest in my appearance.
EH definitely EH I m ay no t take as
m uch care
C ] I do n ’t take as EH I take as m uch care
m uch care as I should as ever.
5) I can laugh and see the funny side o f things.
EH As m uch as I alw ays could EH definitely not so
EH N ot quite as m uch now  m uch now
EH not at all
6) Worrying thoughts go through my mind.
EH a great deal o f  the tim e EH from  tim e to tim e
EH a lot o f  the tim e EH only occasionally
Please, read the following questions -| 
anc..• •HUT _________
—
   ^ ) the box that best
describes how you feel.
1) How much do you blame your condition on 
things you did (your behaviour)?
I I Not at all EH Somewhat Ocompletely
EH A little EH Very much
7) I feel cheerful.
EH not at all 
EH not often
□  som etim es
□  m ost o f  the tim e
8) I can sit at ease and feel relaxed.
II  definitely EH not often
I I usually EH not at all
9) I feel as if I am slowed down.
U nearly all the tim e EH som etim es
I I very often EH not at all
2) How much do you blame your condition on 
the kind o f person you are (your character)?
I I N ot at all EH Som ew hat EHCompletely
EH A little EH V ery m uch
PLEASE TURN OVER
239
10) I get a sort o f frightened feeling like
butterflies in my stomach.
EH not at all EH quite often
EH occasionally  EH very often
11) I feel restless as if I have to be on the move.
EH very m uch indeed EH not very m uch 
EH quite a lot EH not at all
12) I look forward with enjoyment to things.
EH as m uch as I ever did EH defin itely  less
than 1 used to 
EH rather less than I used to EH hardly at all
10) Ig e t sudden feelings ofpanic.
EH very often  indeed EH not very often 
EH quite often EH not at all
14) I can enjoy a good book or radio or TV  
program.
I] often EH not often
□  som etim es □  very seldom
T H E  E N D  ! ! !
T h a n k  yo u  v e r y  
m uch f o r  y o u r  
p a r t ic ip a t io n  in 
t h is  s t u d y .
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CLOSING STATEMENT
If you have any questions or comments regarding this project please feel free to ask me 
now or contact me at the following phone/address.
Please keep this page for future reference.
Irene Manaras 
Departments of Psychology 
University of Surrey 
Guildford 
Surrey GU2 5XH 
Tel. (01483) 876946 
Fax. (01483) 259553
Thank you very much for participating in this survey.
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A P P E N D I X  I X  
Q U E S T I O N N A I R E  U S E D  F O R  S T U D I E S  3  A N D  4 ( C H A P T E R S  6 -8 1
UniS
H F f a ^ c l v o l o g v j
This study is conducted at the Department of 
Psychology of the University of Surrey 
under the supervision of 
Prof S. E. Hampson and Dr E.Lyons
Dear Sir/Madam,
The best way to find out about public views and opinions regarding physical and mental health is 
to communicate with people themselves. Gathering such information is essential for making 
effective health policies. This is what this survey is about: it aims to collect information about 
people’s beliefs about various physical illnesses and misfortunes.
This survey is conducted by a research team at the University of Surrey. Below we tiy to answer 
some of the questions you may have about this survey.
How was I  selected? Our Department occasionally obtains representative samples of the British 
population from market research support companies for research purposes. The people in the 
sample are selected through a complex statistical process : the communities are divided into 
neighbourhoods, the neighbourhoods are selected at random, and for each neighbourhood 
households are selected at random. Please note that the lists of names we obtain are usually large 
enough to support a number of studies over a long period of time. Unfortunately, this means that 
we may miss changes in occupancy that happened since we first obtained the sample. If this is 
the case with you, please accept our apologies. You can still participate in this survey if you want 
to.
Who will have access to the information I  eive? Your responses will be treated in strict 
confidence. We are required by law to keep any information you give us confidential. All data 
gathered during this survey is kept safe and secure at all times. Since your name and address will 
not appear on the questionnaire you will return, your anonymity is guaranteed.
What is involved in participating? Simply fill in the questionnaire and return it in the addressed, 
Freepost, envelope provided. This means that you do not need to attach a stamp on the envelope. 
Please return the questionnaire by March 20, 2001.
Who can I  contact if  I have questions? For any queries regarding the survey please write to : 
Irene Manaras, Department of Psychology, University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey, GU2 7XH.
Thanking you in advance,
I r e n e  M a n a ra s
Irene Manaras
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S e c t i o n  A .
Take a few minutes to IM AGINE yourself in the following situation: You have  
recently been experiencing disturbing chest pains. After being admitted to the 
hospital and undergoing the appropriate exam inations, you are diagnosed as 
suffering from heart disease.
K eeping in mind that in all other respects your life is exactly the same as in reality, 
please read the following statements carefully and respond by ticking (V) the box 
that best describes how you feel.
NOT AT 
ALL
A
LITTLE
SOME­
WHAT
VERY
MUCH
How much would you blame 
yourself for your medical 
condition?
How much would you blame your 
condition on things you did (your 
behaviour) ?
How much would you blame your 
condition on the kind of person 
I vou are (vour character)?
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B a ck  to reality no w ..
S e c t i o n  B .
In order to better understand your answers in this questionnaire. I need some 
information about your lifestyle. There are no right or wrong answers, just your 
own view of things.
Please put a tick (V) in the box that best describes your answer:
NOT AT 
ALL
A LITTLE SOMEWHAT
t
QUITE A LOT ll
I am overweight.
I am following a calorie controlled diet.
My meals include high fat foods such as butter, 
ice cream, oil, nuts, mayonnaise, deep fried 
food, bacon and other meat with fat or skin.
My meals include high fibre foods such as 
I fresh fruit, fresh vegetables, whole grain 
breads, beans, peas etc.
My meals include sweets and deserts such as 
pie, cake, cookies, biscuits etc.
I exercise regularly.
1 I smoke cigarettes
I lead a stressful life
I lead a physically active life.
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S e c t i o n  C .
Please, read the following statements and then tick iVl the box that best describes 
how you feel about them.
STRONGLY
DISAGREE DISAGREE
NE1™ I R
AGREE 
NOR 
. ! ''Is M ’ !>_!_!___
AGREE
y||"?£L
STRONGLY
AGREE
I believe a bad diet is a habit I 
can avoid.
I believe smoking is a habit I 
can avoid.
I believe I can avoid a 
stressful lifestyle.
I believe that I can change my 
behaviour if  I want to.
I believe that I can change my 
character (personality) if  I 
want to.
T h a n k  you f o r  
g e tt in g  t h is  f a r !
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S e c t i o n  D .
The first column of the grid below (words in capital letters) contains a list of events 
or medical conditions. For each of these events or conditions, please answer the 
questions at the top of the grid and put your answer in the corresponding empty cell. 
Choose your answers from the following scale:
1 = not/none at all 2= a little 3=somewhat 4=quite a lot 5=very much -
If, for example you think that for flieart disease’ the answer to the question ‘How much is 
the sufferer responsible for causing this?’ is 3 = somewhat, you should write 3 in the first 
empty cell.
There should be no empty cells when you have finished.
How much is 
the sufferer 
responsible
for causing 
this?
How much 
control does the 
sufferer have over 
causing this?
How much is the 
sufferer to be 
blamed for causing 
this?
■ . ■■■,
How much could 
the sufferer have 
avoided this?
HEART DISEASE
HIGH BLOOD PRESSURE
ADULT DIABETES
LUNG CANCER
BR^ast c a n c e r
STROKE
AIDS " 'U&
RAPE
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
PARALYSIS DUE TO CAR
SPORT ACCIDENT
BURN injuries  a t  w o rk
A kitchen  a c c id en t
* When answering this question for the event o f  ‘rape’, think about ‘managing the aftermath Qf  the event*.
Have you experienced any o f  the conditions or events listed in the first column? 
N o □  Yes □  If yes, which one(s)? ...................................................
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S e c t i o n  E .
— i. — — — — «
Please fill in the following:
AGE* ...................YEARS SEX : MALE O ' FEMALE D
What is the highest qualification you have obtained either while at high school or since leaving
school? ....
Occupation: (previous occupation if  retired)
Do you suffer from any major medical conditions? No □  Yes □
If yes, please sp ecify :...........................................................................................................
Do any o f  your close family members suffer from any major medical conditions? 
No D  Yes Q  If yes, please sp ecify :.................................................................
T H E  E N D  ! ! !
T h a n k  yo u  v e r y  
m u ch  f o r  y o u r  
p a r t ic ip a t io n  in 
t h is  s t u d y .
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AGGLOMERATION TABLES FOR CLUSTER SOLUTIONS FOUND 
IN STUDY 4 (CHAPTER 8)
A PPE N D IX  X
Agglomeration schedule from Hierarchical Cluster Analysis of ‘blame’ 
ratings.
Stage
Cluster combined Sage Cluster First 
Add ears
Next
stage
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Coefficients Cluster 1 Cluster 2
1 4 6 71 0 0 3
2 2 7 96 0 0 4
3 4 9 101.5 1 0 6
4 2 3 110 2 0 7
5 13 14 136 0 0 9
6 4 11 140.67 3 0 8
7 1 2 148.33 0 4 11
8 4 10 168.5 6 0 12
9 12 13 209 0 5 11
10 5 8 211 0 0 13
11 1 12 229.08 7 9 12
12 1 4 274.09 11 8 13
13 1 5 491.08 12 10 0
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Agglomeration schedule from H ierarchical C luster Analysis of ‘responsibilies’
ratings.
Stage
Cluster combined Sage Cluster First 
Appears
Next
stage
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Coefficients Cluster 1 Cluster 2
1 4 6 62 0 0 3
2 9 11 112 0 0 3
3 4 9 116.5 1 2 11
4 3 7 133 0 0 7
5 1 2 144 0 0 7
6 13 14 191 0 0 10
7 1 3 211.5 5 4 9
8 5 8 262 0 0 12
9 1 12 267.75 7 0 10
10 1 13 311.1 9 6 11
11 1 4 383.143 10 3 12
12 1 5 626.82 11 8 13
13 1 10 777 12 0 0
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Agglomeration schedule from  H ierarchical Cluster Analysis of ‘control’
ratings.
Stage
Cluster com bined Sage Cluster First 
Ann ears
N ext
stage
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Coefficients Cluster 1 Cluster 2
1 4 6 68 0 8 8
2 1 2 97 0 7 7
3 9 10 118 0 5 5
4 3 7 119 0 7 7
5 9 11 134 3 8 8
6 13 14 144 0 11 11
7 1 3 165 2 10 10
8 4 9 169.5 1 12 12
9 5 8 190 0 13 13
10 1 12 228 7 11 11
11 1 13 272.4 10 12 12
12 1 4 334 11 13 13
13 1 5 511.42
..
12 0 0
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Agglomeration schedule from  H ierarchical Cluster Analysis of ‘avoidability’
ratings.
Stage
Cluster combined Sage Cluster First 
Appears
N ext
stage
Cluster 1 Cluster 2 Coefficients Cluster 1 C luster 2
1 4 6 114 0 0 6
2 1 2 149 0 0 11
3 9 11 162 0 0 6
4 3 7 162 0 0 8
5 5 14 194 0 0 9
6 4 9 203.5 1 3 8
7 10 13 227 0 0 10
8 3 4 244.75 4 6 12
9 5 8 256 5 0 13
10 10 12 281.5 7 0 11
11 1 10 292.5 2 10 12
12 1 3 374.13 11 8 13
13 1 5 585.88 12 9 0
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